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Concepts and strategies for diplomacy in the Lula government
2 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DICIEMBRE 2004
Celso Amorim
3
Concepts and strategies for diplomacy in the Lula government
4 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
5
n a passage from her outstanding study on The Human Condition, Hannah
Arendt remarks: “we can only appreciate the greatness of Homer’s Achilles if
we see him as the doer of great deeds and the speaker of great words.”
For Arendt, action is the moment men develop the capacity most peculiar
to them: the capacity to be free. Freedom, moreover, is bestowed not so much
by the sheer contingency of choosing between alternative courses of action
but rather by the capacity for initiative, the ability to transcend what is given
and start something new. Action, she reminds us, “creates the condition for
remembrance, that is, for history.”
Action and freedom lead us to an interpretation of power. From the
perspective Arendt gives us, power is not a resource men can wield indivudally.
It is a relational attribute (the capacity for joint action) so the condition enabling
it is plurality. The key to power is not, then, appropriating another’s will to
The Argentine
foreign policy in
the context of
regional integration
Rafael Bielsa
*
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Intenational Trade and Worship of the Republic of Argentina.
I
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
6 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
6
attain one’s own ends. Instead, it is the shaping of a common will through
communication that aims to achieve understanding. That is why politics is
essentially done with words.
What significance do these remarks have when it comes to considering
Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration? Their real
significance, to my mind, is that they allow us to map out the epistemological
terrain on which the country’s international operations unfold.
Let me explain myself. In a world in which uncertainty, risks and disparities
have been heightened, moving conscientiously within the existing limits of
self-determination requires the strengthening of co-operation, solidarity and
the establishment of common ground with countries with whom we share
interests, values and outlooks. In an interdependent global arena, that capacity
to act concertedly – to work together – with a positive-sum rationale is a
power resource that we must prove capable of exploiting to the full.
The foreign policy of democracy
It has become a common practice in certain academic circles and in
some journals to play up the ruptures more than the continuities when analysing
Argentina’s foreign policy from a historical perspective.
It could be said that the ruptures apparent in Argentine foreign policy
mirror those that vexed the life of the country itself while it was beset by the
chops and changes of dictatorial rule. Conversely, despite their differing shades
of colour and emphasis, one can perceive a common thread linking the country’s
constitutional governments. They have all favoured peace, Latin American
unity and respect for international law. This is an approach that the government
of President Néstor Kirchner is also endeavouring to advance.
Until 1976, for Argentina the 20th century was marked by the people’s
struggle to secure their political, social and economic rights. Their struggle
was channelled primarily through the country’s main political parties and its
popular governments. It was thwarted by the breaks with the constitutional
order provoked by coups d’état. It might seem unnecessary to recall the influence
that external circumstances and the prevailing ideological systems had on
domestic affairs. The dire effect the Cold War had on the countries in the
Southern Cone cannot be understated, though.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
7
The last military dictatorship in Argentina, the self-proclaimed “Process
of National Re-organisation” (1976-1983), took the premise of eliminating
the “ideological enemy” to extremes. “The Process has objectives but no time
limits” was a maxim that marked a break with the tacit understanding that had
prevailed until then: that coups d’état installed transitional governments to prepare
the way for fresh elections once the desired “order” had been imposed. This
time round, however, not only were citizens’ political rights abrogated but a
deliberate policy of physical extermination was introduced. The issue of human
rights in Argentina thus became notorious and painful.
While it set about eliminating the “internal enemy” the Military Junta
exaggerated the existence of potential external enemies. These were to be
found in the territorial as opposed to the ideological terrain. The regime
appealed to a demagogic, anachronous form of nationalism whipped up by
the hypothesis of military confrontation with countries on its borders. Just as
the dictatorship had stifled civil society’s means of expression, organisation
and participation, so it set about dismantling policies promoting co-operation
with neighbouring countries – a hallmark of previous constitutional
governments.
Based on a seriously misinformed assessment of the international
scenario and its alliances, the already debilitated military government of General
Galtieri opted for war in a move to recover its strength. The defeat in the
Malvinas widened the chink in the armour that the people had begun to prise
open on March 30
th
1982. After years of oppression and forced silence, they
marched on the historic Plaza de Mayo in central Buenos Aires to demand
their rights.
1
The reference above to the last military dictatorship makes it easier to
contextualise Argentine foreign policy in the democratic phase that followed
and to appreciate the progress made over the last two decades. Besides securing
full enjoyment of constitutional freedoms, Argentina has established a series
of principles relating to its foreign policy that we now steadfastly uphold with
great pride.
1
This was the first mass demonstration against the military dictatorship rallied by the CGT union confederation
and human rights organisations to demand “peace, bread and work.”
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
8 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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I refer particularly to the defence of democracy and unfaltering respect
for human rights as a core value; the commitment to peace, security,
disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
condemnation of drug trafficking and international terrorism with strict
observance of decisions issuing from the United Nations Security Council;
the priority ascribed to regional integration, especially Mercosur, which we
now look upon as a political and strategic project whose scope extends well
beyond that of a mere trading bloc.
In the framework of a foreign policy committed to peace and
multilateralism, I would like to express our desire to further our pacific
endeavours to recover the Malvinas Islands. This will entail actions intended
to preserve and reaffirm Argentina’s sovereign rights over the Islands and
their surrounding maritime waters at both bilateral and multilateral levels.
Recovering full exercise of sovereignty, with due respect for the islanders’
interests and the precepts of international law, is an unrenounceable objective
of the Argentine people and a policy of State that the present Government
continues to advance.
In this southern hemisphere context, we remain committed to protecting
the interests of the international community in Antarctica, ensuring that
activities undertaken there comply with the terms of the Antarctic Treaty and
the Madrid Protocol on preservation of the environment. In this respect, we
are taking action in the appropriate forums to see the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat
operating and its authorities instated at their headquarters in the Autonomous
City of Buenos Aires.
The Argentine Government intends to be true to the finest of our foreign
policy principles and traditions and at the same time to pay heed to the nation’s
interests. In my opinion, coherence of this sort is achieved by replicating the
values of democracy, equality, liberty, social justice and participation that we
espouse in the domestic sphere in the international arena.
Thus, the consolidation and modernisation of our democratic institutions
at home match the strengthening and updating of international organisations;
the principle of equality among citizens reflects the necessary parity among
sovereign States; the objective of achieving higher levels of welfare and social
equity is on a par with the right of access to international markets without
subsidies or unfair competition; social cohesion is one with regional integration;
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
9
social solidarity equates with Latin-American solidarity; defence of human
rights corresponds to rejection of all species of fundamentalism; preservation
of domestic peace and security is analogous to strong condemnation of
terrorism and the consolidation of a zone of peace in our region of the world.
Argentina’s stance toward the international order
We are at one of those points in time when mankind yearns for a new
direction once the reasons that had led it to take the previous tack have lost
their shine.
Little more than a decade ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a
post-Cold War period that tendered the promise of a more balanced, fair and
plural world order. Co-operation would upstage conflict among nations and
attention be focussed on socio-economic conundrums rather than on the
traditional issues of defence and security in international politics. The Utopia
of the so-called end of history – despite the heated controversies this notion
aroused at the time – somehow expressed the euphoria pervading the air in
the context that made such an idea tenable. The post-Cold War order,
nonetheless, failed to dispel wars and conflicts.
For their sheer magnitude and organisation, the September 11
th
attacks
in 2001 gave unwonted prominence to the threat of terrorism besides exposing
the vulnerability of the entire international community. The novel mode of
attack and, no doubt, the target chosen drove home that day the true extent
of the threat. As a result, security rebounded once more to the top of the
international political agenda.
The brutal attacks on the Israeli Embassy and AMIA
2
in 1992 and 1994,
respectively, had already given us Argentines tragic first-hand experience of
this threat. Workers, shopkeepers, children on their way to school – all slain
without warning and without explanation. Like Sören Kierkegaard, we could
say that a sense of oppression, a dread foreboding of an earthquake nestled in
our breast.
2
Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid Association.
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
10 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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In the current world scenario not only terrorism but also the violation
of human rights, massacres associated with armed conflict and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction oblige us to be vigilant and never indifferent
to such scourges. Our stance, however, must always be one of strict observance
of international law and the principles enshrined in the UN and OAS Charters.
We are fully aware that the actors and circumstances that gave birth to
the creation of multilateral organisations in the aftermath of World War II
have changed. Yet how can we be oblivious to the threat that overweening
projects and the oppression they imply pose to such fundamental human rights
as the right to life, the right to profess a religion and to express divergent
political ideas? The great lesson of the 20
th
century – hopefully the great lesson
learned – consists precisely in not forgetting and so not being doomed to
relive the tragedies that have shaken humankind.
Argentina views multilateralism and the prevalence of effective
international co-operation as the only path toward building a more pacific,
solidary and rational world. We believe that in the current international scenario
there is no substitute for the United Nations capable of providing legitimacy
for measures to counter threats to world peace and security. Only the concerted
action of the international community can provide adequate responses.
Multilateral action alone will prove effective and sustainable over time, precisely
because it endows the response with legitimacy and enjoys the backing of
international public opinion. The Security Council must perform its key role
of adopting efficacious measures in situations that could develop into a threat
to world peace and security. We thus firmly believe in the need to strengthen
the Security Council. We also feel that it should be reformed to ensure that
decision-making is more democratic, balanced, representative and transparent.
Our view, however, is based on the premise that a complex dialectics
associates problems in world order and security to the possibility of furthering
democracy, development and peace.
We have learnt from history that different forms of fundamentalism
and hegemonic ambitions tend to snuff out freedom, the most elemental
human rights and, above all, peace. Today peace is not simply the antithesis of
armed conflict, it is also a form of want for those beset by terror or wracked
by famine. This is why we insist on the need to strengthen the United Nations
Organization to ensure it is more effective, to demand more even-handed
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
11
treatment from the World Trade Organization and exact more democracy
from the International Monetary Fund.
Given this scenario, alongside the member states of Mercosur Argentina
is engaged in forging new relations and alliances. Their strategy is to create
political and economic networks and associations in order to make greater
room for negotiation. This can be enriched by viable new options for co-
operation and development, and gradually give birth to a multipolar system.
Expanding co-operation between Asia and Latin America, for instance, is a
concrete step in this direction.
For a variety of historical, geopolitical and cultural reasons, Argentina failed
to pay due heed to the extraordinary development achieved by many Asian countries
in the closing decades of the 20
th
century. Explaining this oversight is not easy. We
Argentines have had difficulty interpreting certain historical, economic and political
processes that, owing to geographical and cultural distances, have seemed alien to
us. Argentina has traditionally concentrated on its relations with countries in the
Western Hemisphere and in Western Europe, virtually dismissing two thirds of
the world, without making any relevant move to reprieve itself. We acknowledge
the major role Asia has come to play in international affairs, China, Japan and
India to the fore. Even so, we have thus far failed to capitalise on this knowledge
when it comes to formulating and carrying out our foreign policy.
In consonance with this outlook on the world, Argentina strives to tender
its own discrete but firm, prudent but professional stance in all the available
forums in the concert of nations.
This tack is visible, for instance, in the stand we made together with
Brazil and other G-10 countries at the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the
WTO held in Cancún in September 2003. There we argued for the
establishment of an open system of world trade free from the subsidies and
barriers that prevent developing countries from generating income in equitable
conditions. Despite the results achieved at the Cancún meeting, Argentina
continues to demand negotiation on this point. It also insists that the World
Trade Organization be a truly multilateral forum providing plural, democratic
participation for all its members. It may then deserve to be seen as the best
means of obtaining even-handed trade agreements.
The Special Conference on Hemispheric Security held in Mexico in
October 2003 likewise stressed the virtues of multilateral scenarios as
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
12 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
12
appropriate arenas for assessing the circumstances and problems that affect
and are of concern to the individual members. The notion of security was
extensively debated at the Conference, the strict traditional, defence-based
notion being replaced by a pluridimensional concept encompassing aspects
related to poverty, disease, obstacles to development and others directly
associated with human welfare and security.
We view human security as a component of human development, a
concept that has been on the international co-operation agenda for two decades
though not hitherto directly connected with “security” proper. Ambiguities
and debate aside, human development includes what we hold to be imperative:
the fight against hunger, illiteracy, exclusion, ignorance. These are the seedbeds
that sprout international terrorism or the emergence of sudden domestic mass
migrations with all their attendant cultural, social and economic side-effects.
We know only too well that unregulated negotiations in which one party
is much stronger than the other inevitably play into the hand of the stronger
and that law is the one mechanism that can restore the balance. So, when it
comes to trade, we likewise seek to enhance multilateralism, taking due account
of disparities and the need for flexibility.
Our position does not consist in demanding that more developed
countries zero their agricultural subsidies from one day to the next. We do,
however, require that the market provide the same signs of intent that we
demand of ourselves: signs of seeking to promote equitable growth.
Trade negotiations
The Argentine Foreign Office is working simultaneously on diverse trade
negotiation fronts.
On the one hand, we have undertaken bi-regional negotiations (e.g. between
Mercosur and both the European Union and the Andean Community of Nations)
besides those proceeding under the 4 + 1 format. On the other hand, we are
playing an active role in hemispheric negotiations aimed at establishing the Free
Trade Area of the Americas. Meanwhile, we continue to be an active, constructive
negotiator in the multilateral framework, at the WTO. This does not mean,
however, that we have neglected bilateral negotiations, by which we seek to gain
access to potentially important markets for Argentine exports.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
13
Before going into details about some of the specific actions we have been
developing, I should like to stress that we do not negotiate on these different levels
to demand principles or ideas that depend on other spheres. Much less do we
support the idea of extending warlike metaphors into the arena of international
trade. Our purpose is to protect and promote collective interests as best we can
and to obtain results that will enable us to generate wealth. This wealth must be
adequately distributed in such a way that Argentines currently suffering want and
destitution can confidently face the future. For this to occur, they must again be
able to perceive as a concrete daily reality the upward social mobility that was once
the boast of Argentina, a country forged by native criollos and immigrants.
From our standpoint, negotiating arenas are neither good nor bad. Rather,
it is good or bad negotiators that lend trade rounds the qualifications they
deserve. That is why we reject oppositions like “FTAA versus Mercosur.” It is
clear to us that the paradigm to be pursued is integration or “intranscendence,”
for our lot lies with that of Latin America and we must therefore do our
utmost to bolster our local trade bloc. This, though, hardly implies ceasing to
negotiate in the sphere of the Free Trade Area of the Americas or the WTO.
Regarding bi-regional negotiations, at the beginning of 2003 Mercosur and
the European Union exchanged their respective improved offers, including
agricultural produce and industrial goods. Argentina, together with its Mercosur
partners, is willing to make offers in services, investments and government purchases
– all sectors of interest to the EU.
3
Argentina’s interest in these negotiations is to
improve access to the EU market for Argentine products (especially those subject
to tariff and non-tariff barriers, the majority in the agriculture and agroindustrial
sectors) while consolidating its status as a supplier of top quality foodstuffs.
The imminent sealing of a free trade agreement between Mercosur and
the Andean Community of Nations is equally significant given the dimensions
of the new trade area it will comprise in South America.
As for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, certain clarifications need
to be made in view of the public debate raging at hemispheric level, which
Argentine society has followed with keen interest.
3
Argentina’s offer of services includes temporary entry of persons rendering services, and covers services in
the following sectors: telecommunications, professional services, construction, distribution, finance and tourism.
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
14 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
14
In constant liaison with its Mercosur partners, Argentina is participating
in negotiations on FTAA. Its primary objective is to effectively open up markets
in the region to our exports without leaving the country’s more sensitive
production sectors unprotected.
We hope to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas that will
contemplate our interests and help promote sustained growth for all the
countries in the region. Naturally, if we seek to obtain concrete benefits for
ourselves, we must be actively engaged in negotiations. It goes without saying
that negotiating does not mean renouncing the sovereign right to determine
public policies or assuming commitments that run counter to the State’s priority
interests. On the contrary, it means defending our interests and pressing home
our legitimate demands.
In this respect, I should especially like to underscore the fact that at a
meeting in Buenos Aires in October 2003 the Argentine and Brazilian presidents
concurred on the need to reach an equitable agreement that respects the disparate
interests of the parties. The negotiation process must likewise be sufficiently
flexible to develop according to the circumstances of each of the countries and
blocs involved. In the same month, Mercosur member states presented a joint
declaration at the 15
th
meeting of the FTAA Trade Negotiation Committee held
in Trinidad and Tobago, expressing their interest in constructive negotiation. It
was thus a welcome development that it proved possible to move forward on
this basis at the high level meeting held one month later in Miami.
Concerning the WTO, despite all the efforts made at the last ministerial
conference in Cancún, no substantial headway has been apparent in the
negotiation process.
The touchstone of the Doha Round, which is the framework for current
negotiations within the WTO, is development, and agriculture is the main
focus of these negotiations.
The reason why agriculture is the centrepiece of negotiations is the pivotal
role it plays for the welfare and growth prospects of developing countries,
particularly the poorest among them. Suffice it to state that 73% of the world’s
poor live in rural zones and depend on agriculture for their subsistence. Indeed,
while vast segments of the world’s population struggle to survive on less than
two dollars a day, developed countries spend almost one thousand million
dollars per day on subsidies for agriculture. It is worth adding that OECD
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
15
countries spent five times more money protecting their farmers than they did
on aid for development in 2002.
This brief summary of the chief moves our Foreign Ministry has made
to consolidate Argentina’s standing in the world and, more specifically, to place
Argentine products on international markets, is connected – as are events
unfolding in the geo-strategic sphere – with the drive to promote a new model
of international integration. It is one that will invigorate domestic and global
economies by upholding the principles of justice, equity, democracy,
participation, transparency, accountability and social inclusion.
Never before have transportation and communication been so swift and
cheap. Never before has such broad access been afforded to information and
has knowledge been spread so far by electronic media. There is now widespread
acceptance that international trade can be beneficial to both importers and
exporters. Conversely, though, never before have such sophisticated forms of
financial speculation and protectionist measures emerged. This is especially
true about agriculture. They deepen disparities, seriously impair fair trade and
deny large segments of the world’s population the benefits of material progress.
Now more than ever before, interaction in the external arena has a major
effect on a country’s domestic policies. Even so, this verifiable, undeniable
fact does not oblige us to adopt a passive attitude, leaving us at the mercy of
the winds. We do not subscribe to views that demonise globalisation. Instead,
we prefer to consider it a new stage in the evolution of capitalism, brimming
with opportunities for countries willing to venture into it without selling out
their people’s future and determined to diminish domestic disparities through
regional integration and multilateral co-operation.
On this footing, Argentina will continue to work alongside other G-10
countries to further deregulation and reform of global agricultural trade and
to ensure that this sector becomes fully compliant with WTO norms. The
majority of the members of G-10, which encompasses half the world’s
population, convened for a meeting in Buenos Aires in October 2003. On the
occasion, they reiterated their commitment to the Development Round
programme, calling on all members of WTO to resume negotiations in a
constructive spirit, setting aside confrontational stances and surmounting
ideological barriers. Their aim was to foster the convergence that will pave the
way toward achieving a result that is fair and acceptable to all parties.
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
16 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
16
Without in any way diminishing the importance Argentina ascribes to
G-10, our participation in trade negotiations is not confined to this group. We
are an equally active member of the Cairns Group, which strongly supports
more open markets and easier access for agricultural produce, the elimination
of export subsidies and a substantial curtailment of the domestic support
measures that distort international trade.
In this sense, the Argentine Foreign Ministry does not see G-10 and the
Cairns Group as mutually exclusive options. On the contrary, both defend
more equitable trading conditions for agricultural produce and thus have
mutually supportive objectives.
The Mercosur outlook
Mercosur, with the prospects it holds out for improvement and expansion,
is one of the cornerstones of the Argentine Republic’s foreign policy. Indeed,
we consider regional integration an irreversible process that requires and
demands immediate, serious action to ensure that it will prosper.
Despite the complex phase the integration process has traversed, the member
states have given ample proof of their political will to undertake the task of
advancing the bloc’s institutionalisation. It should particularly be noted that
strengthening Mercosur’s institutions, improving predictability in the observance
and application of the norms they draft, and perfecting the mechanisms for
settlement of trade disputes are all measures that not only serve to further integration
but also improve the bloc’s credibility in the eyes of other parties.
Among the chief recent accomplishments I would first like to highlight
approval of the Olivos Protocol on the settlement of disputes, which has led
to the creation of Mercosur’s first permanent tribunal. The Argentine Congress
ratified the Protocol just seven months after it was signed, with Paraguay,
Uruguay and Brazil following suit. This mechanism will provide greater legal
grounding for the exchange of goods and services besides raising confidence
in Mercosur among the business community and investors.
Another important improvement to the institutional structure of the
integration process is the creation of a technical consultancy sector in the
Mercosur Secretariat. This has been accomplished by transforming the
Administrative Secretariat into a Technical Secretariat. By instituting this new
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
17
sector comprising four consultants selected by exam and on the basis of
experience, Mercosur will henceforth be able to rely on a permanent technical
staff mandated to work in the interests of the bloc as a whole rather than for
the member countries taken individually.
Equally auspicious is the recent creation of the Commission of
Permanent Mercosur Representatives (CRPM) whose brief is to assist the
Common Market Council and the Pro-Tempore Chair, to submit proposals to
the Common Market Council and to promote economic, social and
parliamentary relations within Mercosur. In addition, CRPM has a Chairman
with a mandate from the Common Market Council to represent the bloc in its
relations with other countries, groups of countries, and international
organisations.
The incorporation of Mercosur regulations into the legislation of the
member states, on which necessarily depend the prevalence and operativeness
of norms applicable to all parties, is crucially important to ensure sound legal
grounding for the integration process. One of the main problems hampering
the progress of Mercosur at present is precisely delays in incorporating the
bloc’s regulations. Apart from creating differences in application this also sows
unease in the private sector with negative effects on trading and the prospects
for investment.
In view of this, we have proposed that the possibility of establishing a
procedure allowing for direct application of Mercosur regulations, without
the need for legislative ratification in the member states, be analysed. To my
mind, this is a challenge that is worth taking up in the short term to guarantee
firm legal grounding for the integration process. It would also ensure the
effectiveness and applicability of shared regulations and afford operators in
the four member states equitable treatment regarding their rights and
obligations in the broader common market.
Finally, we should strive to make good the commitment assumed by the
member states to assess the feasibility of establishing a Mercosur Parliament.
It would serve as a democratic political body that would commit our societies
more firmly to the process of regional integration. Just as in the domestic
sphere parliaments act as a sounding board for social concerns, the existence
of an assembly or Parliament would lend greater legitimacy and transparency
to decisions adopted to develop and advance integration, thus enhancing its
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
18 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
18
political dimension. In my opinion, the creation of a Mercosur Parliament
entrusted with the political and social representation of the member states
would clearly betoken the bloc’s consolidation and maturity.
All these improvements will serve to perfect Mercosur’s institutional
structure, facilitating co-ordination of technical activities and producing slicker
decision-making. It is not a matter of producing more red tape but of creating
agile, efficient, professional administrative institutions.
To match the historic moment it is facing, Mercosur must prove it can
rise to the challenge of enhancing the international negotiating capacity of
each of its members, allowing for more autonomous decision-making. Current
circumstances inform us that the development we desire for our countries –
understood as a combination of economic growth and social justice – basically
depends on such autonomy in decision-making while also demanding a strategic
valorisation of regional integration.
Being able to speak with one voice in international forums is a source of
power that will enable us to boost our individual capacities for negotiation
and action. Meanwhile, however, it is essential that within the bloc the political
space of Mercosur be representative of its citizens. It must become the locus
for catalysing our values and traditions so as to forge a common future. I
believe it is vital to drive this point home as the time comes to build the
institutions that will serve these objectives: from supranational tribunals for
settlement of disputes to agencies for promoting educational exchange.
What we seek is not merely a trade bloc. We aspire to forge a unified
economic, political and cultural space which, by generating a renewed sense
of belonging, will empower us to grow as modern, integrated societies. The
socio-cultural value of Mercosur will become apparent when its effects can be
felt in the day-to-day lives of the bloc’s citizens. We do not, of course, intend
to become one people but to attain a sense of shared citizenship.
The integration process is at a pass that we should take advantage of. We
have a historic opportunity, which is different from a historic challenge. A
historic challenge depends solely on an individual who wishes to challenge. A
historic opportunity, on the other hand, is an alignment of stars.
Like minds, similar political approaches among governments that think
along the same lines and are coincidentally in the early days of their mandates,
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
19
in conjunction paint an unsurpassable scenario. Perhaps this illusion of being
in our prime will allow us to recoup the drive needed to make the dream
come true.
The strategic association with Brazil
Although a detailed account of the broad-ranging bilateral relations the
Argentine Republic maintains extends beyond the purpose of this article, brief
mention should at least be made of the excellent phase in our relations with
neighbouring Brazil.
President Lula da Silva’s State visit to Buenos Aires in October 2003 was
an apt token of the extent to which the close association between the two
countries has advanced and deepened. Given its nature and scope, it can only
be described as strategic and expressive of true fellowship.
During the said visit, the two presidents signed a Joint Declaration, the
terms of which merit repetition here. They agreed to underscore the degree
of convergence, understanding and predictability attained in a spirit of mutual
trust. The agreements sealed included such relevant issues as culture, education
and physical integration besides those relating to the circulation of people,
which will facilitate the daily lives of Argentine and Brazilian citizens moving
between the two countries for study, trade and tourism. It will, of course,
particularly benefit residents of the frontier zone.
We have likewise drawn up important agreements associated with the
pacific use of nuclear energy, especially in medicine. I would also like to
emphasise our countries’ innovative decision to collaborate and co-operate on
technical tasks concerning the non-permanent seats our two nations aspire to
occupy on the United Nations Security Council in the 2004-2006 period.
All these agreements signal the maturity of a strategic association that
will grow without tensions because it is based on appreciation of our similarities
and respect for our differences. They are grounded in our shared determination
to work together to bring about a world order that enhances justice, encourages
development, combats injustice and protects the environment. The
consolidation of this world order will allow all the nations of the world to
enjoy the benefits of material progress and peace.
The Argentine foreign policy in the context of regional integration
20 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
20
Equally noteworthy in the sphere of the South American subcontinent
is the importance Argentina and Brazil ascribe to upholding the quality of
democracy, respect for human rights, combating poverty and injustice, and
forging a co-operative approach to regional security.
For these reasons, I consider the signing of the Buenos Aires Consensus
of singular importance. By the Consensus, our two countries are committed
to co-operating actively to promote sustained economic development and fair
distribution of the benefits thereof. This is a joint position that we propose to
share with all Latin American nations.
By way of conclusion
If a country’s foreign policy fails to serve to increase prospects for
collective fulfilment of domestic society, the deeds it undertakes will never be
great nor will it be a suitable vehicle for transmitting great words.
As far as I am concerned, accomplishing this purpose – like our people’s
victory in the struggle for democracy – implies attaining levels of welfare and
social justice that will allow all Argentines to exercise their rights as citizens to
the full.
The Latinobarometer
4
recently registered Argentines’ adherence to
democracy as a positive sign. At the same time, nevertheless, it also recorded
low levels of confidence in its results, referring to the widespread perception
among Argentina’s citizens that democracy fails both to solve their problems
and to translate into improvement in living standards. In other words, a high
appreciation of personal freedoms curiously squares with a low level of respect
for the population’s economic and social rights.
This is a worrying state of affairs and in December 2001 Argentines
were given a dramatic taste of its effects, which have since spread to other
parts of Latin America.
Integrating in order solve these problems is an imperious domestic necessity
but I want to be sure to make myself crystal clear in these closing remarks.
4
Latinobarometer, a Latin American counterpart of Eurobarometer, canvases public opinion about politics,
the economy and regional integration.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Rafael Bielsa
21
Eradicating poverty by simultaneously enhancing social inclusion and
regional integration and achieving decent standards of living for our citizens
and populations necessarily requires a strong political commitment. Political
will alone, though, will not suffice to sustain an inclusive democracy. This
requires States that are efficient at gathering information, intelligent in
processing it, diligent in harnessing interests and generating consensus, effective
in providing a response, and transparent to propitiate social control.
Integration is no panacea that will allow us to solve all our problems at
the touch of a magic wand. Rather, it is a dynamics of political culture that
keeps a delicate yet auspicious, hope-giving balance. It is a balance between
the strengthening of nation States and the building of supranational institutions,
between the defence of national economic and strategic interests and their
empowerment within the framework of regional integration.
Integration means at once learning, exchanging and making good
agreements. Moreover, to return to the initial Arendt quotation, it is the path
that will lead us to do great deeds and speak great words.
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
22 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
22
urrently, bolivian foreign policy, like that of other countries in the
world, converges to an international scenery in permanent reconfiguration.
The particularities of the current international system pose unquestionable
challenge for the whole international community, particularly to developing,
vulnerable, and poor countries like Bolivia. Accelerated and irreversible
processes, such as globalization and open regionalism, present themselves as
two central vectors in structuring the new international order, designing the
general space in which foreign policies should develop their actions, trying to
find certain opportunities and spaces to obtain a better international insertion
and fulfill their objectives. Phenomena such as frailty of the international
financial system, accelerated technological changes, crisis in governability,
weakening of multilateralism and international law, transnational crime,
terrorism, narcotrafficking, and corruption, among others form a group of
problems to which countries like Bolivia have to respond and face through its
foreign policy.
The transcendental changes generated in the last decade, such as
accelerated technological development in telecommunications and informatics,
The Bolivia’s
new foreign
policy
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
*
C
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bolivia
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
23
transformed our societies and the form in which the countries of the
international community interact and relate with each other. The pace of
“international time”, which is nothing else but the speed in which the negative
and positive effects of events produced in other latitudes are received through
the different technological media, is greater and greater. This demands foreign
policies to have a great sense of opportunity and effectiveness.
The international scenario is also being configured based on the actions
of the countries, the different cultures, religions, non-government
organizations, multilateral organisms – particularly the United Nations, the
Organization of American States, the World Trade Organization, the
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank – and, more and more by the
role played by civil society. These actors juxtapose their points of view and
interests, and prioritize themes of the international agenda, focusing their
attention to foreign policies. In this context, for countries like Bolivia, it is
important and a priority to respond to global initiatives related to the
consolidation of democracy, preservation of human rights, consolidation of
integration processes, international cooperation, strengthening of the UN and
other international organisms, struggle against poverty and social exclusion,
search of a greater global wellbeing, protection of the environment, and
peaceful resolution of disputes.
As an effect of this divergence of interests and cosmovision of the
world, international order happens in two scenarios: a) the imposition of a
new unilateral and hegemonic order; and b) the establishment of a multipolar
order, where multilateral organisms and other actors would be converted into
moderators of interstate tensions. These two tendencies are visualized and
are present in this moment of reconfiguration of the international system. At
any rate, the consolidation of a new international order, be it unipolar,
multipolar, or both at the same time, will depend, to a large extent, in the
states’ recognition that world problems may find better solution when there is
cooperation instead of imposition or antagonism.
In this regard, the appearance of regionalism and the consolidation of
processes of integration, such as the European Union, represent another option
that is coming about with great strength in the current world scenario. There
is no doubt that regionalism and the creation of economic and political blocks
in distinct regions of the world were notably incremented in the last two
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
24 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
24
decades, with three fundamental actors emerging of this process: the European
Union, North America, and Pacific Asia.
In this context, South America also started to structure and consider
itself as a block. Integration is a process being developed in the region for
several decades, and was stimulated by the Ftaa negotiations in the last years.
South American integration was developed with high and low moments, but it
always advanced toward its consolidation. Since the creation of the Andean
Group, now the Andean Community of Nations (ACN), until the creation of
the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the countries in South America
actively participated in the different initiatives of regional integration. In this
context, for developing countries like Bolivia, the opportunities of real
development may be incremented by broadening their markets, incrementing
its negotiating capacity, deepening the processes of interdependence ant
creating new economic and commercial opportunities. This is why part of the
efforts and actions carried out by bolivian foreign policy are geared toward
the consolidation of a new political and economic block of South America,
which is visualized as a significant space to face hemispheric integration, bi-
regional dialogue, and the globalization process.
General scope of bolivian foreign policy
In the last two decades, the world’s perception of Bolivia was modified.
bolivian democracy has continuously existed for 21 years, and has proven to
be growingly participatory, plural and inclusive. The country developed a social
market economy and has tried to emphasize the most vulnerable and disfavored
sectors constitutionally defining itself as multiethnic and multicultural.
Bolivia is a country of multiple areas of interest, starting point of the two
South American river basins, a country of contacts, the energetic hub of the
continent and the center of inter oceanic corridors. Bolivian foreign policy tries
to translate these realities into initiatives and concrete actions. In this framework,
energy integration, in addition to physical and commercial integration are three
key topics of Bolivia’s international agenda. Through them the country is turning
the geopolitical postulate of “country of contacts and not of antagonisms,” put
forth by bolivian diplomatic visionaries in last century’s decade of 30s into reality.
From this perspective, Bolivia tries to play a central role in the process of forging
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
25
a South American space, solidifying its aspiration of articulation, union, and
cohesion of the countries that surround it.
Since the re-establishment of democratic governments, the country’s
foreign policy shows characteristics of continuity. The variations have always
been of style, emphasis, and opportunities. Bolivian foreign policy has tried to
be versatile, dynamic and creative, adapting to the great internal and external
changes that occurred in the last years, making clear an active capacity of
proposal and initiative. Foreign policy is an increasingly complex phenomenon.
There are more and more countries in the world, the number of international
organisms continues to augment, the number of themes in the agenda increases
daily, and the actors are multiple and diverse. The information, as it turned
accessible, also became difficult to manage.
Currently, it is possible to visualize the form in which bolivian domestic
policy is conditioned by external action of the country or vice-versa. The
struggle against narcotrafficking, the maritime question, free trade, or the export
of natural gas, became “inter/domestic” themes. They have an internal
component and an important international component to which, frequently,
not adequate attention is given. This new reality directs and conditions the
action of bolivian diplomacy, but also forces it to maintain a more fluid dialogue
and to consult on the theme of international agenda with the civil society.
Origins of bolivian crisis
Bolivia is going through difficult moments for various reasons. The
fundamental difficulty has to do with an economic situation that has been
dragging for many years. The international crisis, but mainly the Brazilian
crisis and the dramatic situation that Argentina went through, exert its pressure
over a highly dependent and very sensitive to neighboring countries’ economy,
such as Bolivia’s. In the internal plan, pension reform generated a significant
fiscal deficit. In addition to this, the process of institutionalization of customs
marked the lowest level of contraband, eliminating one instrument of liquidity
in bolivian economy. Finally, a fundamental factor to explain the crisis was the
process of eradication of surplus coca, which meant a very important reduction
of irregular revenue that fed bolivian economy. All these factors combined in
a period of a few years, exert enormous pressure of on the economy, generating
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
26 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
26
five continuous years of recession, increased unemployment and significant
growth of fiscal deficit.
Bolivia is a country with strong structural heterogeneity and significant
socio-cultural, ethnic, and regional diversity. The country is now predominantly
urban, the social indicators in education, health, and basic sanitation have
improved, but the indicators of income, jobs and productivity are stagnant.
The growth rate of the country in the last years was insufficient to reduce
poverty in absolute and relative terms. The social crisis in which the country
debates, explains iniquity and social exclusion as a result of these factors and
the high concentration of income. Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in
Latin America, and is the poorest in South America. In turn, the areas that
were the epicenter of the October crisis, that is, the so-called High and West,
are among the most depressed regions in Bolivia. Consequently, it is one of
the poorest zones in South America. In the last years, the poor felt and lived
a process of political, economical, and social deterioration. In the October
crisis, it is very illustrative to remember that the majority of the 56 victims
were young, that is, they belonged to an age group that is poor, has no
expectations, no jobs, and no opportunities.
The question of poverty is a challenge for one or two generations, and
not just a challenge for the current government. Bolivia is a HIPC (Debt
Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) country and one of the few in
the international community that internalized the objectives of the development
for the millennium as goals of its social agenda. Regrettably, with its current
growth rates, Bolivia will not be able to reduce poverty by half by year 2015
and will have to wait until 2042 to reach this objective. On the other hand, it is
not always recognized in the country that structural reforms were able
accomplish a series of advances in the economic and social front. It is obvious,
that, although the population of the country has improved its living conditions,
the efforts are still insufficient. For example, child mortality in Bolivia was
reduced by a half, illiteracy among adults increased, life expectance also
increased, and the gross domestic product doubled. Of course, despite all
this, Bolivia still remains at the rear of the rest of the region.
The bolivian political crisis is related to the lack of trust in the political
system, the crisis in representation and legitimacy of the parties, the lack of
credibility of institutions, the government’s difficulties to improve social and
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
27
economic conditions of the population, the lack of a democratic culture in
the country, and the intolerable levels of corruption. Other themes that
increasingly worry the citizens are the increase in violence, crime and insecurity
of the people. All these factors weaken democracy and make vulnerable the
populist and authoritarian discourse that, based on easy and demagogic
promises, offer changes that never come.
The social, political and economic crisis that Bolivia is going through
affects its credibility and external image. The rate of uncertainty, legal insecurity
and the country risk has grown, decreasing the interest in investing in Bolivia,
at a moment in which capturing public and private resources for economic
reactivation is indispensable, and in which internal and foreign debt continue
to grow. This is one of the reasons why the bolivian government requests
backing and support of the international community. After the October crisis,
uncertainty prevails. Besides, the fiscal debt, currently around 8% is unbearable.
Bolivians should pay more taxes and the government has to reduce the current
expense. The country cannot continue to live on external savings.
Bolivian government has welcomed demonstrations of support received
from the international community and has committed to have a transparent
government, guarantee democratic institutionalism, boost economic development
and take corruption head on. The maintenance of a democratic and constitutional
government in Bolivia will be strengthened with constructive dialogue, active
participation of its citizens, and support of friendly government and multilateral
institutions. In tune with these efforts, we are working to bring the country
together, to strengthen democratic institutions in defense of the empire of law
and in the need to solve social conflicts by constitutional means.
Bolivian new foreign policy
Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert was inaugurated as president and took his vows
for president of the Republic on October 17, 2003. During his speech, Carlos
Mesa outlined the central points of his tenure. The new president will call a
binding referendum to decide on gas export. He also promised to make a fresh
start for Bolivia through a Constituent Assembly and change the Hydrocarbon
Law. President Mesa stressed the need to preserve the unity of the nation, which
is putting its destiny and its future on the line, leaving the door open for Congress
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
28 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
28
to recall his term. Finally, the President emphasized that the fight against
corruption will be strengthened, and that human rights and life will be respected.
Later, Carlos Mesa asked that the bolivian people grant him a space “time
to work” and asked the social sectors to relax their pressure measures. He
recognizes that “the economic situation of the country is delicate,” but expressed
confidence in the support of the international community and of the cooperating
agencies. “The State cannot give an efficient and effective response to all the
legitimate demands of the people,” he stressed. Later, President Mesa stated
that to again “bet on economic orthodoxy is insane” and admitted that, in case
his government fails, Bolivia runs the risk of a “total failure.”
In the first three weeks of President Mesa’s government, the three central
themes of Bolivia’s foreign agenda were to seek recognition from the
international community, to prevent the international image of the country to
continue to deteriorate, and to request immediate assistance and cooperation.
The international community, in general, manifested its support to President
Carlos Mesa and to the process of constitutional change that Bolivia went
through. For example, days after his inauguration, United States President
George Bush, discussed with President Carlos Mesa the need to continue the
struggle against cultivation and traffic of drugs, the need for a referendum to
decide about the export of natural gas to the US and to Mexico, and reiterated
his country’s support to Bolivia’s constitutional process and to its democratic
institutions.
The 13
th
Ibero-American Summit, in Santa Cruz de La Sierra, was a unique
opportunity for Bolivia to recover – to a certain extent – its international image.
The 13
th
Ibero-American Summit coincided with the period following the October
crisis. Consequently, it was a propitious occasion for the bolivian government to
request aid from the Ibero-American Community and from international organisms.
The summit was also propitious for the bolivian government to obtain a serious
of bilateral support. In this regard, the 21 Ibero-American countries agreed on an
emergency plan for Bolivia, which will be completed in 45 days, maximum. The
agreement, entitled “Ibero-American emergency actions for Bolivia,” made
reference to the different bilateral or multilateral actions. The Chiefs of State and
of Government of Ibero-America, furthermore, requested the support and
cooperation of the international and regional organisms for the development and
completion of these emergency actions.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
29
The central themes of the 13
th
Ibero-American Summit were the Cardoso
Report, social inclusion as a development engine and the economic and political
support for Bolivia’s government. The chiefs of states present at the 13
th
Ibero-
American Summit signed the Declaration of Santa Cruz de La Sierra, containing
45 points, an annex about programs of cooperation, and 14 special notices. A few
of the main recommendations are: defeat poverty, reform the system of the UN
Security Council, and recognize that subsidies distort commerce. The Declaration
of Santa Cruz still recognizes that corruption is one of the greatest threats to
democratic governance. The presidents ratified their will to solve the problem of
foreign debt and manifested against extraterritorial laws and measures contrary to
international law. In this regard, the government of the United States was urged
to eliminate the Helms-Burton Act, and the importance of establishing the
International Criminal Court was highlighted. The presentation of the Cardoso
Report allowed the creation of the Ibero-American General Secretariat, but it was
decided that its statute would be approved in the 14
th
Summit to be held in Costa
Rica in 2004. The Secretary General and the headquarters of the organism will be
chosen at that meeting. The permanent secretariat will be responsible for
accompanying programs created by the presidents, and will be a forum of
permanent discussion and representation for Ibero-America.
The maritime theme was not absent from the 13
th
Ibero-American
Summit. The Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, manifest his
willingness to offer his good offices so that Bolivia and Chile arrive at an
understanding about the bolivian demand to have an exit to the Pacific Ocean.
Also, President Mesa discussed the theme in several bilateral meetings, and
Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez, declared that “Bolivia has already had a
sea, and I dream that, some day, I will bathe in the sea of a bolivian beach.”
The meeting between Ricardo Lagos and Carlos Mesa was useful to reorient
the bilateral agenda for a post-October reality. Both presidents agreed with
the need to “un-gas” bilateral relations, delay the dialogue about the project to
export bolivian gas, and deepen the agreement of economic complementation.
The first trips of the president of the republic were to Panama, Peru
and Brazil. After participating in the celebrations of 100 years of the foundation
of Panama, the bolivian president visited his peer in Peru, Alejandro Toledo,
with whom he made a commitment to “un-gas” bilateral relations and advance
in other themes of the binational agenda. The bolivian government wishes to
deepen integration and advance toward a common market. President Carlos
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
30 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
30
Mesa told President Toledo that there will be no conversations about gas until
the bolivians have their say in a referendum.
On the other hand, the relation between Bolivia and Brazil was defined
as a strategic alliance. For the country, Brazil’s support is fundamental to
reactivate its economy, guarantee its political stability, and strengthen its national
unity. Brazil decided to forgive almost all of Bolivia’s public debt and vowed
to invest 600 million dollars in highway infrastructure. Finally, it is pertinent to
highlight that in the last weeks, Brazil decided to increment its demand of
bolivian gas and reach 20 million cubic meters a day. (MMmcd).
In another area, on December 16, 2003, the President of the Republic,
Carlos Mesa, was present at the biannual meeting of Mercosur in Uruguay,
where the establishment of a free trade zone between CAN and Mercosur,
was agreed upon; and Peru was the last country to become a member of this
block. On the other hand, the president prepares his agenda to participate in
the Extraordinary Summit of the Americas, to be held in Mexico between
January 12 and 13, 2004. Congress has given its authorization for both
presidential trips.
In the institutional scope, many significant advances were produced
during the current government. For the first time, 56% of the persons in the
foreign service were career diplomats, consolidating, more and more, the
process of institutionalization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Service
(Affairs of the Vatican). Besides, the administration of President Carlos Mesa
vowed to present the diplomatic career plan next year.
Continuity and change in foreign policy
Among Bolivia’s main themes in the international agenda, a few can be
highlighted:
Good neighborhood policy
One of the main objectives of bolivian foreign policy is to promote
cooperation, integration, and agreements with the neighboring countries. One
of the great aspirations of the country is to become the main articulator in
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
31
South America. The objective of the good neighborhood policy is to improve
or maintain relations with the 5 neighboring countries in the commercial plan,
by signing and implementing the economic integration agreements and in
issues of physical, energetic, and telecommunications integration by planning
and building roads, bridges, underground passages, and communication
networks. In the same manner, we wish to establish programs of cooperation
in the borders, customs, and of migration with all the countries in the region.
During the last years, the development of themes in the bilateral agenda
with Argentina was affected by the events that occurred in both countries. At
the bilateral level, the central points are migration, trade, transportation and
energy. With Brazil, among the relevant themes of the bilateral agenda, the
projects of physical and energy integration are underscored. Two central points
in the Bolivia/Chile relations in the past months were gas export to the North
American market and the negotiation to turn the TEC (Treaty of Economic
Cooperation ) 22 into a Free Trade Agreement. With Paraguay, the most important
themes in the bilateral agenda are trade, physical, and energetic integration. In
the agenda with Peru, in turn, we highlight energy, the revision of the accords
with the WLO, the migration questions and the water resources of Lake Titicaca.
Maritime reintegraton
Maritime integration is a fundamental and indisputable objective of
Bolivia’s foreign policy. In the last years, the negotiations about this theme
were directed to seek a solution that allows not only to augment bolivian
presence in the Pacific Ocean, but to also recover its maritime quality. In both
cases, Carlos Mesa’s administration is party to the latter and has emphasized
the notion of “maritime reintegration” with greater strength than “maritime
quality.” The way to the sea that is to be determined for the country should
have the following characteristics: be free, useful, and sovereign. On the other
hand, it is good to remember that in repeated opportunities, the bolivian
government has manifested that the problem with Chile has bilateral, trilateral,
and multilateral dimensions. In the same way, the bolivian government thanked
the manifestations in favor of the century-old bolivian maritime cause and
feels rewarded with the long tradition of support to this issue, the multilateral
support of the OAS, and the offering of the good offices of Secretary-General
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
32 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
32
of the UN, Kofi Annan, facts that again caused the maritime issue as a regional
and multilateral issue to surface.
The government of Chile considers that Bolivia’s inland quality is a
strictly bilateral issue. From the Chilean perspective, the signature of the
Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1904 definitively sealed any bolivian aspiration
to a useful and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The government of
the neighbor country has sustained an inflexible policy in this regard. On
the other hand, the problem was complicated right after the “no” in 1929,
when Peru and Chile, by the signature of a treaty and a secret protocol
established that they could not give up the territory in question, reasons of
the cited accords, to a third country, thus putting an obstacle to the solution
of the maritime problem in the last decades. This situation triggered the
search for a solution for the conflict, once Chile has the lock, Peru has the
key, and, from this perspective, the solution to the problem necessarily goes
through a trilateral consensus.
For Bolivia, maritime reintegration is not only a foreign policy goal. In
addition to being an economic need or a social demand, it is a psychological
effect that is engraved in the collective national memory as a limit and condition
for a complete human development. Since 1904 Bolivia has tried, insistently, to
make Chile accept a negotiation that would allow for one of its most important
objectives in foreign policy. One of these efforts was to obtain resolution 426
of the OAS in 1979, which establishes that the maritime question is an issue of
hemispheric interest. Since then, every year Bolivia comes before the OAS, one
of the most appropriate multilateral spaces to seek a solution for the problem,
to remind the Inter-American community of the existence of a pending problem
that prevents integration, development, and peace in the region.
Diplomacy and natural gas
Bolivia is the second to Venezuela with the greatest reserve of natural
gas in South America. In the last years, the country went from 5 trillion
cubic feet (TCF) to 54 TCF. Gas is an inexpensive and clean product that
reinforces conservation of the environment, and one of the best substitutes
for traditional fuels. As a consequence, this resource will be able to
potentialize Bolivia’s strategic importance in the region and in the western
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
33
hemisphere. For its geographic location, away from the most important
international contemporary conflicts, it is possible for Bolivia to become
a trustworthy and safe source of natural gas for the west coast of the
United States.
In the next years, Bolivia will have to face three main challenges: firstly,
consolidate its markets; secondly, diversify its export markets; and, thirdly,
give more added value to its natural gas exports. In the area of international
economic relations, Bolivia could use its reserves of natural and liquid gas to
diversify its agenda with countries in North America, strengthen its relations
with the countries in the Southern Cone and be more present in the Pacific.
However, the reserves of natural gas do not have any economic value if they
are not monetized and remain underground. It is for this reason that opening
markets for this hydrocarbonate will be central to bolivian foreign policy and
diplomacy in the next decades. The reserves of natural and liquid gas discovered
in Bolivia allow us to think that the country will become the center for providing
natural gas in the region and an emerging regional energy power.
The sector of hydrocarbonates was one that contributed with greater
strength to bolivian economic growth in the last years. The current government
decided to call a referendum that will define export of the gas, a modification
to the law of hydrocarbonates, and develop an information campaign about
the export project. The campaign will have data about the industrialization
process of the gas and basic technical details about energy. The referendum
will also be done, and will serve to arrive at a consensus in the different regions
and sectors to execute this project.
Integration policy
The policy of integration is much more than an instrument of commercial
policy and promotion of exports. It is directly linked to the purpose of the
foreign policy to improve the terms of the country’s international insertion, in
addition to being an instrument to increase exports and to develop the country
economically. Bolivia is aware that only through economic and political
strengthening of the region will it be possible to face the negative aspects of
the globalization processes, protectionist tendencies and the weakening of
multilateralism. It is for this reason that regarding trade and integration, bolivian
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
34 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
34
foreign policy seeks to expand markets, diversify the national export menu,
strengthen the process of the country’s international insertion, attract foreign
investment, increase its negotiating capacity, and contribute to its economic
and social development.
Bolivia’s insertion in the region and in the world will be obtained when the
country is able to carry out an articulating function in the process of designing
South American space, making its aspiration of being a country of contacts
come true. For that end, bolivian diplomacy encouraged the strengthening of
the Andean Community and promoted a process of growing association with
Mercosur. Bolivia is a full member of the Andean Community, has an agreement
of free trade with Mercosur, supports efforts to articulate the two plans of
integration, and actively participates in the Initiative for the Integration of
Infrastructure in South America (Iirsa), whose objective is to develop physical
infrastructure in the sectors of energy, telecommunications and transportation.
Bolivia is also developing strategies of expansion and commercial
association with developed countries and has been benefited with Atpdea
(Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act) and Europe’s SGP (Small
Grants Program), mechanisms of preferential access to these markets. In
relation to hemispheric integration, it is pertinent to highlight that, in the last
Ministerial Summit in Miami, it was decided to reorient the Ftaa negotiations
and establish a common space of commitments, in which each country will
advance at the pace it desires. Under this framework of negotiations, the
possibility of a plurilateral agreement was formulated, in a variable geometry
and with different paces. Every topic in the agenda will be negotiated by every
country in a basic packet. Finally, it should be noted that Ustr Robert Zoellick,
announced the launching of bilateral negotiations to establish a free trade
agreement with Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, that will advance at
different paces, and will be started in the second quarter of 2004.
At the bilateral level, Bolivia has pending the negotiation of a
complementary protocol to TEC 22, underwritten by Chile, whose purpose is
to reduce commercial unbalances and asymmetries that exist between both
countries. Finally, in the multilateral area, Bolivia’s participation in multilateral
commercial negotiation at the WTO and the G-20, that intends to be an
institutional counterweight to the United States, the European Union, and
Japan, who protect and subsidize the agricultural sector.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
35
Fight against narcotrafficking
Bolivia is part of the United Nation Convention against the Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, the United Nations
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, amended by its Protocol of
1972 and the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971.
At the bilateral level, Bolivia underwrote several international legal instruments
to fight against narcotrafficking, and, at the regional level, is part of the
Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism of the OAS. Besides these international
agreements, it is noteworthy that Bolivia and the United States signed an
Extradition Treaty in 1995 and that it has been in effect since 1996.
Practically every country in the international community is involved in
the fight against narcotrafficking. Some of them are producers of raw material,
while others transform, distribute, or consume them. Some countries serve
as passageway, while others face phenomena associated to the fight against
drugs, such as guerrilla, terrorism, organized crime, contraband, traffic of
firearms, or money laundering. This situation reveals the multiple dimensions
of the problems and the different political, economic, and social effects that
narcotrafficking may cause. In the last years, narcotrafficking has been seen as
a real threat to internal security of the countries, because of its pernicious
effects on health, the family, the stability of democratic institutions, the increase
of delinquency, and the patent increase in violence.
The process of eradicate cultivation of coca in Bolivia began in 1988, with
the passing of Law 1008 and Regulatory Decrees to eliminate plantations of illegal
coca and settle the foundation for socio-economic development in the coca-
producing areas. Recently, however, there has been in the last years a substantial
reduction of illegal coca, and we were able to advance in the development of
alternative cultures. In its new Strategy of Fight Against Narcotrafficking, and
under the principle of shared responsibility, the bolivian government intends to
substitute the economy of coca and encourage alternative development, incorporate
thousands of bolivian families in legal activities, continue to eliminate illegal coca
(albeit respecting traditional consumption), seek markets for alternative products,
and reduce the internal consumption of drugs.
The co-responsibility and international cooperation are essential to
confront to the curse of narcotrafficking. Within this context, the country
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
36 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
36
should continue in its efforts to cut off from the coca-cocaine circuit, thus
avoiding to be consolidated as a passageway country, while concentrating on
reducing internal consumption and support, at the international level, the
consolidation of multilateral evaluation mechanisms. The country has to
guarantee that financing for the fight against narcotrafficking and alternative
development be maintained or increased, so as to make the efforts of the
country to eradicate illegal and surplus coca sustainable. In the same way,
considering the high socio-economic cost that the reduction of its production
of coca had, the country has made great efforts to solicit from developed
countries a greater cooperation, the opening of their markets and resources
proportional to the efforts made. Bolivia needs to be rewarded and attain the
consolidation of the markets of industrialized countries for the products of
alternative development, especially if they are labor-intensive and generators
of jobs.
A few days ago, a report from the U.S. Embassy stated that Bolivia’s
illegal production of coca had increased 26% in the region of the Yungas and
decreased 15% in the area of the tropic of Cochabamba. There would have
been a total increment of more than 4,000 hectares in Bolivia, reaching a
national total of 28,500 hectares of coca cultivation. In this regard, President
Carlos Mesa pointed out that, until the government “certifies” the report of
the U.S. about the increment of illegal coca, the tasks of eradication in areas
such as the Yungas will not be reformulated. In addition to this, he said that it
would be necessary a “particular work” to face the anti-drug action of his
government. In this regard, one of his first initiatives was to ask the UN for
satellite information, and initiate a process of measuring or data information.
Once these numbers of the “reality” in the Yungas, based on data evaluation,
were obtained, they would have to be cross-examined with the satellite
information available. Bolivia wants to act with sovereignty on the issue of
eradication of coca, and for that, it is planning to create a particular system of
measuring the plantations of this leaf, to improve its margin of negotiation
on the topic. The new bolivian anti-drug strategy seeks to complement the
traditional strategy of banning illegal plantations of coca, with structural
adjustments in the projects of alternative development, and recover the pillar
of the importance of prevention and social rehabilitation, forgotten in the
past. Nevertheless, the production in the Yungas region configures itself as an
area of great conflict for future national governments.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
37
Fight against terrorism
After the terrorist attacks against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in
the United States on September 11, 2001, the issue of terrorism and
international security acquired new nuances and a growing interest and character
in the international agenda. Terrorism implies executing acts of violence to
frighten certain social actors or a determined population, or yet, disorganize a
social, economic, or political structure. Terrorism usually bitterly expresses
the frustrations of certain sectors of the population and uses the tactics of
psychological terror to attain its objectives. The purpose is to inflict fear to
attain political ends. In the bolivian government’s opinion, terrorism can be
incubated in narcotrafficking and feed on it. Besides, the illegal traffic of drugs
became, worldwide, the financial engine that feeds many terrorist organizations.
The goal of bolivian policy of fight against terrorism is to combat this
curse in all its forms and manifestations, according to international law and
the Charter of the United Nations, fully respecting the law, human rights, and
democratic institutions, as well as reinforce the mechanisms of political, legal,
financial, and operational cooperation related to fighting terrorism, participating
in every international agreements about the issue, and permanently monitor
them. Finally, it should be highlighted that in the last years Bolivia has ratified
every convention against terrorism and its manifestations, approved by the
United Nations and the Organization of American States, underwriting the
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, adopted on June 3, 2002 in
the 32
nd
General Assembly of the OAS in Bridgetown, Barbados.
Fight against corruption
Bolivian government attributed great importance to the issue of fighting
corruption and to the international legal instruments underwritten about the
issue, especially within the OAS and the UN. Bolivia has worrying levels of
corruption and impunity, causing great economic harm and hurting the morale
of bolivians. Corruption, furthermore, is a threat to democratic governance.
In this regard, the country has committed to conform to its international
obligations and permanently monitor the actions carried out to combat
transnational crime. In this context, it is pertinent to highlight that the bolivian
The Bolivia’s new foreign policy
38 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
38
government subscribed to the UN World Convention Against Corruption.
However, for the Convention to be implemented, it is necessary that it be
ratified by at least 30 countries. Nevertheless, after the presidential representative
against corruption, Lupe Cajías, ratified the document on behalf of Bolivia,
she announced that the bolivian government expects a prompt ratification of
the Convention at the National Congress.
The fight against transnational crime is also going through an institutional
strengthening of the three powers: executive, legislative and judiciary. There
have been significant efforts to fight against corruption and impunity and
recover credibility in justice, in finance and in the police, as well as create more
efficient mechanisms of accountability.
Protection to bolivian communities abroad
The abuse and embarrassment that a few bolivian citizens were under in
countries to which they saw themselves obligated to emigrate became, regrettably,
a recurring practice. On this issue, the bolivian state has not been yet successful
in offering satisfactory solutions. Consular Service, under the Ministry of Foreign
and Religious Affairs is in charge of collaborating and protecting bolivian citizens
abroad, but does not have the staff or the necessary means to take on this task.
In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign and Religious Affairs is working to
strengthen and elevate the quality of services rendered by the Consulates of
Bolivia – mainly in the countries that host the greater numbers of bolivian citizens
to improve service to the bolivian community that lives and works abroad. The
Chancellery of the Republic has special interest in offering the greatest
cooperation possible to the bolivian communities that reside abroad. These
communities of compatriots make important contributions for our economy
through money orders they send to their family members in Bolivia, project a
positive image of the country for their honesty, work capacity and effort, and
are starting to gain important political clout in the countries that shelter them.
This is why the Chancellery is working in a General Plan of Protection
and Service to bolivian Citizens who live abroad, developed, initially, in the cities
where there are a greater number of bolivians, especially those who are in a
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Juan Ignacio Siles del Valle
39
vulnerable condition. Another pending task in this area is to obtain the inclusion,
in the framework of reforms to the Political Constitution of the State, of the
right to vote of expatriate bolivians, as well as to facilitate dual citizenship to
bolivians who emigrated to other countries, through bilateral agreements.
To conclude
In an international context that can be seen as transition to consolidate
a uni-multipolar order, in which multilateralism and international law are
weakened, bolivian foreign policy is the expression of its internal reality, an
instrument of connection of the country to the world and a tool to face the
process of globalization. Bolivia has permanently sought a better international
insertion in the different aspects of international life – in the global,
hemispheric, regional, or sub regional levels. With a democratic government,
a social market economy, and a multicultural and multilingual identity, Bolivia,
for many years, has been making efforts to become a country of contacts and
of sub-regional energy distribution. Currently, Bolivia is going through an
unprecedented social, political, and economic crisis, and the government of
President Carlos Mesa has great challenges, and therefore needs recognition,
support, and backing of the international community.
Bolivia promotes cooperation, agreement and integration with the
neighboring countries. In this framework, an indispensable objective of its foreign
policy is to be successful in maritime reintegration to the Pacific coast. From the
bolivian perspective, this issue is bilateral, trilateral and multilateral. Likewise,
the policy of integration tries to contribute for the international insertion, growth,
and development of the country. On the other hand, in a increasingly complex
process of the international system, bolivian foreign policy seeks to face, in tune
with international law and the empire of law, new transnational threats like
organized crime, narcotrafficking, terrorism, and corruption. In the new anti-
drug strategy of the bolivian government, in addition to the October crisis, it is
believed that the country will continue to fight against the curse of drugs, and
that, in the beginning of shared responsibility, the international community has
the moral obligation to make an effort proportional and equivalent to the effort
made by the country.
Version: Vera Galante.
Concepts and strategies for diplomacy in the Lula government
40 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
40
resident Lula’s election came at moment when fresh political and
economic responses were being sought to the problems afflicting the countries
of South America. The deterioration of social indicators for the region
underscored the limitations of a neo-liberal model hinging on blind faith in
liberalising markets (one-sided deregulation, in some cases) and in down-sizing
the role played by the State. The socio-political crises besetting the region
revealed the illusory nature of the belief that such a model would usher in
sustainable development. For his steadfast commitment to democracy and his
concern for the social dimension of development, President Lula has become
a symbol of the desire for development that promotes social justice not only
among Brazilians but also among many others in our region of the world and
even beyond its bounds.
The Lula Government’s diplomatic action is conceived as an instrument
for promoting the country’s social and economic development. There is a
humanist dimension to this policy, however, geared to promoting international
Concepts and
strategies for
diplomacy in the
Lula government
Celso Amorim
*
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil
P
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Celso Amorim
41
cooperation for development and peace. It is deeply rooted in the interests
and hopes of the Brazilian people. Its internationalist aspect springs from a
national bedrock.
Our foreign policy is based on acute awareness of the intertwined fate
of Brazil and its South American neighbours. Given the broad-ranging affinities
that bind us together and the difficulties we aspire to overcome, the integration
of South America is an ineluctable imperative. The crux of the issue is
determining what kind of integration we seek to achieve. Without an agenda
for greater cooperation focusing on shared interests and opportunities for
mutual benefit, we run the risk of falling prey to a perverse form of integration
stemming from reciprocal contamination by successive crises or, worse still,
the offspring of organised crime, smuggling and drug-trafficking.
The establishment of closer ties between our economies, thriving political
convergence and enhanced contact among the societies and citizens of South
America are attendant upon trade agreements such as that signed between
Mercosur and the Andean Community. Infrastructure merits special attention,
particularly in the fields of transport, communications and energy. Nonetheless,
our peoples and societies must also be brought closer together through art,
culture and burgeoning opportunities for greater contact. Our ultimate aim is
to forge a South American Commonwealth of Nations.
This grand integration project must also be looked upon as mobilisation
to realise our full potential for relations with other nations and groups of
nations. We firmly believe that a multipolar world order provides a more stable,
secure environment, affording better conditions for the development of all
parties. Developments in the international scenario seem to be leading in the
direction of a world comprised by large blocs (e.g. the European Union) or
countries equivalent in weight and size to a bloc (e.g. the USA and China). In
such circumstances, the power of developing countries taken individually –
even of large ones like Brazil – to exert any influence on the global stage
remains limited. The strengthening of our regional cohesion will thus enable
us to make our voice heard in multilateral trade negotiations and empower us
to make a greater mark on the international order with a view to making it
more even-handed and democratic. Improved understanding with our partners
in Mercosur, particularly with Argentina (a key strategic partner) has made it
possible to advance down this road.
Concepts and strategies for diplomacy in the Lula government
42 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
42
If South American countries en bloc approach other developing countries,
they may increment their relative negotiating weight and clout. In the multilateral
trade sphere we are already in liaison with other developing nations, working
on joint platforms that combine (perhaps for the first time) the promotion of
trade liberalisation and social justice. The G-20
1
is spearheading an international
movement – supported, it should be noted, by civil society even in the developed
world – to reduce protectionist barriers and abolish subsidies running to billions
of dollars that penalise competitive exporters of agricultural produce in the
developing world.
By modifying the traditional dynamics of negotiations in the WTO – in
which the two main trading powers were wont to set the directions and level
of negotiating ambitions by mutual consent – the G-20 has helped to “alter
the geography of international trade,” to borrow President Lula’s expression.
The G-20 has established itself as a key player in enabling negotiations at the
Doha Round to progress. It is our belief that the Round will only be successful
if negotiations prove to be transparent and capable of contemplating the
interests and demands of the main actors involved.
Consolidation of the G-20 has shown that there is diplomatic space that
deserves to be explored further in liaison with other major developing countries
and regions. For centuries, we have relied on perceptions recorded by European
and North American observers of societies that are geographically distant
from our own, such as those in Asia and the Middle East, and even in relation
to others closer to home, in neighbouring Africa. The intensification of direct
contact and exchange with these and other regions of the globe, above and
beyond outworn rhetoric about Third World brotherhood, demands reciprocal
political will, first and foremost.
The Lula Administration has striven to demonstrate that Brazil’s
diplomatic objectives can be, at one and the same time, universal in outlook
and yet firmly anchored in the priority we ascribe to South America. This is
the spirit in which we have launched innovative initiatives such as the trilateral
1
The G-20, a group of developing countries created at the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in Cancun, currently includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt,
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela
and Zimbabwe.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Celso Amorim
43
forum uniting South Africa, India and Brazil (IBAS), also known as the G-3,
and the proposal of a Summit between the countries of South America and
members of the Arab League.
Africa, the continent from which almost half Brazil’s population descends,
is generating growing political, economic and cultural interest in Brazil. It is
our desire to turn a new leaf in our relations with our African brethren. By
intensifying presidential and ministerial visits in both directions, we are
endeavouring to build new bridges for closer cooperation, attuned to our
historic and geographic affinities and in consonance with our domestic moves
to promote racial equality.
Beyond the focus on enhanced contacts with our geographical
neighbourhood, a hallmark of the present Administration is its vocation for
dialogue with actors from all corners of the globe and of all levels of
development. President Lula’s attendance at the Porto Alegre and Davos
Forums in the very first month of his mandate simultaneously reflects the
Government’s democratic convictions and its desire to influence major
international debates in defence of a non-exclusive form of globalisation.
The concern for social justice and human rights is likewise at the root
and core of President Lula’s proposal for concerted international action to
fight poverty and hunger. Born of humanist ethical values, these endeavours
seek to call the attention of the international community to the limitations of
outlooks that play up the military dimension of international security without
taking due stock of the connections between economic and social development,
on the one hand, and peace and global security, on the other. As President
Lula stated at a meeting in Geneva, attended by the Secretary-General of the
UN and the Presidents of Chile and France, hunger could well be considered
the most lethal of all weapons of mass destruction.
The establishment of closer ties with the developed world proceeds
through the intensification of political dialogue, given the interest in expanding
trade relations, attracting investment and furthering scientific and technological
cooperation. Negotiations on the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (Ftaa) represent a challenge from the standpoint of finding a balanced
solution to a complex range of issues. They encompass not only deregulation
of trade in goods and services (on which we would like to focus) but also
matters relating to investments, intellectual property, government procurements,
Concepts and strategies for diplomacy in the Lula government
44 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
44
among others. With regard to the European Union, negotiations for a biregional
agreement between the EU and Mercosur are well advanced. Such an agreement
offers promising prospects for commercial gains and should be viewed as a
healthy “multipolarity” factor in our economic and trade relations with the
North.
Brazil has a solid tradition of seeking to bring about peace by pacific
means through dialogue and due observance of the tenets of international
law. It is our conviction that multilateral forums provide a locus for dialogue
among sovereign States and should thus be valued for their contribution to
the progress of the international order.
The international consensus concerning collective action to combat
terrorism forged in the wake of the attacks of September 11
th
2001 was
shattered by the military intervention in Iraq. The tragic consequences of the
Iraq crisis – among them the attack on the UN Offices in Baghdad in which
Brazilian envoy Sérgio Vieira de Mello lost his life – continue to confound the
political wisdom of the international community. The prospect of the system
of collective security enshrined in the UN Charter being eroded has led
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to propose that we reflect upon the present
threats, the means at our disposal to counter them and corresponding ways of
equipping the UN system, the Security Council in particular, to deal with them.
As Kofi Annan has pointed out, we have come to a historic crossroads.
Political courage is required to tackle the risk of retreat towards unilateral
action bereft of grounding in international law. Resoluteness alone will permit
the necessary adjustments to be made to the system of collective security,
preserving the key role of the Security Council in legitimating the use of
force. True to our conviction that multilateralism represents the same political
progress in international relations that democracy affords in the domestic arena,
we consider it indispensable that the reform of the United Nations serve to
strengthen the voice of developing countries – especially those in Latin America
– in promoting peace.
To the extent that the predicament in Iraq and more broadly speaking in
the Middle East is the most serious threat to global stability, we must not shirk
our portion of responsibility in addressing it. This is certainly the feeling of
President Lula, whose action prior to the war in Iraq envisaged diplomatic
means for a peaceful solution to the deadlock. Today, the Brazilian Government
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Celso Amorim
45
seeks to liaise actively with the countries in our region as well as other
international actors so as to revert the present atmosphere of scepticism and
violence shrouding the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole. The appointment
of a Special Envoy to the Middle East and the steps already taken to install a
Brazilian diplomatic mission in Ramallah are both signal elements of this
undertaking.
Our region of the globe has a track record of peace and stability that we
have managed to uphold. The absence of large-scale conflict and the prevalence
of democratic forms of government are accomplishments in which the
governments and peoples of Latin America should take real pride. This does
not imply, however, that we cannot or ought not take a keen interest in
promoting peace on a global scale. Instability, however remote its source may
seem, eventually generates costs for all who are party to the international system.
Closer to home, Haiti demands a long-term commitment from the
international community to bolster economic and institutional reconstruction.
As a member of the Security Council, Brazil has been working to ensure that
the perceptions and concerns of Caribbean nations be taken into account in
UN decisions concerning Haiti. Our ultimate goal is to guarantee that Haitians
can, in as short a time as possible, enjoy the benefits of an atmosphere
conducive to the consolidation of democracy. In the case of Haiti at least, it is
gratifying to observe that conditions are in place for a UN operation based on
the political consensus of the international community. This is the rationale
underpinning Brazil’s decision to agree to head the UN peace force at the
Security Council’s behest.
Our participation in the UN Peace-Keeping Mission to Haiti, moreover,
is based on the belief that peace is not a free international product: a price
must be paid for the maintenance of peace. The price is participation. To
abstain or refrain from tendering an opinion or taking action in the face of a
crisis may mean being excluded from the decision-making process or, worse
still, having to rely on other countries or regions.
* * *
Fifteen months into its mandate, the Lula Government can display a
substantial credit balance in terms of its diplomatic action. The Buenos Aires
Consensus and the Copacabana Act betoken an unprecedentedly high level
Concepts and strategies for diplomacy in the Lula government
46 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
46
of understanding between Argentina and Brazil. Mercosur has recovered its
internal cohesion, forged an association with Peru and concluded negotiations
with the other members of the Andean Community. A South American
Commonwealth of Nations is gradually taking shape.
We have consolidated key alliances in the struggle to achieve freer, less
distorted international trade. The G-20, born of confrontation in the build-up
to the Cancun Conference, has established itself as a vital interlocutor in the
resumption of negotiations on agriculture within the framework of the WTO.
The Miami Ministerial Declaration, meanwhile, has served to redress the balance
in negotiations on the Ftaa. Prospects are bright for Mercosur to conquer new
markets by means of agreements due to be sealed or under negotiation – e.g. the
biregional agreement with the European Union, and agreements to set fixed
preferences in trade with the Southern African Customs Union (Sacu) and India.
Negotiations are due to be commenced for agreements between Mercosur and
Caricom, China, Mexico, Morocco and other Arab countries.
Ties of friendship and cooperation are being strengthened with traditional
partners in the developed and developing world. China is emerging as a major
strategic partner. Relations with Russia have acquired renewed impetus. Recent
projects for establishing closer diplomatic ties are beginning to bear fruit. One
example is the IBAS Forum, whose first Trilateral Commission convened in
New Delhi in February to set an ambitious cooperation programme. Brazil,
India and South Africa are also taking joint action to place the issue of hunger
at the top of the international agenda. Projects financed by the IBAS Fund for
combating hunger and poverty are now ready to be implemented.
Brazil will forge ahead with these endeavours throughout 2004, a year in
which our country will again chair both Mercosur (from the third quarter
onwards) and the Group of Rio. In July 2004, the city of São Paulo hosted the
XI United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad). The
Conference examined the possibility of launching a new round of trade
negotiations under the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing
Countries (Gstp) and other bolder mechanisms for bringing developing
countries closer together, thus consolidating a number of initiatives already
under way. In September, President Lula is to organise a fringe meeting at the
UN General Assembly, the purpose of which is to examine ways of raising
funds for combating hunger and poverty.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Celso Amorim
47
The progress achieved to date entitles us to approach the international
scenario with confidence in our capacity to blaze new trails and exert growing
influence on processes already under way. We should not, however,
underestimate the many obstacles and challenges we shall continue to face.
These include promoting more even-handed decision-making procedures,
defending greater social justice across the globe, and resuming effective
international cooperation for peace and development. In partnership with our
South American neighbours, Brazil will continue to strive for better living
conditions for its citizens in the certainty that we can count on growing respect,
good will and support in this region and throughout the world.
The Chile’s foreign policy at the dawn of the millennium
48 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
48
he emergence of globalization both as a phenomenon pervading the
environment in which contemporary nations develop and as a mode of
comprehending the conditions in which they relate to each other has been
swift, intense and inexorable. The speed of advances in communications and
their influence on decision-making by governments, individuals and markets
affect every sphere of life for countries and citizens alike.
This, then, is the scenario in which Latin America must move. It is a
scenario fraught with uncertainties and challenges in which mistakes can have
dreadful costs for development and may take years to recover from. As
President Lagos said recently: “We seek to build a better world, a world we can
bequeath as a legacy to future generations. Nonetheless, we have fewer
certainties now than in the past. We may not fear the Apocalypse but we have
learnt that resources are not inexhaustible, that damage to the environment
menaces the future, that social tensions stemming from the stark inequalities
in some of our societies are veritable time bombs.”
1
We know that we must
find our way in a world that is very different from that of our forbears. Looking
The Chile’s foreign
policy at the dawn of
the millennium
María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela
*
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile
1
President Ricardo Lagos Escobar at the 2003 Graduation Ceremony for Students of Chile’s “Andrés
Bello” Diplomatic Academy. 22 September 2003.
T
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela
49
back at the experience accumulated, our only certainty is that we must not
repeat the errors of the past. To this end, we must make full use of the resources
of the present and those that we can predict the future will bring us.
To venture into this globalized world, we must start out from a continent,
from a region. Latin American countries’ foreign policy is thus rooted in the
region, in its history and its potential. Therein lies the importance of
strengthening regional agreements and integration. We need to advance
concrete, feasible integration processes otherwise we shall be left as mere
spectators standing on the sidelines of global development.
Chile’s foreign policy: an overview of present and future
Permanent and programmatic guidelines
Chile’s foreign policy derives from two basic sources: permanent
principles and programmatic objectives. President Lagos defined them well in
his first Address to the Nation shortly after taking office in the year 2000.
2
Another key element for understanding Chilean foreign policy is the return
to democracy. This has radically changed the way Chile relates to the rest of the
world. Our country’s return to the international fold, which began in 1990, marked
the beginning of a fecund period in the history of our foreign relations.
Permanent aspects have to do with the concepts informing a substantial
portion of our diplomatic action. They comprise the immutable principles
that underpin our country’s international outlook, which our republic has
consistently upheld throughout its history.
Programmatic objectives, meanwhile, shape and distinguish the very
aspirations, interests and international image that the government of President
Ricardo Lagos has stamped on our foreign policy during his mandate. These
supplement and extend the objectives and achievements of the nineties.
Permanent principles include compliance with International Law and,
consequently, absolute respect for treaties; non-intervention in the internal
2
Presidential Address. 21 May 2000.
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50 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
50
affairs of other States; peaceful settlement of disputes; and the promotion
and defence of Chilean interests.
Consistent adherence to these principles has lent Chilean foreign policy
a degree of historic continuity. Since it develops coherently within a stable
frame of reference, Chile can be viewed as a predictable, reliable actor in the
international arena.
Continuity aims to ensure that foreign policy is treated as a policy of the
State. It must pursue strategic objectives that promote social welfare, national
development. Chile’s international actions, then, must uphold the principles
and values that form the bedrock of Chilean society.
In the same vein, the country shares of the values and ideals that unite the
peoples of Latin America. We seek – in a joint, cohesive fashion – to further our
common aspirations, make our demands heard, put our ideas into practice, and
spread abroad the way we view solutions to global problems. This approach is
based on our experience and this region’s outlook on the world.
The end of a cycle
The return to democracy in 1990 marked a renewal of Chile’s foreign
policy. Two prime objectives were set at that point: reinserting Chile in the
international community and preserving the balanced international economic
standing that had consolidated the opening up of our economy.
Chile had spent seventeen years in exile in an international scenario marked
by a sharp ideological rift between two opposing blocs. Our country suffered
the effects of a period in which reality was interpreted, shaped and reduced to
biased, exclusive projects. The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the eighties
symbolised the end of an era. It also marked the beginning of a process of
profound transformation that was to alter the underpinnings of the political,
social, economic and cultural structures that had prevailed since 1945. It ushered
in a new phase characterised by the phenomenon of globalization.
The resumption of democratic rule in Chile required a renewal of
principles, interests and objectives in our foreign policy. This was the historic
context in which, in the early nineties, Chile’s international stance was branded
by the affirmation of its democratic will. As a result, principles such as defence
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María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela
51
of human rights, promotion of democracy, and maintenance of international
peace and security became the foundations and precepts informing the country’s
foreign policy decisions.
Meanwhile, the formation of a vast global market, transnational
operations, greater interdependence and instant communications obliged Chile
to take an open world economy as the starting point for grappling with these
new realities. The country thus took a stage further a process that had begun
gradually with the unilateral opening up of its economy. The strategy adopted
was designed to achieve advances in the multilateral sphere while also
establishing bilateral agreements with the world’s major markets.
Over the past thirteen years, Chile has managed to integrate fully with
the international community. Moreover, it has proved itself to be entirely in
tune with the principles that inspire the United Nations and with a world
order based on international law and multilateralism. This has enabled us to
assume greater responsibilities in the international arena: we have twice been
elected non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (1996-1997,
2003-2004); we have stood four times on the Economic and Social Council;
we have participated virtually without interruption in the Human Rights
Commission since 1992; and we are consistently willing to work with the various
multilateral bodies. As for Summit diplomacy, we have organised the World
Summit on Social Development and hosted meetings of the Rio Group, the
Ibero-American Summit and the II Summit of the Americas. At regional level,
we have hosted the General Assemblies of the OAS and promoted adoption
of the 1991 “Santiago Commitment,” which prepared the way for the Inter-
American Democratic Charter.
In addition, Chile has integrated positively in the global economy. Setting
out from its own region and the experience obtained in the first agreements it
negotiated, Chile has extended its trade farther afield, conquering markets in
the Asian Pacific region, the United States and Europe. The choice of these
three target areas resulted in intense diplomatic activity which, after several
years, led to trade agreements far greater than anything of their kind in the
country’s history.
The different trade agreements sealed with Latin American countries,
the Free Trade Treaties established with Canada, Mexico, the United States of
America and Korea, and the Association Agreement signed with the European
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52
Union have opened the doors for us to markets that total approximately 1,300
million inhabitants and more than half the world’s Gross Geographic Product.
In brief, by accomplishing the objectives we set ourselves more than a
decade ago, we have successfully completed a cycle in Chile’s foreign policy.
We are now ready to embark on a new phase. The tasks before us now are
associated with enabling Chile to attain vigorous socio-economic development
in a stable, democratic, socially cohesive regional environment. This will equip
it to project a strong national and regional image to the rest of the world and
so rise to the great challenges of the 21
st
century.
This, then, is the prime challenge for Chile’s foreign policy. To face it
squarely, we have chosen four main lines of action, which we shall proceed to
describe below:
Our priority is Latin America
In today’s world the future of nations lies in interdependence. Globalization
requires joining forces to gain a satisfactory foothold and not be left behind by
progress. Whatever the wishes of the players involved, the global perspective is
a present reality. Serious consequences will ensue for those who refuse to
acknowledge, examine and deal with it in a joint, effective manner.
In the political sphere, small and medium-size States are endeavouring
to make their voice heard and exert relevant influence in the world decision-
making process. This implies being willing to reach agreements at regional
level, promoting our integration and ensuring it suits our national development
strategies. We must seek to obtain the benefits the competitive advantages of
the diverse areas within the region can bestow in our dealings with the rest of
the world.
A key feature of Chile’s foreign policy is our belonging to Latin America.
We face the world as a region, co-ordinating our positions in order to promote
our shared interests and so together be able to enjoy the benefits of
development.
Most of the countries in the region are small or medium size. This should
encourage us to stress the regional factor on both the political and economic
fronts. Commercial competence and liaison in defence of our positions in the
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53
global arena depend on our establishing effective integration. This alone will
allow us to enjoy the benefits of economies of scale and the varied potential
deriving from permanent dialogue and the pooling of ideas.
To achieve this objective, Chile has embraced the commitment to play
an active role in the search for joint solutions to regional problems. We are
similarly intent on setting realistic integration targets that will allow us to
advance in an orderly fashion and in a predetermined direction.
Likewise, we shall redouble our determination to share experiences and
put our full weight behind co-operation programmes that serve to generate a
stable environment in the region. To this end, our economies must be controlled
from a macroeconomic viewpoint. At the same time, though, they require strong
mechanisms capable of launching a sustained fight against poverty and of
generating a virtuous cycle featuring good political governance and social progress.
Chile has a commitment to the region that is political and commercial as
well as bilateral and multilateral. These dimensions are complementary and
necessary.
In the political sphere, we consider it important to continue endeavouring
to find solutions to existing problems and also to detect factors, variables or
threats that could undermine political and social stability in the region.
We see eye to eye on several key points. All the countries in the region
are concerned at the challenges they face in terms of democratic governance
and social cohesion. This was the subject of the Rio Group Summit held in
Peru in May last year as well as of the OAS General Assembly in Chile last
June, the Ibero-American Summit in Bolivia and the Extraordinary Summit
of the Americas held in Monterrey. In is clear, then, that we are working
together to find ways of achieving development and prosperity for our peoples
and of consolidating our democracies.
In this context, institutions such as the Rio Group, the Extended
Mercosur and the Organization of American States – to name but a few in
which advances have been made at regional level – are relevant forums which
Chile will continue to support in its endeavour to come to grips with the
overarching issues that are a priority for the region.
Mercosur is the most relevant integration initiative in our geographic
vicinity. We wish to see a substantive strengthening of the political dimension
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of the Extended Mercosur. It may then become a locus for concerted sub-
regional action and thus attain greater stature in the international community.
We are similarly keen to see closer ties established considering the broad range
of issues on which progress can be made, e.g. macroeconomic co-ordination,
the fight against poverty, defence, culture and education, among others.
Meanwhile, we must work to make the Organization of American States
operate more effectively. The Organization’s agenda needs to be brought up
to date to contemplate the issues that most concern the hemisphere as a whole.
Its methods and praxis must be made more agile and its structure modernised.
Finally, we must establish effective liaison between the agencies comprising
the Inter-American system.
Chile’s prospects for regional integration are founded on the building of
a realistic framework that sets viable, selective targets in sectors where palpable
progress can be achieved. This will enable us to open up areas for concerted
action that permit the association of existing schemes and the variety of
interests at stake.
At the same time, it is imperative to make headway regarding integration
on education, the free circulation of people and capital, environment, defence
and security.
One key aspect of the Inter-American agenda is a line of action designed
to foster democratic governance and social cohesion in Latin America. Working
to consolidate sound government and stability in our region is clearly in our
national interest since it produces favourable conditions for advancing our
development strategy.
The foregoing has led us to put all our weight behind the proposal tabled
at the last OAS General Assembly (Santiago, June 2003) to implement an Agenda
for Democratic Governance in the Americas. The idea is to pool national and
international efforts to help face the new political, economic and social challenges
arising in the present context of globalization. This includes forging ahead with
the task of enhancing citizens’ trust and confidence in democratic institutions.
On the other hand, trade is also a proven means of spurring integration.
As stated above, Chile has already established a distinctive set of agreements
with all of Latin America, and the region tops the list of our priorities in the
economic arena. Indeed, the Americas account for 45% of our foreign trade
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55
and absorb nearly all Chile’s overseas investments. Moreover, the region is the
main destination for Chile’s higher added value manufactures.
A trade issue of common interest to all of Latin America – one which
we should persevere in debating – is negotiations for instituting a Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA). Chile argues that over and above the distinct,
legitimate standpoints being sustained, these negotiations should seek to benefit
the entire continent, especially when it comes to setting constant, clear norms
for developing all forms of exchange. An environment featuring greater
commercial discipline and mechanisms for the settlement of trade disputes
that all parties respect and apply will undoubtedly secure better, more stable
conditions for exports and investments in the region.
On the bilateral front, we possess an intense working agenda with
neighbouring countries and with all other countries in the region. It covers issues
such as physical integration and closer co-operation on energy, frontiers and
social matters. Integration with our immediate neighbours has far more evident
significance given the existence of a network of concrete interests and the
dynamics of establishing progressively closer ties. This has rapidly and
substantially raised the level of interdependence of our peoples in recent years.
We have pushed ahead on a priority agenda with our neighbours Argentina,
Peru and Bolivia that we expect to enhance further still in the next few years. We
are undertaking a major drive on a wide range of bilateral issues that we trust will
be expanded and supplemented by greater integration in other fields. We trust this
will lead to the materialisation of alliances, strategic associations and shared
development platforms in all fields in which common interests are identified.
Along the same lines, we are in agreement with Brazil on the urgency of
setting a regional agenda to contemplate issues such as economic integration,
physical integration (bi-oceanic corridors, in particular), strengthening of
democratic institutions, terrorism, burgeoning drug trafficking networks,
besides cultural, educational and technological co-operation. We likewise agree
that political consultation and liaison mechanisms merit improvement to secure
consensual positions in international forums.
As both Chile and Brazil are currently non-permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council, we shall continue to endeavour to act in
tandem in that forum. Both presidents concur on the need to reform the
United Nations System, especially the Security Council, to make it more
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56
representative considering present circumstances in the world. On this
particular, President Lagos has reassured President Lula that, should the number
of permanent members of the Security Council be increased, Chile will
acknowledge Brazil’s historical, legitimate aspiration to become one.
We shall also continue to enhance our relations with Colombia, Ecuador
and Venezuela, nations with which we have maintained very close historical ties.
Achieving greater presence in Central America and the Caribbean is
another relevant component of our foreign policy in the region.
We likewise view Mexico as a crucial part of any policy to form alliances
that spur Chile’s development and presence in Latin America.
We intend to maintain balanced, mature relations with the United States
and Canada. The aim is to guarantee stability in the Hemisphere and open up
spaces for dialogue, co-operation and concerted action. That will not only enhance
the Continent’s security but also boost prosperity for the Americas as a whole.
As mentioned previously, in today’s world no-one is sufficient unto
themselves, not even the great powers. Globalization, interdependence and
transnationalisation imply cross-border flows that unveil planetary prospects
beyond the will and control of the main global players.
Latin America must make its voice heard and exert a significant influence on
global decision-making. This requires joint action founded on a concrete will to
integrate. Our foreign policy thus has a Latin American slant for it is the geographic
vicinity in which we live, and everything going on around us affects us directly.
We believe in the need to nurture a spirit of concerted endeavour among
the countries of the region. We can then plot a functional, open, flexible course
that will allow us to agree on certain subjects and differ on others without
excluding anyone. It is far better to join forces to forge basic consensus and
carry out what has been agreed upon and to work together to stake out spaces
that will assist us in implementing our regional agenda.
Our global and multilateral action: Governing Globalization
Globalization affords advantages concerning investment and trading of
goods, communications and establishment of closer ties. Conversely, however,
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57
it provokes imbalances between countries. Moreover, it affects kernel elements
of the present international system, which is based on the existence of
independent States entitled to take sovereign decisions. It likewise corrodes
the established political, economic and social order in most countries.
The problem arising in this new phase is that the current order seems
incapable of promoting globalization. Furthermore, the consensus concerning
compliance with a set of common norms with which all parties are in agreement
has been undermined. Partly this is because globalization presents a novel
feature in comparison with similar episodes in world history: it is bereft of a
visible political and economic power base.
So far we have highlighted the questioning of present-day multilateralism.
The international organisations born in the wake of World War II suited
prevailing circumstances at the time, subsequently reinforced by the Cold War.
Nonetheless, criticism of the way they operated began to surface more than a
decade ago when the first signs of obsolescence began to show in certain
fields. This is apparent in the make-up of the United Nations Security Council,
in the existence of a Trusteeship Council – when for nearly two decades now
no territory has been in trust for it to supervise – and in the workings of the
Economic & Social Council.
New players and new moot points have unexpectedly taken the stage in
this debate. Governing globalization also implies taking on the great global issues.
In this frame of reference, a new debate has arisen about “global public goods.”
They are defined as public goods because, regardless of who supplies them
(private sector or State), society understands that they should be available to all.
This expression has surfaced in international discussions as a new element
for analysis. Although it has not yet been conceptually mapped out and that the
idea has so far defied precise definition, that has not prevented it being treated
as a subject for reflection and of interest for application in several global policies.
This discussion is compounded by a growing interest in harnessing and
fleshing out the “new” multilateralism that many countries seek to bring to fruition.
The idea is to make it possible to live with a global system that offers opportunities
but also poses threats, especially to more vulnerable peoples and societies.
As mentioned earlier, multilateral matters will in all likelihood be deemed
of increasing domestic relevance. The ordinary citizen may yet come to see
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58
performance in the international arena as a matter meriting as much attention
as any of our national policy issues.
Renewing multilateralism is thus also imperious from this standpoint.
Indeed, the structure and distribution of powers will largely dictate the extent
to which States will be independent in the future.
Fresh new structures are required for dealing with global macroeconomic
conundrums, regulation of international trade and financial stability. The same applies
to the environment, international justice, human rights, the fight against pandemics,
cultural diversity, knowledge and use of common goods. We need a different kind
of multilateral system if the aim is to foster social cohesion on a global scale and
bring about a world with clear rules and opportunities for all. Otherwise, without
universally applicable law, the law of the jungle will surely prevail.
For Chile, multilateralism and International Law are crucial instruments
for adequately promoting and defending the country’s interests. We must
concentrate on strengthening these institutions and building a world order
based on principles and the rule of law.
Our global and multilateral action, then, follows guidelines based on
permanent principles and values that stem from the country’s deep democratic
conviction, on appreciation of international relations, mutual respect among
nations, and the quest for higher standards of international coexistence. Among
these, the following guidelines deserve special mention:
(a) We shall sustain Chile’s active participation in the forums the
international community has created to discuss these issues (e.g. the
International Task Force on Global Public Goods, led by Sweden
and France). Likewise, our status as a non-permanent member of
the Security Council in 2004 is a significant opportunity for pressing
home our stand on these issues. In this sense, the tasks to be tackled
have to do with enhancing the international community’s role in
consolidating peace and making progress on the renewal and
strengthening of the United Nations Organization, supporting the
work of the Panel of Eminent Persons, and giving the Secretary
General backing in this undertaking.
(b) We shall increase our efforts to promote democracy and human rights
as the basis for civilised coexistence and as a hallmark of our foreign
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59
policy. (Hemispheric Governance agenda, Community of
Democracies, system for the protection of human rights.)
Vis-à-vis the Community of Democracies, we have been entrusted with the
task of organising its next meeting due to be held in the first quarter of 2005.
Ever since September 11
th
, 2001, the fight against terrorism and control
of weapons of mass destruction have acquired capital importance. Chile
believes these issues should be addressed by the entire international community
in the appropriate multilateral forums. In combating the scourge of terrorism,
due care must be taken to ensure full respect for human rights.
(c) We shall continue to collaborate in UN peace-keeping missions and to
work to reach a consensus on notions of security for people (Human
Security Network). Meanwhile, we shall continue to develop the new
approach on confidence building measures with immediate and regional
neighbours. We shall also work on new methods for making our
purposes transparent and procuring the means to secure our defence.
(d) We shall help develop a social agenda for the governance of
globalization, bringing our capacity and experience to bear on the
following issues: health, education, campaigns against discrimination,
development of indigenous communities, information society, and
science & technology.
(e) Chile is deeply committed to the sustainable development agenda, for
it has a direct bearing on our country’s future. It largely depends on
sustainable exploration of natural resources. We shall therefore maintain
our active participation in the main forums where this issue is debated,
in diverse multilateral negotiations on the environment and at
international bodies that devise sustainable development policies.
(f) Regarding certain special regimes, as a signatory of the Antarctic
Treaty, Chile will continue to play an active role in perfecting the
regime applicable to the Antarctic and to provide active support for
the work of the Secretariat set up for that purpose. On maritime
matters, we are developing an active policy combining global and
regional approaches (Cpps
3
), particularly regarding conservation of
3
Permanent Commission for the South Pacific.
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maritime resources and norms on shipping of hazardous substances.
Concerning space and aeronautics, we concentrate our efforts on
obtaining access for Chile to leading-edge technologies and on helping
Chilean corporations to improve their standing in the international
aeronautical market, besides improving our astronomical observation
capacity.
In March 2004 we hosted the First World Biotechnology Forum, bringing
together an assortment of specialists to discuss a subject that has become
increasingly important for all mankind.
Open trade and implementation of Free Trade Agreements
and Treaties
Given the size of our economy, national development is singularly
dependent on free trade and full insertion in world markets. Increased
productivity, scale production and access to broader markets are the best way
to improve the country’s labour prospects and sustain high growth rates,
technological innovation and effective allocation of resources.
We intend to achieve multiple, flexible global incorporation. This degree of
insertion will allow us to engage fully in regional and bilateral integration processes
besides affording Chilean importers and exporters legal and economic security.
The international economic strategy Chile has adopted in the context
of so-called “open regionalism” comprises three major instruments or paths
toward attaining the prime objective of free trade: unilateral opening of its
markets; multilateral trade negotiations; and negotiated deregulation at bilateral
and regional levels. Thus, in the near future, more than 75% of Chile’s trade
will be tariff-free. This will not only benefit our economic efficiency but will
also help to boost and diversify our exports to include goods with higher
added value and services.
A major challenge for Chile is to take full advantage of the benefits and
potential the Free Trade Treaties we have signed can afford us, consolidating
collaboration between the public and private sectors. This means tackling a
highly complex task typical of this stage in the administration of such
agreements. Among other things, it involves preventing or forecasting any
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61
problem that may arise and then consistently responding with international
quality standards.
As from 1
st
February 2003, 85% of all Chile’s exports to the European
Union (the country’s main trading partner) are tariff-free. At the same time,
the EU is the main source of the foreign investment and international co-
operation it receives.
The Agreement with the EU has enabled us to boost job creation and
improve the quality of employment besides raising competitiveness,
modernising business and production. Above all, it has given our export drive
a fillip and helped diversify our range of products, particularly in the different
regions of the country.
On the other hand, the treaty drawn up with the United States creates a
solid, far-reaching free trade zone between the two countries which is balanced
and broad-sweeping. It covers all aspects of our bilateral economic exchange
including trade in goods, government purchases, promotion and protection of
foreign investments, cross-border services and the protection of intellectual property
rights. It also encompasses features associated with the new economy such as e-
commerce and telecommunications, as well as environmental and labour issues.
The chance to compete for government purchases and other
opportunities that FTAs afford requires us to devise instruments that will
allow them to be duly profitable. Likewise, it is essential to prepare public
institutions for the challenges posed by an open, global economy. That implies
promoting a “country image” and working with the public and private sectors
to accomplish shared objectives.
Entering such demanding markets as the United States and the European
Union has made us redouble our attention when it comes to prevention. We
shall seek to steal a march on any problem that may arise, providing a permanent
response by compliance with international quality standards. This will enable
our exporters to match their competitors. Only then will we be in a position to
take full advantage of the benefits these agreements can secure in terms of
trade, investment opportunities and the tangible gains ensuing from juridical
regularity, which makes a country a reliable partner.
Meanwhile, our membership of the Word Trade Organization (WTO)
is directly associated with our determination to obtain a solid multilateral trade
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system that is fully legitimised and sets down clear rules and principles for
international trade.
By this token, our country sets great store by the success of negotiations
in the Doha Round. The WTO is the forum that frames the norms for
disciplining world trade and this alone can vouchsafe a fair international trade
system to a small, open economy such as Chile’s.
We have made it crystal clear that the time has come for industrialised
nations to put an end to the unfair competition that spawns more poverty in
developing countries. We must convert the rhetoric that accompanied the
launching of the Doha Round into actual political will to resolve our problems
and to put what we have agreed upon into effect.
Chile will continue to strive for a resumption of Doha Round negotiations
by seeking to build bridges and find common ground in the positions of the
WTO’s different member states, without neglecting to defend its national interests.
Asia-Pacific: Chile 2004 Apec Year
If Latin America is our natural home ground, the Asian-Pacific basin is
specially relevant to our country. Chile is a Pacific rim country and maintains
ties with countries in this vast region that in some cases reach far back into the
earliest stages of our history.
As from 1990, our Asian-Pacific policy has acquired a multilateral
dimension that has led to our membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Forum (Apec). This forum was established in 1989 and has since
become the world’s largest trade integration undertaking. Taken together, the
economies of Apec member states account for more than 50% of global
GDP and 47% of all international trade.
For this reason, Chile’s hosting of the next Apec Leaders’ Summit and
the celebration of Chile 2004 Apec Year together represent the chief multilateral
administration challenge to which Chile’s foreign policy must respond. This is
the biggest political-diplomatic commitment our country has ever assumed
before the international community.
The Summit will allow us to promote Chile’s foreign policy objectives
regarding the Asian-Pacific Basin among the economies of the region. It will
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63
also give us an opportunity to consolidate our status as a bridge between the
Asian-Pacific countries and Latin America. From this standpoint, the priority
we ascribe to Latin America will be enhanced by the association of these two
regional spaces under the auspices of Chile 2004 Apec Year, particularly in
relation to Peru and Mexico, which are also APEC members.
The so-called “Bogor Goals” are a major milestone in Apec’s short
history. In the light of them, developed countries undertook to deregulate
their economies completely by the year 2010 (Chile has voluntarily included
itself in this group), less developed economies following suit by the year 2020.
Three official strategies have been chosen to accomplish the Bogor Goals.
The first concerns the so-called Individual Action Plans (IAP) and the second
Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation (Evsl). The third is a commitment to liaise
on multilateral action in trade negotiations within the framework of the WTO.
Three fields have likewise been selected for accomplishing the objective
of free trade: deregulation of trade and investments (elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers); promotion of trade (lower commercial transaction costs
and improved access to information); and economic and technical co-operation
(to enhance the States’ capacity to accede to free trade).
Following consultations with the economic authorities of APEC
members, Chile has drafted an agenda for the year 2004 based on three key
aspects: the Forum’s permanent agenda; the shared interests of Apec
economies; and the Chilean Government’s agenda and its focus on the Forum:
(a) Apec as a catalyst of the multilateral trade system: Apec is expected
to help break the deadlock in WTO negotiations, which have ground
to a halt since the Cancún Ministerial meeting.
(b) Institutionalisation of Free Trade Agreements and Regional Trade
Agreements: Apec can help provide these types of agreements with an
adequate framework so as to advance the process of deregulating trade.
(c) Trade Promotion, Trade and Security: A Plan of Action is to be
developed as part of Apec 2004 to facilitate implementation of Apec
economies’ commitments concerning security.
(d) Development of Small and Medium-Size Businesses: Support for
the establishment and determined public-sector backing for the
development of small and medium-size business concerns.
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(e) English as the Working Language for doing Business: Improving
educational methods for expanding the use of English in Chile. A long-term
Plan of Action is to be established to ensure the target of making English the
working and business language of APEC economies can be met.
Conclusion
The consistency and coherence of Chile’s foreign policy are based on
the country’s continued adherence to the values and principles it has historically
upheld, respected and defended. These include strict compliance with
International Law, non-intervention in the affairs of other States, and the
integrity of treaties.
Chile’s efforts to restore democracy have yielded good fruit. These, in
turn, pose challenges inherent in and proportional to the results achieved.
As a result, continuity and change are the watchwords of this new phase
in our foreign policy. Continuity in defence and promotion of models of
international coexistence based on greater social cohesion and the advancement
of democratic rule. Change, meanwhile, in our stance toward the globalization
processes currently under way, concerning speedy technological advances and
the so-called “information society” and the surprising dimensions of the new
fields they have broached.
This historical development we are witnessing holds out more questions
than answers and more challenges than certainties. This is a powerful incentive
to employ our creativity and display our considerable potential. In order to
achieve development, we must make the most of the opportunities on offer
in a world where countries stake out their place on the basis of their national
and regional realities.
Latin America is the mainstay of our foreign policy. This is the geographic,
political, economic and cultural space we and our descendants live in and will
continue to inhabit. We are convinced that frontiers and countries are places
well suited to exchange, integration and fruitful dialogue where we can build
bridges that directly benefit our peoples.
Chile seeks the development of Latin America as a whole. Our
international action acknowledges the region as its base, the locus from which
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65
Chile opens its doors to the outside world. This is the starting point for us to
grasp firmly the opportunities globalization can afford, using all the spaces
and tools at our disposal.
Satisfactory accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives depends,
first and foremost, on our ability to pinpoint the issues that will drive the
future.
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he foreign policy of a country is determined by the combination of
the international reality and its internal situation. The irreversible dynamics of
globalization and the transnational phenomena that characterize it increase
this interdependence.
The current world offers numerous new opportunities that should be taken
advantage of, but they also carry threats of a global nature, attempting against
the structure of national societies and democratic governance of the States.
The historic situation that Colombia is going through highlights the
crudeness of this reality. Violence and insecurity generated by terrorism and
financed, with special strength in the country, by the transnational business of
illicit drugs – and related crimes: bad usage of chemical precursors, money
laundering, and illegal trafficking of firearms, ammunition and explosives –
and by other criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, compromise
the economic and social development of the nation, turn rule of law vulnerable,
weaken democratic institutions and affect the civilian population.
The Colombia’s
foreign policy: democratic
governance, shared responsibility,
and solidarity
Carolina Barco
*
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia
T
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This cycle cannot be broken if firm and decided commitment of the
international community is not added to the efforts and sacrifices of the
government and the Colombian people.
Colombia’s foreign policy cannot ignore this context. This is why it
should be used as support and complement to internal efforts to face the
challenges of national reality, in addition to the traditional purposes that
characterize international management of a developing country.
Reconfiguration of the world order
The world order is in process of reconfiguration – as is manifest by the
patent tension in the international community – between the unilateral actions
and the need to strengthen multilateralism and the Organization of the United
Nations in order to fulfill its purpose to preserve international peace and security.
In the words of UN’s Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the world faces
“old threats in new and dangerous combinations.” The new forms of terrorism
– financed with drug money – the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, the extrapolation of internal conflicts and the illicit traffic of
firearms are a few of the challenges that the international system is up against.
Also, it is mandatory to talk about the so-called non-armed threats, such
as the persistence of extreme poverty, the widening of the gap between rich and
poor countries, and the increase of exclusion in the bosom of national societies.
These phenomena are factors of instability that cannot be underestimated.
Consolidating combat to terrorism as one of the central points of
international relations and the consequent strengthening of the link between
foreign policies and security did not weaken the desire of a global order based
upon cooperation, solidarity, dialogue and negotiation.
This tendency coincides with the callings for social cohesion and
economic development as basis for a more humane globalization that favors
governance and consolidates democracy, and guarantees a fairer and more
just international system for all.
Colombia’s foreign policy does not ignore the complementary natures
of these two visions, seeking the active participation of the country in building
a new world order – perfecting both its insertion in the international community
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and its negotiating capacity – not forgetting the defense of its national interests
and the improvement of living conditions of our fellow citizens.
I. Guiding principles
Colombia’s foreign policy is a state policy whose cornerstone is the
connection to principles and norms of International Law established in the
Political Constitution and in the Charter of the United Nations. Among them
we highlight sovereign equality, non-intervention in internal affairs of other
states, good faith in fulfilling international obligations, peaceful solutions of
controversies, and abstaining from threat or use of force. Its management is
inspired, also, in the following guiding principles.
1. Democratic Governance
It is necessary to defend and preserve democratic governance in the
national realm. For this, the government committed to strengthen rule of law
and re-establish the empire of law in the national territory. The policy of
democratic security seeks to return security and order to Colombians and
guarantee the full exercise of democracy, as well as the basic rights and liberties,
in a context of political pluralism and citizen participation, and in the realm
of a total commitment to human rights and International Humanitarian Law.
This effort was followed by a responsible work in economic issues,
directed, mainly, to adjust finances of the State, reactivate the economy, generate
of jobs, and create essential social investment.
In addition, there were advances in public administration reforms to
adjust the institutions to the needs of the country and optimize the state’s
efficiency, without abandoning the firm commitment to combat corruption
and malfeasance of public resources.
With the drive to contribute to fulfill these goals, foreign policy is working
to obtain political support and concretization of commercial opportunities
and projects of economic and financial cooperation. It wants to highlight, in
the international scope, the objectives of the government in issues of equity,
reduction of inequalities, and defense of vulnerable populations.
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The greatest challenge of Colombia’s foreign policy, currently, is to
effectively transmit the message that Colombia is strengthening democracy
and governance in the national territory and promoting development with
equity; that it continues to fight against terrorism and perseveres in the
unbending commitment to combat drugs. But this effort is not enough: there
is the need for concrete, determined, and immediate actions from the
international community.
2. Shared Responsibility
Colombia’s foreign policy recognizes and values the existence of a shared
responsibility on the part of the international community in relation to the
world problem of drugs and related crimes as well as to combat terrorism and
its sources of money. This responsibility presupposes combining the firm
commitment of other states and of every international actor to the action of
the Colombian government, to contribute to eradicate these curses.
Whoever accepts shared responsibility accepts the integral nature of the
problems of global character, and, therefore, the need to face in a balanced
way every stage of the criminal chain not leaving aside the humanitarian crises
that may derive from these phenomena. Hence, it is a priority for foreign
policy to obtain international commitments to combat the diversion of chemical
precursors, money laundering, illicit trafficking of arms, ammunitions, and
explosives, as well as other activities such as kidnapping, extortion, and illicit
exploitation of natural resources that constitute substantial part of the sources
of financing of terrorism networks.
In the light of the principle of shared responsibility, Colombia supports
and promotes every international effort destined to combat activities that threaten
democratic governance and feed terrorism and violence in every latitude.
3. Solidarity
Colombia asked for support from the world to defeat terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations, being solidary to the world fight’s against this
phenomenon. This implies promoting frontal combat against it sources of finance,
closely linked to the criminal business of illicit drugs and its related crimes.
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International solidarity should translate into programs and projects that
complement the government’s efforts on economic and social issues and help
combat the effects of violence and the deterioration of the socioeconomic
tissue of the nation especially in areas where there are illicit plantations. This
is how foreign policy seeks to support social investment and the plans to
combat poverty, favor generation of jobs and increase of programs of
humanitarian assistance.
II. Strategic objectives
Colombia’s foreign policy is oriented to attain the following objectives:
1. Defend national sovereignty and stimulate the total
development of the frontiers
Ensure the integrity of the territory and stimulate concerted development
of the frontier zones are purposes that reflect the highest interests of the
nation. In order to fulfill it, and under the direction of the President of the
Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs currently leads the implementation
of a double strategy that tries, firstly, to defend and underwrite Colombia’s
jurisdiction in the spaces of its maritime and terrestrial sovereignty, in
conformity to the principles and norms of International Law. Particular
emphasis is given to the safeguard of Colombia’s rights and interests before
the demands imposed by Nicaragua before the International Court of Justice,
while links with bordering countries are strengthened at the same time.
Highlighted among them are the integration spaces, such as the
neighborhood committees and the binational committees, besides other
mechanisms, such as the Colombia-Venezuela presidential negotiation committee.
Secondly, there is an inter-sectorial committee of integration and border
development, which promotes enhancement of infra-structure, the realization
of productive projects with local and regional participation, and, generally, the
development of public policies to improve living conditions in the frontiers.
In the scope of the Andean community, there is promotion of a common
foreign policy and a joint policy of security to coordinate strategies in issues
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such as combating drugs, terrorism and frontier security. Also, there are advances
in implementing actions that generate benefits for the frontier population, in
the work areas, protection of the environment, and social protection.
2. Consolidate strategic bilateral relations
The relations of Colombia and other countries and groups of countries
should be seen as part of a comprehensive strategy to achieve the objectives
of foreign policy and of the goals predicted in the National Development
Plan. This strategy includes:
• Strengthening the links with Latin America and the Caribbean,
emphasizing the relations with neighboring countries;
• Consolidation of a strategic relation with the United States and
developing closer ties with Canada;
• Consolidation and development of a comprehensive agenda with Europe;
• Broadening and deepening a political dialogue and exchange with Africa
and the Middle East.
3. Defend and promote national interests in the multilateral
scenario
Colombia’s foreign policy is characterized by a firm commitment to
multilateralism. That is reflected in its active participation in international fora,
particularly in those that deal with themes of the global agenda pertinent to
Colombian reality.
This seeks to promote international actions on issues related to the
situation of the country and obtain support for the efforts destined to boost
economic and social development.
In the global front, we prioritize:
• Strengthening multilateralism;
• Defending and promoting human rights and International Humanitarian
Law;
· Social equity and human development;
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• Treating the world problem of drugs and combating terrorism,
corruption, and organized crime;
• Protecting and preserving the environment;
• International cooperation; and
• Relations with non-governmental organizations and other actors of
civil society.
4. Support the policies of the National Plan of Development in
the international scope
The National Plan of Development pointed out four basic objectives
regulating government actions – guarantee democratic security, promote
sustainable economic growth and the generation of jobs, construct social equity,
and increase transparency and efficiency of the state – thus directing foreign
policy to support the implementation of these objectives.
On issues of democratic security, we seek the global support to combat
terrorism and drugs, striving to improve the understanding of the reality of
the country by the international community.
Sustainable economic growth is stimulated through international
negotiations to obtain financial resources and to have preferential agreements
of trade and investment with countries or regions of special importance for
Colombia. The political support of the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Colombia’s
negotiations of economic and commercial nature is an important component
of this effort.
Social equity and human development seek programs of technical
assistance and projects of cooperation in strategic areas for economic and
social development. Besides, the Ministry follows the international accords
signed by Colombia in this area, and the management of program of
humanitarian assistance.
Lastly, the Ministry is working with the Vice-Presidency of the Republic
in the fight against corruption and political influence, and for the state’s
transparency and efficiency.
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5. Improve the comprehension of the reality of the country
abroad
Limited or biased perceptions of the reality of the country are an obstacle
for the full development of political, economical, and commercial relations
with other states, also making the actions of Colombia in international
organizations and in fora of regional of hemispheric character difficult. Besides,
they harm communication with non-governmental organizations and other
actors in civil society.
Therefore, the main goal of Colombia’s foreign policy is to seek a better
understanding of the country’s situation on the part of the international
community by correcting these perceptions.
The realization of this objective implies developing a communication
strategy in coordination with the Presidency of the Republic. It implies, also,
recognizing and potentializing the work of businessmen, scientists, artists,
sportsmen, and other compatriots that are part of Colombia’s presence abroad
and help promote the image of the country.
It demands, equally, efficient work on the part of the embassies and
consulates, on issues such as promoting our biodiversity, the widespread and
use of Colombian cultural richness, creation of spaces of dialogue with civil
society and promoting and forming study groups about the Colombian reality.
6. Strengthen links with Colombian communities abroad.
Currently, 4.5 million Colombians – about 10% of the population – live
abroad. The government is committed to strengthening the links with our
communities abroad – establishing a two-way communication with them, for
mutual benefit – recognize them as vital part of the nation, and make them
targets of public policies.
With this objective, programs are being designed to improve the living
conditions of out compatriots in the different countries of residence and
their process of insertion in local societies. A few lines of action used by the
government to reach these goals are signing labor, emigration, education, and
social security agreements with countries recipients of Colombian emigrants;
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promotion of programmed savings account to purchase housing in Colombia;
possibility for the emigrants to access housing credit in the country; and
reduction of costs of money orders.
In addition to this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognizes the need
to strengthen consular assistance in legal and social issues and inform our
compatriots about their rights and obligations as immigrants.
The importance of the work that the members of the Colombian
community abroad is undeniable, especially those organized in associations.
For this reason, we promote the configuration of thematic and geographic
networks, as well as initiatives that allow involving them in planning, developing,
and, also, financing programs and social projects productive for the country.
Likewise, we try to take advantage of the potential of Colombian
businessmen, creators, or researchers whose work have international
recognition, so that they contribute with the basis of their experience in other
countries for the economic, cultural, and scientific development of the nation.
Although the government is not able to provide every solution, it has
the responsibility and the duty to facilitate the encounter and foster the contact,
and, in what touches the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, give effective answers.
III. Lines of action
Colombia’s foreign policy is structured according to thematic lines of
action, on one hand, and on the other, along geographic areas. The thematic
lines of action correspond, in their majority, to themes of the global agenda
approached multilaterally, mainly, but are also integral part of the foreign policy
strategy in the bilateral level. Lines of action by geographic areas touch upon
themes from a regional perspective.
A. Thematic lines of action
1. Strengthening multilateralism and its action in Colombia
Foreign policy seeks to promote an active participation in the international
fora – governmental and non-governmental – and in the spaces where themes
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of interest for the country are debated. We pursue, thus, the consolidation of
relations with international organizations, their agencies and other bodies,
especially with those that play an important role in defining of implementing
programs in Colombia.
Besides, strengthening multilateral instances is considered of vital
importance to guarantee more democratic and balanced international decision
processes. In this regard, strategies of participation in fora of agreements
with the Movement of the Non Aligned Countries and the Group of the 77
are promoted.
The Organization of the United Nations
Colombia highlights and defends a preponderant role for the
Organization of the United Nations in preserving and constructing
international peace and security, in promoting economic and social development
of peoples, and in fostering international cooperation.
Its continued commitment to strengthening the Organization can be
verified, for example, in the support for initiatives destined to adapt its
operational system to the new realities of the international system. This was
obvious in Colombia’s most recent action as a member of the Security Council
of the United Nations, when it had the chance to promote, in this Council,
the discussion of themes of interest for the country, such as traffic of firearms
and protection of civilians in armed conflicts.
In turn, the United Nations has had a particular relationship with
Colombia, based, mainly, on the support that this Organization and its
specialized agencies offer to the efforts to restore peace and democratic
governance in our country. In this regard, the joint work with the UN’s
Secretariat and, especially, with its Secretary-General, grants priority character
to the country. Colombia’s government has requested, valued, and supported
the good offices of the Secretary-General to explore ways for peace with
illegal armed groups, based upon an effective ceasing of hostilities.
Also, the work of the funds and agencies of the UN system in searching
solutions for the humanitarian problems that the country is going through is
highlighted. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works with these funds and
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agencies to coordinate and monitor the programs of cooperation and assistance
to benefit the affected people by the different manifestations of violence,
particularly of dislocated populations.
Lastly, the decision to extend in four years the term of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia was adopted within the
spirit that inspires the government to promote policies of democratic security
in rigorous respect for human rights and for International Humanitarian Law,
reflecting a disposition of collaboration and closeness that guides the
relationship between Colombia and the UN system and its agencies.
The OAS and the inter-American system
The Organization of American States – a privileged scenario for
Colombia’s foreign policy – plays a principal role in maintaining the democratic
and security order in the hemisphere today, as well as in implementing treaties
attained in the Summit of the Americas and in the consolidation of a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (Ftaa). It will also play an important role in seeking
peace in our country.
Colombia’s foreign policy supports the work of the Organization while
seeking:
• To strengthen the Unit to Promote Democracy, that seeks to fulfill the
purposes contemplated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter;
• To advance the works to reinforce the system of collective security in
the hemisphere and the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism;
(Cicte);
• To strengthen and consolidate the Inter-American System of Human
Rights;
• To promote the Consultative Committee for the Inter-American
Convention Against Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (“Cifta
Committee”);
• To increase the role of the Organization in the process of monitoring
the Summit of the Americas; and
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• To progress in the implementation of the multilateral mechanism of
evaluation in combating drugs.
Other organizations and multilateral regional mechanisms
Colombia’s participation in organizations and in the mechanisms of
agreements and hemispheric and regional integration is a fundamental tool of
management of foreign policy and obeys the constitutional mandate that binds
the country to regional integration.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to privilege regional
scenarios and fora, such as the Andean Community, the Group of Rio, the
Group of Three, the Treaty of Amazon Cooperation, the Association of
Caribbean States, Caricom, Ibero-American Summit, and the Summit of the
Americas, to promote joint strategies in the area and stimulate economic and
social development, democracy, and governance. In these scenarios it will also
seek to advance in combating illicit drugs, illicit traffic of arms, ammunitions
and explosives, money laundering, terrorism, corruption, and organized crime.
2. Defense and promotion of human rights and International
Humanitarian Law
Violence derived from drugs and the growing threat of terrorism affect,
mainly, the civilian population. Therefore, the government adopted a policy
of promotion and protection of human rights and defense of the International
Humanitarian Law that requires the support of the international community
to increase its effectiveness.
To prevent violations and combat impunity, it is necessary to develop
actions such as identification and prevention of forced movements; implement
measures that will promote International Humanitarian Law; strengthen
administration of justice, especially in the cases related to human rights; and,
no less importantly, strengthen and modernize institutions.
In the scope of the Inter-Sectoral Unit of Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law, the state keeps a permanent dialogue with
international organizations, which contributes to the implementation of the
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mains international instruments of human rights in the inter-American system
and of the UN system.
The participation in specialized multilateral fora is another means utilized
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its active search for support and
cooperation with those that can contribute to solve the humanitarian situation.
So, the Ministry has tried to coordinate donors and international agencies that
collaborate in this search.
Internal dislocations are one of the social phenomena that concern the
government and the international community the most, in such a way that, in
addition to managing the resources and coordinate activities with other
countries and organizations that give humanitarian aid and along with the civil
society, the Ministry has developed efforts to consolidate trustworthy statistics
that will facilitate the design of solutions in accordance with the needs of the
affected population.
3. Social equity and human development
The economic crisis and the problem derived from violence and traffic
of illicit drugs in Colombia have caused a great deterioration of the social
indicators and of human development, especially in certain regions and
population groups. Bearing this panorama in mind, the government had to
face three great challenges: increase the efficiency of social expenditures, take
resources to the neediest, and consolidate a system of protection and social
assistance to mitigate the effects of the social crisis and fiscal adjustment.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is committed to constructing social
equity and human development – goals spelled out in the Development Plan
– so one of the purposes of its foreign policy is to promote this agenda at the
international level. For this, we actively participate in international fora that
deal with issues such as social development; elimination of discrimination
against women and the role of women in maintaining peace and security; the
rights of children and adolescents; HIV/Aids; the elderly; the rights of
emigrants; and protection of indigenous communities and other minorities.
Coordinating Colombia’s position in these meeting with government
entities and civil society organizations; monitoring Colombia’s commitments
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in special assemblies and world conferences held about these themes – where
we can point out the UN’s Summit of the Millenium – and developing activities
that will publicize the agreements reached within the country, and promote
compliance to them is an integral part of foreign policy.
4. The fight against the world problem of drugs and terrorism
In the same way that the illicit trade of diamonds, timber, and other
natural resources feed armed conflicts in other latitudes, in Colombia the
business of illicit drugs and related crimes harm democratic governance to
the extent that they contribute to the degradation of the political situation,
deterioration of the economy, weakening of institutions, and destruction of
the social tissue. They are one of the causes for violence and its principal
source of finance, and, along with capturing the surplus in the petroleum
industry and its byproducts, they feed terrorism, which make the civilian
population and a society as a whole vulnerable.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively seeks international support for
government policies, aiming to eradicate drugs and defeating terrorism, through
projects of technical cooperation and assistance in the military and police
areas, as well as with international agreements to strengthen activities of judicial
assistance and promote projects of alternative development.
It also encourages the implementation of international agreements about
terrorism and promotes the approval of agreements that Colombia is still not
a party of, in addition to negotiating new instruments in the hemisphere and
in the Andean region.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs promotes the initiative
of the international community to reduce the demand of drugs, control of
commerce of chemical precursors, and money laundering. Also, it encourages
adopting measures that help combat kidnapping and extortion, sources of
financing of terrorist groups.
Foreign policy is particularly occupied with the issue of controlling the
illicit traffic of small and light weapons, whose discussion is promoted by
Colombia at the United Nations – both in the General Assembly and in the
Security Council – and in the Organization of American States. Likewise, it is
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pertinent to highlight the commitment the country has to implement
international accords about anti-personal mines.
5. Protection and preservation of the environment
Colombia is one of the five countries with the greatest biodiversity in the
planet, which represents an asset that strengthens the positions of the country
in different spaces of negotiation, but implies an international responsibility.
Colombia’s foreign policy demands, in the international arena, the
principle of common responsibility although differentiated, due to which
developed countries should take the lead in problems as grave as climate change
and its adverse effects, and provide financial assistance to developing countries.
In this way, our country has defended the focus of precaution, established in
principle 15 of the Declaration of Rio About the Environment and
Development as the directing axis of multilateral environment agreements.
Colombia’s international strategy on issues of the environment includes
the participation of international negotiations of a bilateral or multilateral
manner, especially those of the United Nations Program for the Environment
– such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Forum
on Forests, International Tropical Timber Organization, and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol – as well
as the monitoring of the different agreements.
In addition to the initiatives resulting from the implementation of Colombia’s
environmental agenda, foreign policy tries to support programs of cooperation
that complement the national strategy based upon the three pillars of sustainable
development: social, economic, and environmental issues. The inter-relation
between environment and development occupies a central place in the conclusions
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, as well as in
the decisions of the environmental conventions of the United Nations.
6. International cooperation
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with its network of diplomatic
representation, is the central point of the effort to materialize the commitment
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of the international community to implement the National Development Plan,
since international cooperation can no longer be seen with the traditional point
of view of aid to development, but an integral tool for it.
From this perspective, Colombia has sought, on the one hand, a bilateral
approach with different countries, and on the other, the realization of an
International Table of Coordination and Cooperation, proposed as a space
for open bilateral and multilateral negotiation, that will channel official aid to
development – coming from the international community and from the national
and international private sectors – for six priority areas:
• Democratic governance;
• Attention to dislocated persons and programs of humanitarian
assistance;
• Demobilization and reinsertion of members of armed groups;
• Regional programs of development and peace;
• Productive development; and
• Preservation and protection of forests.
International cooperation can and should be an instrument to strengthen
Colombia’s relations with other third-world countries, the reason so much
importance to horizontal cooperation is given, that aims to take advantage of
our experience to find solutions for common problems in the developing world
and strengthen the technical capacity of national institutions.
7. Relations with civil society
Colombia’s foreign policy recognizes the growing importance of non-
governmental actors in the international context and values their
independence and critical sense in their analytical task, elaboration of
proposals, and monitoring of the international agenda. Consequently, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to consolidate, along with the non-
governmental organizations and other entities of civil society – such as
political parties, foundations and think-tanks – a relationship based on
transparency and mutual respect, that will favor an open debate about
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international management and themes of the world agenda strategic to the
country.
B. Lines of action by geographic areas
1. Latin America and the Caribbean
The geographic and cultural surroundings of Colombia are regions of
Latin America and the Caribbean, and the relationship with countries in this
region is a natural priority of the country’s foreign policy.
The consolidation of this relationship has two main purposes. The first
of them is to reinforce bilateral links strengthen the political dialogue about
themes of common interest, and promote commercial exchange, while the
second purpose is to defend national interests – starting with our sovereignty.
With the neighboring counties, we try to support programs of frontier
security and the wholesome development of the frontier areas, as well as advance
in the different themes of the binational agenda pertinent to neighborhood
committees, a mechanism that remains useful as a space for dialogue and
integration. Besides these committees, there are binational committees that are
an efficient way to tighten links with countries to which we are bound by fraternal
ties and regional and thematic coincidences that should be preserved and
strengthened, as well as mixed committees of cooperation that offer another
space of work to consolidate relations with other countries in the region.
Colombia’s foreign policy wants to energize the projection of the country
in the Caribbean as a whole and exert leadership in the fora of integration and
agreements in the area, especially in the Association of the Caribbean States
and the Group of Three.
2. Regional integration and agreement
Integration with Latin America and the Caribbean is a constitutional
mandate, in obedience to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts,
simultaneously, in different scenarios of integration, with economic, political,
social, and cultural objectives.
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In the Andean Community, we seek a multi-dimensional integration that
will strengthen community market and ease negotiations of agreements with
other countries and regional groups.
Through a common foreign policy, we seek to revitalize the Andean
agenda with the following principal objectives:
• Consolidate democracy;
• Strengthen peace and security;
• Combat drugs, terrorism, and corruption;
• Eradicate poverty; and
• Sustainable development and economic integration.
There was also progress in consolidating a common policy of Andean security,
to establish commitments and perform joint actions that will allow us to efficiently
face problems such as delinquency and organized crime, illicit drugs, and terrorism.
Our foreign policy tries to deepen the current integration processes,
such as the Group of Three, persist in the existing processes of integration
with other countries, such as Chile; and tighten economic, commercial and
political relations with critical regions for the country, such as Central America,
the Southern Cone and Caricom.
The efforts developed within the Group of Rio continue to be vital for
Latin-American understanding, still applicable in foreign policy. For Colombia,
this forum is not only a space for reflection, consultation and construction of
common regional positions around the great international themes, but also a
mechanism that favors and reinforces the capacity to talk with other countries
and groups of countries, such as Canada, China, Russia, Japan, the European
Union, the Community of Independent States, and the Asean, among others.
Lastly, the country’s active participation in developing the Amazon Cooperative
Treaty aims to implement programs of use and development of Colombian Amazon,
the use of its biodiversity and increase and improve infrastructure.
3. United States and Canada
Colombia has maintained a strategic relationship with the United States,
a relationship that tightened and increased in the last decades due to the joint
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combat to illicit drugs and related crimes, and, more recently, in the area of
cooperation between the two countries in combating terrorism. The
government proposes to strengthen the channels of communication, as well
as to increase and consolidate the existing cooperation.
The United States is Colombia’s principal trade partner and one of the
main sources of investment, and offers support through multilateral credit
organizations – an important factor in seeking macroeconomic stability and
in financing and growth of Colombian economy.
Our foreign policy wants to strengthen economic cooperation with the United
States, increase and diversify commercial relations, promote the use of the benefits
of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Atpdea) and encourage
new investments, agreements of cooperation, and technical and financial assistance.
With this purpose, there was advance in the negotiation of a bilateral
free trade agreement, parallel to the process of negotiation of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (Ftaa).
On another front, we continue to insist on the work of promoting the
adoption of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Colombians residing
in the United States.
The priority goal of Colombia’s foreign policy is to strengthen ties with
Canada, with whom we have been building a tight relationship based on
common interests, among which we highlight strengthening multilateralism
as a tool to reach a fair and solidary international order, and the need to promote
a hemispheric agenda in the area of the Summit of the Americas.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to advance the common agenda
with Canada on issues like intensifying the political dialogue, signing a bilateral
trade agreement, and developing projects of cooperation in human rights and
International Humanitarian Law and to tend to the population affected by
violence. Likewise, we seek to encourage preservation and promotion of
cultural diversity and an agenda of connectivity.
4. Europe
The European Union is – and should be more and more – a strategic
ally for Colombia bilaterally, in the context of the Andean Community and in
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the area of the Biregional Summit Between the European Union, Latin America
and the Caribbean.
Colombia’s foreign policy in Europe aims to enrich the political dialogue
and deepen economic and commercial relations, trying to preserve, as much
as possible, Andean preferences. Still, we try to attract European investments
and promote the adoption of a migration policy that is more flexible for
Colombians.
Starting with the Andean Community, Colombia has developed a solid
relationship with the European Union, which should be strengthened with
the signature of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement. This
agreement will allow us to deepen themes of mutual interest, especially those
related to defense and strengthening of democratic principles and institutions,
governance, social justice, human rights, sustainable development, combating
poverty, prevention and resolution of conflicts, and the integration of both
regions. No less important are the improvement of commercial access to
European market and combat terrorism and corruption, as well as the world
problem of drugs and transnational organized crime.
We also work to solidify the European support to priority programs of
Colombia’s Government, such as those relative to alternative development of
microcredit. At the same time, we try to strengthen cooperation on issues of
human rights and solidarity of the countries of the European Union on
humanitarian issues, particularly in regards to the phenomena of dislocation
and attention to populations more affected by violence.
5. Asia and the Pacific region
Foreign policy in relation to Asia and the Pacific region intends to increase
the spaces of political cooperation, promote economic and commercial interests
of the country in those regions, attract sources of investment, and encourage
new projects of assistance, especially scientific and technological.
The action of the Ministry tries to implement effective insertion of
Colombia in the Pacific basin, maximizing the work of regional embassies
and insisting on the effort of promoting and encouraging Colombia’s
participation in organizations of cooperation of the Pacific – Pacific Economic
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86
Cooperation Council (Pecc), Pacific Basin Economic Council (Pbec), Forum
for Dialogue and Cooperation between East Asia and Latin America (Focalae)
– thus making possible the entrance of the country in the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperatiom (Apec).
6. Africa and the Middle East
Colombia shares, along with many of the countries of this region, inter
alia, the objective of building an international system that is more just and
balanced. What unites us is not only the ties of solidarity, but the concerns
inherent to the countries that suffer with internal conflicts and humanitarian
problems that derive from them, in addition to the reflection around the social
dilemmas inherent to developing countries.
Colombia’s foreign policy actively promotes strengthening of political
and economic relations and cooperation with Africa and the Middle East in
the bilateral area and in international fora and organizations.
IV. Institutional strengthening of the ministry of foreign
affairs
The development of foreign policy requires a more efficient management
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, product of professionalization and
modernization of the foreign service, and implementation of mechanisms of
coordination, monitoring, and accountability of the diplomatic service. There
have been advances in this process, whose priority is to give support to
economic, commercial and financial management of the government,
emphasizing development of abilities in the areas of international negotiation
and the establishment of abilities in the areas of international negotiation and
of efficient channels of communication among the missions abroad and the
Ministry in Bogota.
Thus, in trying to make the work of Colombian embassies and diplomatic
headquarters abroad more efficient and coherent with the policies of the
government, we systematized the flow of information related to strategic
themes for the government to the embassies to ensure a unified discourse. We
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also systematized the flow from the embassies, of analytical information about
the perception of the country abroad and other themes of interest to design
foreign policy. As part of this proposal, the results of each headquarter is
evaluated based on the annual plan of action they designed.
Parallel to this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reinforcing inter-sectorial
coordination in themes of the international agenda, strengthening its role as
an executive entity of foreign policy.
On the other hand, we expect to consolidate the Diplomatic Academy
as an organ of training for the foreign service and as a center of ideas that will
contribute to design diagnostics and formulate strategies.
In the same manner, in the area of policies of austerity, we try to
rationalize public expenditures, insisting on efficiency, economy and timeliness,
based upon criteria of proportionality and priority of the national interest.
For this, a few embassies and consulates were closed and there was progress
in implementing regional embassies that will answer to the needs of foreign
policy in specific geographic areas, such as the Caribbean.
Mechanisms of support, information, and monitoring
The effective coordination, information and monitoring of the planned
goals are necessary to fulfill the objectives and establish priorities of foreign
policy. With this in mind, the following actions are developed:
• Information and communication media. Information and monitoring of the
international effort are done based upon a public diplomacy that will
disseminate information, both in Colombia and abroad, about the policies
of the government and of the different aspects of the complex national
reality, through seminars, academic colloquia, and other activities that favor
the necessary exchange between the government and civil society and
inform public opinion about the development of Colombia’s foreign policy.
In the embassies, in the consulates and in Colombia’s missions abroad,
the importance of information is highlighted. We transmit the radio program
“Colombia in the World”, and the journalistic coverage of the Ministry was
improved by constant press releases, cultural releases, and communiqués. Also,
periodic work meetings are held with the media to facilitate objective coverage
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and true and opportune information of the themes related to the foreign
policy of the country. Lastly, the webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in the Internet,
http://www.minrelext.gov.co/Noticias, is updated daily with
news about international management.
• Support to businessmen and investors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
committed to support Colombian businessmen and investors who try
to open markets abroad and consolidate already existing commercial
or investment relations. For this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
working, in conjunction with the Ministry of Commerce, Proexport
and Convertir, to develop mechanisms that optimize the work of
embassies and consulates in this area.
• Interaction with embassies and diplomatic missions accredited in Colombia. An
adequate political management requires constant contact with the
diplomatic community in the country, which led the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to permanently provide the embassies and consulates accredited
in Colombia with information about strategic issues of the national
government, and periodically hold work meetings that favor the analysis
and comprehension of the national reality.
• Cultural management. Aware that cultural policy abroad is essential to
improve the perception of the country internationally, we decided not
only to facilitate the participation of Colombian artists and intellectuals
living abroad in the cultural life of the country, but to improve the
portrayal of Colombia’s culture abroad – emphasizing what can
contribute to promote Colombia’s image – and stimulate the participation
of the country in cultural and educational projects of regional and global
impact. We also emphasize seeking new resources to implement cultural
policies of the government and enrich and divulge our cultural diversity.
• Dialogue with civil society and the academic community. Participatory management
in foreign policy demands a permanent and fruitful exchange about
international management with the academic community and civil society.
For this, we expand the spaces of discussion and analysis through
seminars, colloquia, and publications. The Diplomatic Academy will be
a fundamental part of this effort.
Version: Vera Galante
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hat can be understood by foreign policy or international policy of a State?
According to Arturo Lecaro, International Policy “is the group of
principles, norms, and actions carried out by a State through its diplomacy, to
accomplish the permanent fundamental objectives within the context of its
relations with other countries and international organizations.”
Miguel A. Vasco, in his “Diccionario de Derecho Internacional Público” states
that Foreign Policy is “what the State develops to accomplish, in the
international plan, its fundamental political objectives” whose determinations
“are pertinent to the Chief of State, in close association to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and similar organisms; and its implementation to the diplomatic
agents accredited with governments with whom they maintain relations through
diplomatic negotiation.”
Jorge W. Villacrés, in his work “La política Económica Internacional de los
Estados Hispanoamericanos” expresses that Ecuador “since its creation … has
contributed and allocated its efforts to strengthen its fundamental basis of
every movement that, inspired in the supreme ideals of solidarity and
continental cooperation, tended to narrow cultural, legal, commercial and even
political connections among the American Republics.”
We can say, then, that the distinctive elements of the concept of foreign
policy are: firstly, basic norms or principles that regulate and orient the behavior
The Ecuador’s
foreign policy
Patricio Zuquilanda-Duque
*
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ecuador
W
The Ecuador’s foreign policy
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of the State in this issue; the other substantial elements are the objectives and
the purposes that the State itself proposes to achieve in a certain historical
stage, and, for that reason, may be permanent or transient; a third component
refers to the targets or subjects of international action, that is, the other
countries, and, in general, the international organisms; and finally, an instrument
or means to implement these policies or objectives taking into account these
directive principles and the context in which this action is developed, which is,
exactly, the Foreign Service.
Scope of action: fundamental principles and norms. Goals
of foreign policy. The international context.
The legal framework and the basis of Ecuador’s foreign policy are referred
to in the principles of the Political Constitution of the State. From a strictly
programmatic and conceptual point of view, they can be divided in two
categories:
On the one hand, those traditional principles that emanate from the
Interamerican Law and from the United Nations, through which peace and
cooperation as a system of camaraderie and legal equality of the states are
proclaimed; the condemnation of the use or threat of force as a means of
solution of conflicts, not recognizing plundering of weaponry as a source of
right. At the same time, it is those principles of the agreement, in which
international law is defended as the norm of conduct of the states in their
mutual relations and that, promoting the solution of controversies by legal and
peaceful methods that foster the development of the international community,
the stability and strengthening of their organisms, reject all forms of colonialism,
of neocolonialism, of discrimination or segregation and recognizes the rights
of peoples to self-determination and to self-liberation from oppressive systems.
On the other hand, there are norms and principles of action conceived
and developed in the last three decades, related to the challenges that the
country needs to face due to its social, economic, political, and security reality;
namely: sustainable development, social justice, struggle against corruption,
economic rights of the peoples, Human Rights, and economic integration,
especially Andean and Latin-American, as fundamental propositions and key
elements of international action of the Ecuadorian State, whose design and
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definition, by mandate of the Magna Charter, is pertinent to the President of
the Republic.
Without departing from these bright concepts that, throughout its
republican history Ecuador has highlighted and put at the forefront of its
international action, especially once the ancient territorial dispute with Peru is
overcome, considers that, currently, these last principles are, in good measure,
the conditioning and inductive elements of the external policies of the country.
In this regard, we observe that Ecuador, since its foundation in 1830, is
a democratic and republican country, that always privileged the values of
democracy and that the quest for its consolidation and perfection has been a
constant in the life of the country.
If a factor in particular characterizes national history, it has been the
progressive perfection of democratic institutionalism and the permanent quest
for a national consensus around central values that confer it the same validity;
respect for fundamental liberties, the need to consolidate rule of law and the
search for a greater social participation within this democratic scope.
As every developing country, Ecuador went through critical moments in
its history. However, even before the consolidation of democratic presidential
successions, in 1779 the respect to fundamental liberties and to human rights
was highly consistent in the country. There is a tradition of respect to human
rights in Ecuador and a very low level of social conflicts that, compared to
other countries in the continent, is verifiably low.
Ecuador had to face two considerable challenges in its history, with
significant implications in the direction of its foreign policy: the country was
practically born of a territorial dispute with its neighbors, that, throughout the
19
th
century and in a large part of the 20
th
century, represented a constant
challenge to its security and demanded enormous resources from a reduced
reserve of public funds.
The country has ahead approximately the same economic and social
obstacles the majority of the Latin-American Nations do: excessive
concentration of property and income, little social mobility, lack of connection
to international commercial networks, low level of accumulation of capital
and industrialization, problems of access to technology, scarce foreign
investment and chronic foreign debt, among others.
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The obstacles mentioned above acquired historic dimensions in the full
sense of the word. A large part of the avatars of national life is explained as
the struggle to overcome these obstacles. Along the way, there were
fundamental advances, but there is still a lot of road ahead.
Ecuador is aware that internal obstacles are, in good part, the result of
endogenous factors, which Ecuadorian society recognizes and the State tries
to respond to. But it also notices that there are important difficulties deriving
from international situations, which escapes the will of the country, such as
those referring to issues of security; to the structure of the economy; and to
international trade.
Ecuadorian foreign policy’s main challenge is to contribute to the solution
of the external factors that affect the opportunities of internal, social, and
economic development of the country.
To understand the international challenges of Ecuador, it is necessary
to have a foreign policy that mirrors the internal principals of the country and
covers its foreign needs.
Human rights
Ecuador’s Foreign policy in relation to human rights reflected the
commitment of the Ecuadorian State with the promotion and protection of
the fundamental guarantees of the person and the collective rights of vulnerable
groups in the country, strengthening international law, human rights and its
institutions in a universal scale.
Protection of human rights in our country is based upon the Constitution
of the Republic, whose article 3.2 says that it is a primordial duty of the State
to “ensure the validity of the human rights, the fundamental liberties of women
and men, and social security.” This basic principle is complemented with article
16 of the Fundamental Charter, which stipulates that the “highest duty of the
State consists in respecting and enforcing the respect the human rights that
this Constitution guarantees.”
Ecuador underwrote the 1948 Universal Declaration and is party to the
seven main international agreements on human rights of the United Nations.
In the end of 2000, Ecuador became the first country in Latin America to
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underwrite every international treaty on human rights that has been adopted
within the UN and in the Organization of the American State. These
instruments have the force of law in the country and may be evoked in national
courts. Article 18 of the Fundamental Law notes that “the rights and guarantees
determined in this Constitution and in the international instruments in place
will be directly and immediately applicable by and before any judge, court or
authority.”
In the 80s, the former Ecuadorian president Jaime Roldós Aguilera
proposed a principle that became a doctrine of universal acceptance:
international supervision of the protection of human rights in each country is
not opposed to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of the
States. Faithful to this principle, Ecuador officially notified its subjection to
watch groups of human rights agreements, and extended an open and
permanent invitation to the specialized mechanisms of the UN Human Rights
Committee, and always complied and complies with its obligations to the
Committee and to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights.
In addition to subscribing to international law of human rights, Ecuador’s
foreign policy promotes active participation of the country in international
fora and specialized organisms of human rights. Ecuador was a member of
the Human Rights Committee several times, and Ecuadorian experts such as
Ambassadors Luis Valencia Rodríguez, Julio Prado Vallejo, Jaime Marchán
Romero and Dr. Hernán Salgado were part of specialized international and
interamerican organisms. Among the Ecuadorians connected to international
institutions to promote human rights, it is pertinent to highlight particularly
former Foreign Affairs Minister José Ayala Lasso, who became the first High
Commissioner for Human Rights in the UN in 1994.
Ecuador’s foreign policy generated positive advances in relation to human
rights in the country. The country’s international action made the Ecuadorian
State promote, as a corollary of this international action, the advancement of
legislation and internal institutions of protection of such rights. The high
point of this beneficial connection was the adoption of the National Plan of
Human Rights as a State policy in June 1998.
For the application of a recommendation of the International Conference
on Human Rights of Vienna (1993), and after a wide process of consultations
and debate promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the participation
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of government and civil society, the President of the Republic adopted the
aforementioned National Plan by an executive measure. Currently the National
Plan is in its fifth year and grants support to a growing activity around programs
and projects that contemplate distinct aspects of human rights.
In the sub-regional scope, Ecuador also tried to contribute to the
extension and enrichment of the international law of rights. Five Presidents
of Andean Countries in the city of Guayaquil underwrote the Andean Human
Rights Charter on July 26, 2002, at the II Summit of South American Presidents.
The Andean Charter was prepared at the initiative of the Government and of
the Foreign Ministry of Ecuador was triggered, turning it into reality as the
fruit of coordination among Andean Governments and Ministries of Foreign
Affairs through a process with participants representing civil society and
organizations defending human rights of the five Andean countries.
With the adoption of the Andean Human Rights, the common policy
of the Andean Community of Nations was incorporated to an innovative
instrument that encompasses the so-called latest generation of human rights.
The Andean Charter was conceived starting from the specific perspective of
the Andean reality becoming an original contribution to the development of
international law of human rights.
The Andean Charter establishes priorities for the Andean Community
in relation to human rights, such as the rights of indigenous peoples and of
the communities of Afro-Descendants, economic, social and cultural rights,
and the human rights of vulnerable groups, who demand special social and
legal guarantees: children, women, migrants, physically handicapped, senior
citizens, inadapted, refugees, sexual minorities, persons deprived of liberties,
among others.
Even in the cases referring to a more ample sphere than that of human
rights, it is important to remember, due to their repercussions in the matter,
that in 2002 Ecuador ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court in July 1998.
Ecuador considers that the validity of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, is one of the greatest advances of the
international community following the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. One of the fundamental objectives of Ecuadorian foreign
policy in the multilateral scope is to foster greater international cooperation
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with the Criminal Court, thus supporting a the materialization of the principle
of universal jurisdiction, established in the Rome Statute.
National security and foreign policy
Historic circumstances determined that, once the century-old conflict
with Peru was solved, after the signature of the Agreement of Brasilia in
1998, Ecuador would face, almost immediately, an unprecedented threat derived
from the deterioration of Colombia’s internal conflict.
The internal conflict in Colombia is, thus, a significant factor that
threatens the country’s security, understood in its most complete notion:
military, police, economic, and social security.
At the end of the 90s, southeastern Colombia had become an area of
civil conflict, with a growing local rural population dislocated for war and
for the fumigation of thousands of hectares of illegal plantations. The so-
called Plan Colombia attempted to neutralize two factors of instability in
the neighboring country: guerrilla insurgence and paramilitary violence;
cultivation and traffic of drugs. Independently of its results within Colombia,
who Ecuador is not in a position to judge, our country had to face very
concrete challenges within its frontiers, as a consequence of the
aforementioned plan:
• Increment of the flow of people and families sheltered by the statute
of the refugees (more than 14 thousand people until the present date);
• Increment of the flow of Colombian citizens who migrate irregularly
to Ecuador (it is estimated that approximately 100 thousand people do
not have their documentation in order; in addition, approximately 150
thousand Colombians reside legally in the country);
• Increment of Colombian migration, especially in the Ecuadorian
provinces bordering Colombia, represents significant challenges in
security and rendering of public services for the Ecuadorian State (that
already has serious budgetary difficulties to meet the needs of its own
population);
• Military activities and conflicts verified in Colombia demanded a
strengthening of Ecuadorian military presence at the border.
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Although the Colombian conflict is carried out in another country’s
territory, over which Ecuador, naturally, has no control or even jurisdiction,
and although the Ecuadorian State cannot intervene in an internal crisis
according to international public law, Ecuador had to take measures in its
territory to prevent any breach in its security.
Ecuador sent more than seven thousand military and a thousand two
hundred policemen to the provinces bordering Colombia. This military effort
implies in the mobilization of an important part of the military personnel and
of the national police force, with a considerable expense of mobilization and
operation. In addition to this, such concentration of police forces reduces the
presence of the police in other points of the country, reducing the security for
citizens in the national territory in general.
The weight on the national budget, the problems of security, the demand
for public services and, in general, the efforts of the Ecuadorian State are
significant as a result of the indirect effects of the Colombian crisis.
Ecuadorian foreign policy, before the Colombian conflict, is the same
of any country’s when dealing with an internal problem of another nation.
Ecuador, faithful to the principals of international law, cannot, and it is not its
place to, intervene in any internal conflict.
Actually, non-interference in Colombia’s internal affairs does not prevent
Ecuador to collaborate in international efforts to combat illegal traffic of drugs
connected to that country. Narcotrafficking is a marginal activity, and once
international narcotrafficking networks operate in an international scale,
Ecuador decisively collaborates with the police and legal fight against this
curse. The international conventions and and the agreements of police and
legal collaboration, along with other countries demand Ecuadorian participation
in the effort.
It is Ecuador’s desire that the Colombian conflict be resolved within the
scope of the law of that country and supports every international effort done
to support the pacification of Colombia.
Ecuador desires, still, that the international community offers support
to face the indirect effects generated by the Colombian conflict in its territory.
In this regard, it collaborates closely with Unhcr in the issue of attendance to
the refugees or Colombian origin and aspires that international cooperation
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help resolve the serious economic impact that the provinces of the north,
bordering Colombia, suffer.
Ecuador aspires to remain unscathed before the maladies of violence and
organized crime. Sustaining the social network, which holds together its
development and generates favorable conditions for fruitful and creative work,
is security, personal security, security in its different manifestations, starting by
the one that grants trust and guarantees, mainly for the development of economic,
productive, and intellectual activities; preserve the integrity of the people and of
their possessions; guarantee the imperative of the law; the access, by every citizen,
to an efficient and opportune justice and the right to due process.
Security in the hemispheric realm
In this context, after great changes in the world with the end of the
problem of the Cold War, and according to what Ecuador expressed at the
Special Conference on Security held in Mexico, the historic context is radically
different in the current days.
Our America needs to update its challenges, redefine concepts, objectives,
and priorities of what “Hemispheric Security” means.
There is the need to identify and determine the mechanisms of collective
cooperation, in such a way that they cover, with balance, the interests demanded
by the peoples and the concerns of the States, bearing in mind the political,
economic, social, health and environmental aspects, in addition to concerns
of merely defensive or military nature.
In this realm, where we are still immersed in the process of reflection
and analysis, it is recognized and granted the issue of security, starting now, a
multidimensional scope, but when it is better defined, better structured, it will
constitute the main axis of modern American international law.
In this regard, we believe that a multidimensional approach to security –
innovative, non conventional, based upon the complete respect to international
law and in promoting and observing human rights, as well as the norms and
principles of the Charter of the OAS and the Charter of the United Nations,
that answer to the historic and social principles and concepts that the
hemisphere professes.
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An example that illustrates this agenda in all its dimension is the
phenomenon of the deterioration of the environment, a problem that, like
none other, is multifaceted because it transcends borders, the lines of
conventional limits that separate countries, to become what it really represents:
a globalized threat.
This is why, in its foreign policy, Ecuador understands that this
phenomenon, along with terrorism, organized transnational delinquency,
narcotrafficking, corruption, natural disasters, human drama of extreme poverty,
sickness and social exclusion, constitute vulnerabilities and serious challenges
for collective security, are serious and unacceptable curse against humanity.
Ecuador presented a proposal for the Declaration of Mexico to dedicate a
special paragraph to the Economic Security of the States, in the context of Article
37 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. In the same way, it
contributed enthusiastically to the adoption of paragraphs about the removal of
landmines, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the legal-institutional
connection of the Interamerican Defense Council as a technical advising body of
military, non-operational nature of the OAS and support to mutual assistance in
the case of natural disasters. It still presented a proposal about the access and right
that our peoples should have to a healthy and free of contamination environment,
in agreement with the Political Constitution of Ecuador.
The reform of the organization of the UN
Ecuador is one of the founding countries of the UN, and, as such,
assumes the fundamental principles that guide the Organization and the
international behavior of its member-states. As a member of the OAS, Ecuador
also postulates the principles of this organization in a regional scale.
The cooperation with other developing countries in international fora is
materialized also by belonging to the Non Aligned Movement and to the Group
of the 77.
Ecuador considers that the system of collective security in a planetary
scale, did not lose its validity, but certainly conceives the need for an institutional
reform to update the Organization of the United Nations in relation to new
international demands. Not only the Security Council, but the General
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Assembly and the Ecosoc, among other organs of the system, need to adjust
their structure and political procedures to the new times.
Equal geographic representation, greater transparency in the proceedings,
efficiency of its decisions and procedures a firmer and more efficient action
of the UN to solve problems of developing countries, that is, of the majority
of Humanity, are facets that, in a UN reform, cannot be left aside nor be
partially addressed if the desire to give the Organization a representative and
effective voice in the new millennium is real.
Ecuador supports the objectives of the Millennium Declaration, in its
political and security goals as well as those related to human development.
Only an Organization able to reform its institutional structure according to
the demands of the new times will be able to play its part in boosting,
multilaterally, the praiseworthy objectives of the Millennium Declaration.
Financial crisis. Emigration. Struggle against corruption.
In 1999 Ecuador suffered one of the most serious economic crisis in its
history, as a result of a group of factors that converged to a sudden race to
bank deposits. A fact that, in turn, generated lack of liquidity, and in some
cases, bankruptcy of several financial institutions with consequent loss for the
State – that through the Central Bank had granted last instance credit – as well
as for depositors in general.
Added to the financial unbalance, there was the fall of revenue from
petroleum, the increase of expenses due to political pressures and additional
expenses to purchase weapons and to face the phenomenon of El Niño – all
this generating extremely high interest rates and enormous suspicion of the
economy. The high rates deteriorated the situation of the debtors who were
not able to meet their obligations with the banks; the impact on the infra-
structure, provoked by El Niño; the fall of exports due to a fall in international
prices and a contraction of the markets, all this produced a liquidation of
capital; the excessive generalized debt of the business sector, a hyperinflation
higher than 500% and, finally, the freezing of deposits.
The implications of this crisis were devastating for the national economy,
for the productive chain and for society, especially for its most vulnerable
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segment. As a consequence of the closing of businesses, thousands of jobs
were lost, there was no liquidity, recession, hyperinflation, and strong devaluing
of currency. With the adoption of the American dollar in 2000, a new economic
scenery was configured, with the reduction of inflation and the increment of
public investment.
In the current scenario, the government proposes to support a production
reactivation, by maintaining dollarization, a responsible management of the
economy and public finance and the continuous improvement of competitivity.
Due to the enormous number of Ecuadorians who left their country
and dedicated themselves to finding the means for their subsistence and that
of their family members abroad (about 2 million in the last 2 years), the
consequences for the social aspects continue to be of concern.
Through foreign policy, the Ecuadorian state seeks the protection of
the migrant, tries to legitimize their stay in the countries of destination, with
the objective that they may exercise their rights of resident citizen, with the
faculties and obligations predicted in the laws of each country; orients as to
obtaining a job and protects the exercise and the compliance of human rights.
In this aspect the policy of the State is directed to protecting the family
of the migrant, through an effort of social assistance and economic counseling;
an articulation of actions that tend to attain a balanced economic and social
development and improvement of physical, economic and social conditions
of the sectors with greater impact in the migratory waves of the country.
Due to the established strategies, several instruments were underwritten,
one of them, with Spain, relating to the regulation and ordering of migratory
flows; and two others, with the International Organization for Migration, destined
to provide technical assistance and take care of the functioning of the Migrant
Screening Unit in the scope of the Agreements for Migratory Flows, respectively.
It is a known fact that, with the advent of the financial crisis, a group of
bankers deceived public faith and openly harmed both the State and the
depositors alike, in circumstances that the former had come to the rescue of
financial institutions, devoting enormous resources and putting at risk its own
institutional basis, its seriousness, and financial stability of the country.
Due to these precedents and interpreting the feeling of the Ecuadorian
people, it is especially important, one of the dearest postulates and objectives
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of the National Government, to use every expedient and legal means available,
both in the internal and international levels to guarantee, firstly, that the
resources belonging to society be recuperated and put at the service of its
development and well-being and, secondly, that the ones responsible for its
improper appropriation be available to the pertinent judges to receive a just
and exemplary punishment, in an act of long expected justice.
In this group of considerations and for personal convictions, the
President of the Republic, Engineer Lucio Gutiérrez, interpreting the feelings
of the Ecuadorian people and faithful to his campaign promises, decided that
the central theme to be developed in the next 34
th
General Assembly of the
Organization of the American States, in 2004, in the city of Quito be: “The
hemispheric struggle against corruption.”
This is to decisively contribute for the creation, development and
consolidation of a new, but efficient and considerate interamerican focus in
combating and eliminating this undesirable phenomenon that represents one
of the main causes – maybe the main cause – of the calamity and hindrance in
the social and political structures of the continent.
International cooperation
In the international scope, Ecuadorian foreign policy has a very precise
focus and inspiration: Ecuador is a party to international cooperation, both in
the collective security system and as a tool for economic and social development
of the peoples.
Ecuador’s insertion in the global economy
Article 4 of the Constitution lists the principles that govern the relation
between Ecuador and the International Community, and, in this aspect, in
item 3, it states that International Law is the norm of conduct of the States in
their reciprocal relations, while item 5 of the same article defends integration,
especially Andean and Latin American integrations.
Article 171 of the Magna Carta defines the attributions and duties of
the President of the Republic. Item 12 grants the Chief of State the power to
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define Foreign Policy, direct international relations, celebrate and ratify
international treaties and agreements, after approval by the National Congress,
when the Constitution so defines.
Finally, article 163 of the Constitution establishes the norms contained
in the international treaties and agreements, once approved in the Official
Gazette, will become part of the legal framework of the Republic and will
prevail over laws and norms of lower hierarchy.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter list the purposes and principles that
govern this organization. They are: to promote economic, social and cultural
development through cooperative action. It enunciates that international law
is the norm of conduct of the States in reciprocal relations, and that economic
cooperation is essential for the well-being and prosperity common to the
peoples of the continent.
Ecuador, in harmony with the decisions adopted in the 14
th
Meeting of
the Andean Presidential Council, backs and aligns a strategic vision in the
preservation of the common patrimony built in these 35 years of Andean
integration to advance to a second generation of policies.
The Cartagena Agreement
The Cartagena Agreement is the basic and fundamental norm of Andean
integration that confers the Andean community the legal international status
as a sub-regional organization. It was underwritten on May 26, 1969 by Bolivia,
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. In 1973, Venezuela joined the process,
and in 1976, Chile removed itself from it.
In its preamble, it states that integration constitutes a historical, political,
economic, social, and cultural mandate for their countries, in order to preserve
their sovereignty and independence.
Article 16 of the Agreement establishes that it is the responsibility of
the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs formed by the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the Member Countries of the Cartagena Agreement,
among others, to formulate foreign policy of the Member States on matters
of sub-regional interest, as well as to orient and coordinate the external efforts
of the different bodies and institutions of the Andean Integration System.
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On the other hand, Article 22 establishes that, among others, it the
responsibility of the Andean Community Commission, comprised of a
plenipotentiary representative from each Member Country’s government,
currently by the Ministers of Foreign Trade, to formulate and evaluate Andean
sub-regional integration policy in the area of trade and investment and, when
appropriate, in coordination with the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers.
In another scope, by the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo, the Contracting
Parties agreed to pursue the process of integration leading to promote
harmonious and balanced socio-economic integration of the region, and to
that effect, instituted the Latin-American Integration Association (Aladi), with
its headquarters in the city of Montevideo. The signatories of the Treaty of
Montevideo are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
When they underwrote the Treaty, the countries considered that regional
economic integration one of the main means for Latin American countries to
be able to guarantee a better level of life for their peoples. This process will
have as a long-term objective, the establishment, in a gradual and progressive
manner, of a Latin-American common market.
The goal of the Foreign Policy of Ecuador, regarding integration, cannot
be any other but those listed, firstly in a general manner by the Political
Constitution of the State in its articles 4 and 5, as they state that Ecuador in its
relations with the international community struggles for integration, especially
Andean and Latin-American; and that Ecuador may form associations with one
or more states to promote the defence of its national and community interests.
Secondly, and because of the remission that the Constitution makes to
the international treaties signed by Ecuador in relation to integration, is the
Cartagena Agreement, that says, in its Article 1, that one of its objectives is to
promote the balanced and harmonious development of the Member Countries
under equitable conditions, through integration and economic and social
cooperation; to accelerate their growth and the rate of creation of employment;
and to facilitate their participation in the regional integration process, looking
ahead toward the gradual formation of a Latin American Common Market.
The Agreement also seeks to reduce external vulnerability and to improve
the positioning of the Member Countries within the international economic
context; to strengthen sub-regional solidarity, and to reduce existing differences
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in levels of development among the Member Countries. These objectives are
aimed at bringing about an enduring improvement in the standard of living
of the sub-region’s population.
Ecuador has been one of the greatest propellers of Andean integration
from its start. These objectives have been permanent and, above all, seek to drive
the foreign relationship of the Andean Community in the political and commercial
aspect with Mercosur, the United States of America, Canada, the European Union,
China, Russia, and Japan, among the most relevant. In the same way, along with its
Andean partners, Ecuador tries to develop a Social Agenda with the approval of
an Integrated Plan of Social Development and broaden the participation of civil
society. Likewise, it has been a permanent champion of intra-sub-regional
cooperation on issues of security and trust, combat illegal drugs and felonies
connected to them, and of the broad theme of sustainable development, including
the promotion and the defence of our biodiversity. On issues of community policy
of integration and frontier development, Ecuador seeks the development of border
integration zones and the creation of binational centers of public service at the
borders. It also approved, along with its Andean partners, a Community Policy of
Border Integration and Development, a general mark of the goals directed for the
development of this theme.
Finally, one of its main objectives has been to push for the elaboration
of directives that will allow to design a new Andean institutionality taking into
consideration that, in the future, it will be demanded from it and from the
most developed processes of integration, that they be allowed to deal with the
new challenges and themes of the Andean community project in sectors.
Ecuador became the President of the Andean Community on June 28,
2003, for the period of one year.
As it became the President of the Andean Community, Ecuador
concentrated its efforts in the consolidation of the union of its members,
with the goal that the Chiefs of State of the Andean countries would commit
their political support destined again to potentialize the Customs Union, to
advance to a Common Market, to fulfil an Andean norm and for the
insitutionality of the Andean System of Integration. All this to solve, in the
short term, the objections that came up in these arenas.
This goal was based on the fact that the principal value that the Andean
Community has is the formation of a block that grants force to its members
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in negotiations with third parties. Ecuador also pushed for the inclusion of
social themes as fundamental points that should be considered in Andean
integration, and had not been prioritized in the past.
In the same way, when Ecuador proposed strategic directives – policies
related to economic dimensions, the Andean common market, the relationship
with third parties, the participation of civil society and Andean institutionality.
In the economic dimension, Ecuador managed to unite the criteria of the
member countries regarding the need to deepen, in the macroeconomic policies,
the possibility that they contribute for exchange rate stability and for the possible
broadening of an exchange rate safeguard, because these aspects bear upon
the Andean commercial flux.
As for the theme of the Andean common market, the importance of
consolidating a customs union, the current state of the external common
tariffs and the mechanism of stabilization of process for the agricultural sector
was highlighted. In this issue, it urged the member countries to adopt a
Common Policy of Farming and Cattle-Raising in a near date.
In the relationship with third parties, the participation of Ecuador was
crucial to demonstrate the need to conclude the negotiations between the
Andean Community and Mercosur before December 31, 2003, to create an
area of free trade between the two blocks, and thus, together face the challenges
that the Ftaa represents to the relationship with the European Union, as well
as to the possible negotiation in the political and commercial realm with the
United States and Canada.
Andean countries will adopt, by Ecuador’s request, the an Integrated Plan
of Social Development for the participation of civil society that will allow not
only to follow national policies to combat poverty, but also the insertion of
marginalized sectors, such as indigenous populations and consumers.
As a corollary to the Ecuadorian position, the creation of the Andean
Electoral Council and the consolidation of the Andean Tribunal of Justice
were considered essential. It also insisted on the need that the member countries,
even though this issue is still pending, elect the Andean parliamentarians directly,
a process produced only in Venezuela and in Ecuador.
All these objectives are the same persecuted by Ecuador in relation to
the integration of Latin America when it signed the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo,
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106
and are the same that it promotes when it negotiates, along with other Andean
countries or individually, commercial or political agreements with other
processes of integration or countries considered individually, as in the current
scenario, with special reference to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (Ftaa)
and the Treaties of Free Trade with Mercosur, the United States of America
and the European Communities, the latter to be negotiated in the course of
the following months.
In the current historical moment, the proximity of bilateral negotiations
for en eventual signature of the corresponding Treaties of Free Trade between
Ecuador/United States, and Ecuador/European Union to deepen and
institutionalize the commercial, economic and political relationship between
the parties is noticed.
With this objective in mind, for the implications that these negotiations
will have, not only in the commercial realm, but also in the context of the
international economic relations of the country, Ecuador is preparing itself to
adopt policies of ample reach to strengthen sectors of civil society such as the
labor and academic sectors, to guarantee the coordination and the coordinated
work of different national institutions, whose competence and areas of activities
have direct relation with the themes involved in the negotiations.
To fulfill this high objective, it is necessary to rigorously define the
interests and the national positions in the main themes and questions, in order
to reconcile, in the most egalitarian way possible, the aspirations and needs of
the different sectors of the economy, as well as others derived of the permanent
objectives, namely fight against poverty, social justice, adequate protection of
the environment, preservation of human rights and cultural, ecological and
productive diversity.
Environment
Ecuadorian territory is considered one of those having the greatest
biological diversity of the planet, and it is a basic obligation of the State to be
inclined for its sustainable development and for the preservation of its
environment. From this perspective, and in harmony with the postulates of
the Plan of Action of Johannesburg – paragraph 44 fights for sustainable
development in eradicating poverty. For these effects, Ecuador directs its
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policies to guarantee sustainable management of its natural resources and of
its biological diversity, as well as to avoid the current tendency to degrade it.
For these same considerations, it promotes actions directed to mitigate
climatic changes that generate each time greater risks in the global level, as
their adverse consequences, especially in the developing countries, and on their
economies; it encourages policies and actions to prevent and fight against
desertification, to mitigate the effects of drought, in conformity with paragraph
41 of the Plan of Action of Johannesburg.
To attain the aforementioned objectives, Ecuador proposes an active
participation in international conventions on matters of the environment and
sustainable development; in particular the Convention of Biological Diversity,
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Convention of the Fights against Desertification and Drought, the cites
convention about commerce and trade of endangered species, and the Ramsar
Convention (Irã) about the wetlands of national importance, among several
other multilateral accords to which Ecuador is a signatory.
It also proposes to establish synergies with national institutions connected
to sustainable development and the environment, as well as with organisms
of civil society to use experiences and knowledge as subsidies for its
participation in international meetings.
It also defends the creation of mechanisms to correct common positions
in relation to international conventions regarding sustainable development
and the environment with other nations and groups of countries, especially in
the scope of the Andean Community of Nations, in the Group of Like-Minded
Megadiverse Countries, in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean,
and in the scope of the Group of the 77 plus China; and the mechanisms for
the formation of Ecuadorian negotiators in the context of international
conventions about sustainable development.
Seeking to bring the application of the referred strategies to fruition,
Ecuador, in the orbit of the Convention of Biological Diversity, leads the
preparation of national positions for its participation in the Convention of
Biological Diversity, and, specifically, the meeting of the Subsidiary Body
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, Sbstta, as well as the
Conference of the Parties (COP7) of this Convention (Kuala Lumpur,
February 9-20, 2004), in the main themes, such as ecosystems of the
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mountains, protected areas and technological transfer and technological
cooperation.
In what regards the theme of Protected Areas, that will be the central
point of the Conference of the Parties, Ecuador is detailing a strategy about
the basis of the conclusions arrived at during the “National Congress about
Protected Areas” organized by the Ministry of the Environment.
Along with the National Committee on Climate, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs will coordinate the application of the results of the Ninth Conference
of the Parties of the Convention of Climate Change that was recently held in
Milan, Italy, and that had high transcendence to implement the Kyoto Protocol,
and important themes for developing countries, such as diminishing the effects
of climate change; adaptation to climate change; national communications;
training; technology transfer; special fund for climate change; mechanism of
clean development, among others.
In the same order of ideas, Ecuador supports the continuation of the
Project “Climate Change”, ECU/99/G31; updating the National Inventory
of Gases from the Greenhouse Effect, and the promotion of measures to
adapt to climatic change, consolidation of the work of the National Committee
on Climate, and encourage energy policies, as well as the use of the land
(agricultural and forestry) that contribute to the reduction of gas emission of
greenhouse effect.
In general terms, as thematic veins of foreign policy in matters of
sustainable development and environment, the theme of water and its
integrated management, protected areas, forests, sustainable development of
the mountains, access to genetic resources and a fair distribution of benefits,
biosecurity, among several other matters are highlighted. Among the most
relevant themes, deserving priority attention for the Ecuadorian state and for
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the conservation of the National Park and
the Marine Reservation of the Galapagos.
In this article, I listed the areas that have the greatest significance and
priority for the foreign policy of the country. In relation to them, I tried to
show the main directives of the foreign policy of Ecuador.
This paper shows the multiple connections existing between the
international action of the country and its day-to-day life; between foreign
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policy and internal policies in chapters such as the one on security, human
development, protection of the environment, and human rights, among others.
The inter-relation cited, makes very clear the concept that the Ecuadorian
State has about foreign policy: an additional tool of its general activity to
promote social and economic development of the country. This is why it
constitutes a primordial instrument, once it establishes and maintain contact
between the country and the community of nations, marked by the dynamics
of globalization; because foreign policy reaffirms the presence of the country
in international life, narrowing, at the same time, the links of cooperation
among peoples; and, finally, because foreign policy offers an opportunity that
the State and the Ecuadorian people contribute to the construction of a more
fraternal and harmonious world.
Version: Vera Galante
The Guyana’s foreign policy
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t the outset, it may be useful to list the principal objectives of the
nation’s foreign policy. Briefly stated, they are the following:
(a) the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
independence of Guyana;
(b) the promotion of the economic and social development of Guyana;
(c) the promotion of closer relations with Guyana’s diaspora;
(d) the maintenance of friendly relations with the nations of the world;
(e) ensuring that Guyana’s interests are made known and promoted in
the international community; and
(f) the promotion of the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter.
The Guyana’s
foreign policy:
Responses to a changing
world environment
Samuel Rudolph Insannally
*
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Cooperativist Republic of Guyana
A
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111
The post-colonial years
Ever since the country’s independence in 1966, these goals have informed
policy and decision making in foreign affairs. They have thus remained constant
and firm, adapting as necessary strategy and diplomacy to new circumstances
and challenges. The principal concerns have been with security and economic
development – ends that are essential to the nation’s survival and prosperity.
At the same time, the country has sought to play, notwithstanding its limitations
of size and resources, an active and influential role in international affairs.
This role has served the country well since it has brought it not only prestige
and respect but also, very importantly, valuable support for its major foreign
policy aims.
Like so many other countries that were born out of a colonial past,
Guyana was quickly caught up in the struggle with anti-imperialism and anti-
racialism. At the United Nations which it hastened to join after gaining its
independence in 1966, it became an ardent advocate for the self-determination
of peoples, the promotion of global peace and stability and the achievement
of a new and more equitable international economic order. To escape the
political constraints of the Cold War, a commitment was made to non-
alignment in the belief that this would provide it with greater autonomy in
foreign policy making. Similarly, it opted for membership of the G77 to make
common cause with other developing countries in the search for greater
economic and social advancement. Whatever the forum, Guyana often found
itself in leadership positions which it utilised to make the international
environment more responsive to its needs and concerns.
Although ambitious and enterprising, Guyana’s foreign policy options
were circumscribed by a persistent border controversy with Venezuela, its
western neighbour. The latter, having accepted the actual territorial boundaries
for more than sixty years, suddenly laid claim to almost five-eighths of Guyana’s
territory. Starting with its occupation of the Guyanese part of Ankoko Island,
Venezuela proceeded to instigate a rebellion in the Rupununi region and to
annex maritime areas in the Essequibo. It also effectively denied Guyana’s
participation in several important hemispheric bodies and used economic
coercion to frustrate Guyana’s development of the territory under claim. Not
surprisingly, this controversy, together with a dispute on the Suriname side,
has seriously prejudiced the country’s prospects for stability and development.
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Guyana is determined, however, to find peaceful solutions to the problems as
prescribed by the United Nations Charter (Art. 33).
In the absence of any significant military capability to resist aggression,
Guyana must rely on diplomatic and moral persuasion to protect its sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Accordingly, as a matter of policy, it has sought to win
sympathy and support for its position by cultivating good relations with all
friendly and peace-loving states and by insisting on full respect for international
law and the principles and purposes of the United Nations. At the bilateral
level, it has always subscribed to dialogue with both Venezuela and Suriname
in the interest of maintaining good neighbourly relations. It has also promoted
economic and technical cooperation as a means of transcending immediate
difficulties and of reaching a higher level of peaceful co-existence and
collaboration. At the multilateral level, Guyana has mounted a diplomatic
offensive to reject Venezuela’s attempt at aggrandizement. Although relations
with both Suriname and Venezuela are fairly cordial the underlying problems
remain, always testing Guyana’s diplomatic skills and resources.
The Post-Cold War Period
The changes which occurred in the world at the end of the Cold War
caused a major reorientation of foreign policies in countries everywhere. Gone
was the “stability” provided by the balance of the ideological forces between
East and West and with it, the strategic position which developing countries had
long enjoyed, playing off one titan against the other and securing for themselves
political and economic advantages from both. Suddenly, with global détente,
comfortable old policies such as neutrality and non-alignment were shaken to
their foundations as states were forced to adapt to a new world order.
A triumphant West has now combined with a defeated East to form a
dominant North, much more capable of exercising political and economic
control over a weakened South. No longer can developing countries such as
Guyana rely on autonomy of action since the strategic ground which they had
successfully held during the Cold War was suddenly removed from under their
feet. The new concentration of political ideology, economic policy and military
might have little tolerance for deviants, demanding instead full and unwavering
compliance. Most developing countries, particularly small and vulnerable states
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113
have no other option than to accept and follow the neo-liberal principles of
the free-market, popularly known as the Washington Consensus. The age of
globalization has arrived, defying all states to liberalise or perish. Guyana’s
foreign policy must perforce take account of these developments and to reorient
itself to find a place in the global economy.
The new challenges to peace and development
Experience has since shown that while the winds of globalization have
speeded more developed economies to havens of greater prosperity, they have
left weak economies, such as those in the Caribbean, with further stagnation.
As studies undertaken by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the World Bank
have concluded, Caribbean countries continue to be prey to hazards such as
natural disasters, fluctuating export prices, income volatility, weak
infrastructures and limited productivity. The HIV/Aids pandemic also takes a
heavy toll on those countries’ human and financial resources. Added to these
disadvantages are the new threats to security, stemming from arms and drugs
trafficking and fomenting transnational crime. Small countries like ours are ill-
equipped to deal with such sophisticated aggression and can hardly avoid the
dangers which it poses to their societies. A top priority is therefore the
strengthening of our law enforcement capacity and the legal system as a whole
to protect the society from these scourges. Security – in its broadest term –
has thus become a paramount concern on the foreign policy agenda.
Also of clear impact on the country’s capacity for policy-making – both
domestic and foreign – is its financial situation. As a designated beneficiary of
the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) initiative, Guyana has only recently
reached the completion point in the process that would allow it to draw down
on these resources. Increased ODA remains indispensable to national
development until such time as adequate infrastructure can be put in place.
Equally challenging is the attraction of investment which has become scarce
and competitive. Moreover, Guyana’s dependence on commodities for the bulk
of its export earnings renders it highly vulnerable to vicissitudes in the global
economy. The threat of such marginalization is compounded by the meteoric
advance being made in the field of science and technology which is rapidly
widening the gap between the developed and developing countries, between the
industrialized North and the largely agrarian and under-developed South.
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The cataclysm of september 11
As if the challenges to foreign policy were not enough already, this disaster
further complicated the international scenario. In the words of the Economist
magazine at the time, it not only indelibly altered the Manhattan skyline but
also changed forever the nature of international relations among states. All
countries, more especially the small, have been forcibly reminded of their
vulnerability to unpredictable assaults on their security and of the need to
respond condignly to these threats. As members of the United Nations family,
Caribbean states have condemned international terrorism and sought
collectively to mount defenses against any attacks on their integrity. These
protective measures, however, have not been without significant financial costs
to our economies, already tottering from the effects of September 11.
A strategy for survival
In the face of these difficulties, a small state like Guyana is forced to take
stock of its situation and to devise a strategy for survival. Together with others
in Caricom it has sought to rethink and retool both its domestic and foreign
policies in order to better integrate into the global market economy. Over the
past three years, the Council on Foreign and Community Relations of Caricom
has attempted to formulate a new vision and strategy to inform the direction of
the Community’s external relations. In sum, the strategy contemplates enlarged
regional cooperation to achieve common interests and concerns. Through
increased consultation and coordination, Caricom hopes to minimize the
deleterious impact of external forces and to maximize their diplomatic capability.
Central to this foreign policy is the creation of a Caribbean Single Market
and Economy as an instrument to strengthen the region’s competitiveness in
the global economy. With the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and its attendant
protocols, it is expected that there will be a more harmonized process of
economic liberalization, a greater convergence towards a modern regulatory
framework and increased rationalization and strengthening of regional
institutions to support the integration effort. This policy is expected to lead to
enhanced competition, a redefinition of production and export
complementarities and, ultimately, to a unified market.
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As proud and independent countries, Caricom states would much rather
rely on trade rather than on aid for development. However, it is the case that
because of their relatively recent freedom from colonialism and the consequent
constraints which they face, they are unfortunately still much too weak to
contend with the major forces of globalization. For the small, vulnerable
countries of the Caribbean, including Guyana, market access alone will not
help to improve their export capability. Without assistance in the development
of necessary infrastructure and other facilities, they cannot take advantage of
globalization and trade liberalization. To benefit from any free trade area of
the Americas, for example, Caricom countries must be provided with special
and differential treatment for their exports and access to a Regional
Development Fund similar to that which was devised by the EU to eliminate
regional disparities and bring all member countries on to a fairly level playing
field. These are therefore key goals in the negotiation of new partnership
arrangements with the European Union (EU) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) post-Doha Round.
Yet another major foreign policy objective for Guyana and Caricom is
the preservation of the environment for sustainable development. The region’s
eco-system is so fragile that unless it is insulated as much as possible from
disasters, whether natural or man-made, it will be easily jeopardised. Caricom
continues to be greatly concerned by the trans-shipment by some developed
countries through the Caribbean Sea of hazardous nuclear waste. Such concerns
have led the region to promote at the United Nations, in collaboration with
other countries of the wider Caribbean, the concept of the Caribbean Sea as
a Special Area in the context of sustainable development. Situated as it is also
in the Amazonian Basin, Guyana has a special interest in the sustainable
exploitation of our rich forest resources. In this context, it is fully supportive
of the Latin American and Caribbean initiative which was endorsed at the
World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South
Africa, August 26 to September 4, 2002.
In his inaugural address to the Conference of Caricom Heads of
Government which was held in Georgetown in July 2002, President Jagdeo, as
Chairman, enunciated several policy objectives which Guyana considers
conducive to regional progress. Among these are: the formulation of a
Common Agricultural Policy, the creation of a cooperative multilateral fisheries
regime, a common approach to the problems of crime and insecurity in the
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region, further democratization of member countries, the greater involvement of
Civil Society in policy-making, a review and, as appropriate, the reform of existing
regional institutions and, finally, the promotion of a larger Caribbean area of
cooperation. In pursuit of this last mentioned objective and bearing in mind that
the Caricom Secretariat is situated in Georgetown, Guyana has promulgated the
“Gateway” concept which will allow it to serve as a political, economic and social
bridge between the Caribbean and the countries of South America.
Guyana – A gateway between the Caribbean and South
America
Guyana believes that the time has come to look beyond its immediate
vicinity and its historic relations with the metropoles in the North to the vast
political and economic space that lies not only to the South but also to the
East and West. The rapid developments in its relations with its giant neighbour
Brazil and in particular the northern states, have shown the promise of a
rewarding partnership that with proper planning could offer Guyana enhanced
political stability and increased economic benefit. With the opening of our
interior region and the creation of new transportation routes, trade and
economic opportunities will bloom.
Already Guyana’s relations with Brazil have shown the promise of this
concept. Since President Jagdeo’s participation in the South American Summit,
held two years ago in Brasilia, concrete steps have been taken to develop closer ties
between our two countries. Besides a Partial Scope Trade Agreement which was
negotiated last year there are several other projects in progress, particularly in the
area of infrastructure, e.g. air and road links, which will enhance proximity and
multiply opportunities for trade and economic cooperation. As part of the process
of hemispheric integration, the Committee of the Initiative for the Integration of
Regional Infrastructure in South America (Iirsa) has approved a Guyana/Brazil
road link for funding by the Inter-American Development Bank and other sources.
In addition, a number of other enterprises could be launched which will
contribute to this integration process, including the construction of an industrial
estate at Lethem, close to the border with northern Brazil. Such a facility
could become a Free Zone area allowing businesses from Guyana, Caricom
and Brazil to “set up shop” at that frontier town. An incentive regime could
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be then created to encourage joint ventures between Guyanese, Caricom and
Brazilian businesses. These enterprises will undoubtedly see the benefits of
establishing themselves in Lethem, in order to gain easier access to their
respective markets. In this manner a more direct connection could be forged
between Caricom, the Andean Pact and Mercosul countries, opening up new
vistas for inter-regional commerce.
The importance of physical infrastructure to the creation of a closer
and more dynamic relationship between Caricom and Latin American countries
cannot be ignored. At the South Summit which was held in Havana in April
2000, Guyana and Brazil subscribed to a Declaration and Programme of Action
aimed at promoting linkages between their economies. More recently, at the
two South American Summits which were held respectively in Brasilia, Brazil
and in Guayaquil, Ecuador, as well as at the Rio Group Summit held in Peru
in May, Guyana recommitted itself to the high ideals of hemispheric integration
and cooperation. It is now imperative that we seek to translate into reality
some of the concrete proposals contained in those documents.
The “Gateway” to South America is not only a political consideration
but also an economic necessity with the imminent establishment of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas. Meaningful participation by Guyana in the new
trade arrangement will only be assured if it is linked to the other hemispheric
groupings. Without this linkage, Guyana’s bargaining power may be insufficient
to ensure the preservation of its interests and as a consequence, it may be
marginalized from the benefits of wider association. It will therefore be
desirable for us to strengthen not only our Caricom connection but also that
with the Association of Caribbean States, the Andean Pact and Mercosul. The
rationale for such a policy is not hard to find: for in the face of globalization,
unless regionalism is strengthened, small states such as ours are likely to be
washed away by the rising tides of competition.
It is not enough, however, to focus only on physical infrastructure for
without cultural contact a Caricom-Latin America relationship will not fully
prosper. One must therefore try to develop a sense of kinship among our
peoples who, though geographically close to each other, have been kept apart
by the forces of history, language and culture. The separate existence which
has historically been the fate of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean
can now be altered through a conscious effort to break down these barriers.
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The expansion of cultural and linguistic institutes throughout the region would
certainly improve communication and promote interaction – both economic
and social – among our countries. One concrete recommendation that could
facilitate this process of integration would be to establish links between our
Universities and other educational institutions within the region.
Relations with the wider world
Beyond Latin America and the Caribbean, Guyana looks to the
furtherance of its cooperative relations with the United States and Canada in
the western hemisphere; the United Kingdom and other member countries
of the European Union; the Russian Federation, China, India, Japan and other
states of Asia and the countries of Africa, a continent with which the Caribbean
has had a strong affinity. For historical and geographical reasons, the ties with
the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have been especially close
and continue to be important in both political and economic terms. Migration
of Guyanese to these destinations has been an important factor in the
development of a strong association between Governments and peoples. While
these traditional relationships expand naturally, the Government is intent on
diversifying its cooperation to include all countries that would wish to establish
diplomatic links on the basis of friendship and mutual respect.
Guyana is also committed to extending its outreach to the diaspora.
With so many of citizens resident abroad and often placed in key decision-
making centres, the country has much to gain from whatever advocacy they
can give to our foreign policy objectives. As a small country without adequate
resources, either financial or human, to engage in a major lobbying exercise in
the main target countries, we would do well to call on the patriotic spirit of
such important constituencies to plead our cause before the political directorates
in their adopted homelands. A strategy and programme have been developed
to cultivate this hitherto underutilized asset.
The ideal of multilateralism
These bilateral engagements are reinforced by an overarching
commitment to multilateralism. As a small state within the international
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community, Guyana is persuaded of the virtue and value of multilateralism as
a guiding principle in international relations. Indeed, the country owes its
freedom and independence in great measure to the great decolonization
campaign that was undertaken by the United Nations immediately after its
creation. Not surprisingly, one of the first things Guyana did on attaining its
independence was to become a member of the United Nations and to set up
a mission in New York. Ever since then, it has worked with the international
community to expand the agendas for peace and development.
In Guyana’s view the organization not only serves as a shield with which
to protect its newly won sovereignty but it also offers distinct possibilities for
enhancing its economic and social development. The United Nations also
provides a forum in which the country is able to relate on the basis of equality
to other states and from which it can project its image and influence with ease
and effectiveness. Guyana has in fact served on the UN’s highest councils as
President of the General Assembly and as a member of the Security Council,
the International Court of Justice, Ecosoc, Undp and other ancillary bodies.
In these various capacities it has played a leadership role out of all proportion
to its limited size and resources and in its own way, helped build multilateralism.
Apart from its diplomatic presence in certain strategic locations, Guyana’s
external representation works largely within the United Nations framework and
through its participation in relevant regional and sub-regional groupings and bodies
such as the Caribbean Community (Caricom), the Commonwealth, Association
of Small Island States (Aosis), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G77. The argument that the latter two
bodies have become anachronistic and irrelevant is not valid since they continue
to offer a useful political umbrella to their membership and counterbalance other
powerful interests. Their critics must be fearful of the potential of these groups
since we hear no similar call for the abolition of Cold War creations such as Nato.
Nevertheless, Guyana believes that both the NAM and the G77 should be reformed
and reoriented to make them more efficient and effective. Adaptation, however, is
altogether quite a different thing from abandonment.
Despite the United Nations’ many shortcomings and set-backs, Guyana
remains optimistic about the future of multilateralism. There can be no denying
that since its creation in 1945, the world organization has made many significant
contributions to the preservation and promotion of international peace and
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cooperation. Most notably, it has succeeded in preventing a Third World War
and catalysed economic and social progress in developing countries. Guyana
is convinced that in today’s globalized and interdependent world, there is no
alternative to the United Nations if anarchy is to be avoided and international
stability secured. Accordingly, we will continue to participate in the effort to
reform and restructure the United Nations, the embodiment of multilateralism,
to make it better able to deal with the altered circumstances of today.
In the area of peace and security, the common goals should be the
development of the collective system which is envisaged in the United Nations
Charter to deal with the threat or use of force in international relations. The
Security Council which was conceived in the aftermath of World War II has
proved incapable of adequately discharging the responsibilities allocated to it
under Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. To be
effective, it must be made more open, dynamic and representative.
Understandably, this has not been easy since power and vested interests do
not yield easily. However, after some ten years of exploration, several useful
options are on the table including expansion of the membership in both the
permanent and non-permanent categories, restriction in the use of the veto
and a periodic review of the composition and functions of the Council to
ensure that it is adequate to prevailing needs. Guyana is prepared to support
reform along these lines.
The thrust for reform should also penetrate the institutions within the
international system that are concerned with economic and social development.
There have been some improvements in the operation of functional agencies
like Undp and Unicef, and with the series of Summit Conferences which have
been held over the past ten years on critical issues, including children, women,
social development, sustainable development, the environment, the millennium
goals and the financing for development. There now exists a fair measure of
international consensus on what needs to be done to maximize global economic
and social progress. Unfortunately, however, decision-making on development
remains largely outside of the United Nations – within the multilateral financial
institutions where developing countries have little say in the process.
More immediately the principles and purposes of multilateralism can be
best served by revitalizing the General Assembly, the most representative of
all the United Nations organs. Thus far, the Assembly is a pale version of
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what the founding members intended to be. With the virtual disappearance of
big-power rivalry which had shackled it during the Cold War, the Assembly is
now ready to perform more fully the role intended for it under the Charter.
Even as it is and without waiting for major reform, the Assembly can have a
greater say on peace, security and development issues. One has only to recall the
way in which small Caricom states have been able to use it to push debates on
such issues as South Africa and Haiti and ultimately influence the deliberations
of the Security Council. A more pro-active General Assembly would certainly
help to democratize and generally improve international relations.
In the final analysis, multilateralism’s success depends on the full respect
for the principle of the sovereign equality of states – a principle that was
enshrined first in the Charter of the League of Nations and then in that of
the United Nations. It may be recalled that the first example failed because of
its inability to protect one of its members, Ethiopia, from aggression. The cry
of anger uttered at the time by Ethiopia’s ruler Haile Selassie can still be heard
over these many years. “Outside the Kingdom of the Lord there is no nation
which is greater than any other! God and history will remember your judgment”.
That judgment should indeed not be forgotten if we wish to ensure that the
League’s successor, the United Nations, does not suffer a similar fate. The
international community should therefore do its utmost to safeguard the
principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter which are the bedrock
of multilateralism and which, for small states like Guyana, are their principal
armour against threats to their peace, security and development.
Such is Guyana’s commitment to internationalism that it has decided to
actively promote the concept of the New Global Human Order. This was an
idea of the late President Cheddi Jagan who saw the need for a more just and
equitable international system that would provide the peace and security as
well as the economic and social development that the peoples of the world so
desperately need and want. Launched initially at the World Summit on Social
Development in Copenhagen, Denmark, it has been embraced by a large
number of countries, including Caricom, and enshrined in the declarations of
bodies such as the Rio Group, the NAM and the G77. Yet another United
Nations Resolution on the concept was recently adopted unanimously by the
General Assembly with a co-sponsorship of some forty countries. With further
work and support of the international community, the idea may yet become a
reality.
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Even though small and still economically weak, Guyana believes it can
make an important contribution to the welfare of the international community.
Ideas are not the special prerogative of large and powerful states; any country,
irrespective of its size or situation, can exercise the power of ideas to influence
global thinking for the general good. The most prized assets in the foreign
policy-making of a small state like Guyana are the prestige and influence which
it can command internationally. In this conviction, Guyana will continue to
play a pro-active role in foreign affairs.
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o interpret the true significance of Paraguay’s present foreign policy,
one must first refer back to the country’s history. Only then can one grasp the
need for its foreign policy to be a creative, agile and dynamic form of action.
History, vero testis temporum (true witness of the times), is an inexhaustible
source to which we must all have recourse in our endeavour to plan for a
future with renewed benefit.
Historical background
In the wake of independence, throughout the 19
th
century and on into
part of the 20
th
century, Paraguay was obliged to take part in various
international conflicts that set the country back considerably. As a result, its
foreign policy has focussed almost exclusively on defence of sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
Paraguay was subjected to a dictatorial regime from 1954 to 1989 which
imposed new period of isolationism on the nation. Curiously, democracy came
to Paraguay in the same year the Berlin Wall was dismantled.
The foreign policy of
the Republic
of Paraguay
Leila Rachid
*
*
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Paraguay
T
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124 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
124
Paraguayans felt that time had come for them once again to join in the
mainstream of universal civilisation, in harmony with events unfolding in the
region as a whole. While the world sought to overcome vestiges of the Cold
War – without managing precisely to develop the new paradigms required –
the citizens of our newly liberated nation have devoted a great deal of their
efforts to recreating a Paraguay capable of coming to grips with the new
challenges then emerging.
During this transition period, the foundations of institutional democracy
were laid in the 1992 Constitution. Its precepts envisaged the possibility of
the country being party to integration processes, provided that they “ensure
the upholding of Human Rights, Peace and Justice besides Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Co-operation and Development.”
On the other hand, the domestic political vicissitudes that arose during
the nineties forced the country to concentrate on defending its incipient
institutional framework. As a result, much effort was expended obtaining
support from friendly nations for the consolidation of Paraguayan democracy.
A Time for re-founding
The elections held on 27
th
April 2003 represented a major turning point
in Paraguay’s political history. A presidential candidate, Nicanor Duarte Frutos,
achieved an indisputable and undisputed electoral victory that won him not
only the immediate backing of the international community but also full
acceptance in domestic political circles.
The legitimacy of the current President of the Republic’s mandate, his
firm commitment to promote transparent a public administration, and his
capacity to forge political and institutional consensus are the prime features
of the visiting card the new Paraguay now presents to the outside world.
The new government has succeeded in establishing agreements with the
most representative sectors and leaders of Paraguayan society in order to muster
the support required for its short and long-term plans. These have primarily
been designed to stabilise the economy and pave the way for stronger economic
growth. The Executive Branch has sealed a Political Agreement with the leaders
of the country’s political parties and parliamentary leaderships to obtain support
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for a series of bills on economic matters. An agreement has likewise been
drawn up between the Government and the business community to garner
support for the Tax Reform Bill in its passage through the National Congress.
In as little as four months the new government has made remarkable
headway in stabilising the economy, clamping down on informal economic
activities and fighting corruption. This has brought international and domestic
recognition of its seriousness of purpose and capacity to achieve results.
The efforts of the new government have enabled it to reduce the fiscal
deficit from 3.5% at the end of 2002 to 1% by the end of 2003 and to rein
back annual inflation from 15% to 9%. International reserves, which had
sunk below US$ 600 millions at the end of 2002, have been raised to US$
850 millions and the public debt burden has been lightened. These
accomplishments have been accompanied by 2% growth in GDP mainly
owing to a bumper harvest and increasing yields for soybeans, the country’s
main export product.
After 45 years, Paraguay has finally reached an agreement with the
International Monetary Fund for a precautionary standby loan (US$ 70
millions). This has immediately made it possible to raise two emergency loans
from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) of
US$ 30 millions each to cover repayments of public debt falling due and to
offset the social impact of the adjustment measures to be implemented to
restore the country’s economic stability.
The prospects for 2004 are bright. GDP growth is now estimated at 3%
with a fiscal surplus, single-digit inflation, maintenance of international reserves
and further reduction of the debt burden.
Also worthy of note is the reform of the Judiciary on which the new
government has embarked. It will serve to strengthen the democracy that has
taken root in the country and to enhance Paraguay’s standing in the international
community.
The recent renewal of justices in the Supreme Court of Justice, the top-
ranking institution in the Judiciary, according to criteria agreed upon between
the Executive and Legislative Branches of Power, has ensured that the changes
made pursuant to the provisions of the Republic’s Magna Carta will have a
positive effect on our foreign policy.
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126
Indeed, it is universally acknowledged that a reliable judiciary is a vital
ingredient of credibility for a country seeking to project an image of seriousness
of purpose and commitment to its international obligations. Only then can
foreign investments be attracted and Paraguay strengthen its position in
international negotiations.
Another noteworthy development is the emphasis the President has
placed on the drive to increase the level of formal business activities in the
domestic economy, to bring commerce within the framework of the law and
to tackle corruption in all its forms.
“Organized crime will be punished and dismantled. The Mafia will no
longer find harbour in Paraguay. We will systematically combat contraband,
smuggling and drug trafficking, no matter who may be involved in them and
growing rich by these illicit activities that impoverish our public coffers,” stated
the President in his inauguration speech.
“Our Government seeks to be a landmark, a time to re-found the Republic
of Paraguay, a time to restore what is most sacred and genuine in our people: their
faith in God and their unshakeable trust in free will to determine their own destiny.”
Duarte Frutos’ inauguration as President marks both the end of Paraguay’s
long transition to democracy and the consolidation of its political institutions.
In tune with the many domestic transformations the present
administration has introduced, the Republic of Paraguay’s foreign policy is
also undergoing a series of changes and adaptations designed to equip it to
rise to numerous challenges for the future.
In a globalized world comprised by post-modern societies we are thus
seeking to promote a proactive foreign policy which strives to create opportunities
that will afford the country advantages and benefits. This policy must equally be
in step with international events and provide a ready national response to them.
In other words, our foreign policy is set to pose a constant challenge to
Paraguayan diplomacy.
The new foreign policy
We believe Paraguay’s integration into the international mainstream is
not only necessary but inexorable.
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The complexity of the current international system, the consequent
broadening of the international agenda, the emergence of a set of non-
traditional actors in international relations and the growing interdependence
of the various interests and agents comprising it have significantly transformed
the international community. Such changes have not gone unnoticed by the
Republic of Paraguay, neither has the country remained aloof to them. The
challenge for the present administration is to seek a new mode of insertion
for Paraguay in the international context based on transparency, efficiency
and social responsibility.
To our mind, the objectives of our foreign policy should not be narrowed
to a single approach. Rather they should fan out across a broad range of
possibilities essentially aimed at achieving a new model of sound, sustainable
economic and social development.
In like manner, this new foreign policy should be the fruit of debate and
consensus among the different sectors of Paraguayan society so as to ensure
broad-based commitment to sustaining and upholding it with the passage of
time. It may thus become the policy of the State and not merely a series of
circumstantial decisions taken by each passing administration.
In this framework, we have adopted a foreign policy that will diversify
our relations and strengthen our ties with groups of countries which, albeit
geographically remote from Paraguay, may bring us concrete, shared benefits.
Priorities
This being said, we shall proceed to set out the main guidelines
underpinning our foreign policy. They are based on a prospective analysis but
are all directly associated with the present domestic and international scenarios
in both the short and medium term:
1. Defence of national sovereignty from a variety of perspectives:
territory, security, environment, culture, natural resources, frontiers,
migration, among others.
2. Promotion of democracy and human rights.
3. Furtherance of integration processes as a means to overcoming
poverty and achieving sound, sustainable development.
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128
4. Obtaining special, differential treatment for Paraguay as a landlocked
country in all appropriate international forums.
5. Broadening of our international horizons by enhancing relations with
countries in the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific.
6. Advancement of Paraguay’s strategic role as a junction for routes
linking the Atlantic to the Pacific.
7. Consolidation of Paraguay’s position as the world’s leading exporter
of hydroelectric energy.
8. Unflinching combat against corruption, terrorism, drug trafficking
and other transnational crimes.
9. Identification of Paraguay with the “Guarani World.”
10. Support for the principles of multilateralism on a global and regional
scale as an instrument for co-operation, peace and international security.
In what follows I shall proceed to analyse the more salient features of
Paraguay’s new foreign policy.
Integration and Paraguay’s foreign policy - Mercosur
Since we are convinced that for our region of the world to eliminate
poverty and attain sound, sustainable development we must adopt properly-
planned common policies. We must likewise eschew the unilateral policies
that we have vainly sought to make prosper over the past century. Integration
processes therefore naturally take pride of place among our priorities.
From a historical perspective, Paraguay’s membership of Mercosur has
thus represented a Copernican change of course. From the moment it joined
the Southern Cone Common Market, Paraguay began to face the world shoulder
to shoulder with its neighbours through a form of non-military alliance. Indeed,
Mercosur represents the joint action of four nations that share democratic
ideals, designed to serve their inhabitants regardless of nationality, without
barriers to migration and open to the world.
The Principle of Asymmetric Conditions
All integration processes are based on certain reciprocal, mutually-
supportive founding principles: the opening up of the market as a key element,
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but at the same time with full acknowledgement that this is not in itself sufficient
to attain progress given the asymmetric conditions of the parties involved.
These asymmetric conditions must be appropriately compensated to
ensure that individual potentials can be fulfilled in the scope of the market
and to prevent the gap from widening. Likewise, the reciprocal opening up of
national economies should not imply a new form of protectionism. On the
contrary, we must seek to build a large continental, Latin-American market
that is competitive in the global arena. This is the conception that has
underpinned contractual recognition of disparities in economic development
and the relative handicap of being landlocked, among others.
Throughout 2003, the Republic of Paraguay has systematically insisted
on the principle of asymmetric conditions as a rule of thumb in negotiations
both within Mercosur and in the bloc’s relations with others.
In view of a major economic crisis aggravated by others originating in
the region, more than ever Paraguay has had to face the need to achieve higher
levels of competitiveness in order to achieve its true insertion in Mercosur.
Such are the country’s structural limitations that its own endeavours have proven
insufficient to attain this goal. My country’s social and economic indicators, in
comparison with those of its partners in Mercosur, clearly show that Paraguay
is the least developed member of the bloc. It has therefore become evident
that the task of closing the gap is not simply a national challenge.
In this sense, the Declaration of Presidents at the 24
th
Summit of Mercosur
held in Asunción in June 2003 is of the utmost importance. Paragraph 10 of the
Declaration clearly states that: “Paraguay’s proposal concerning differential treatment
among the Member States of Mercosur was well received. This is seen to be an
important step toward consolidating the process of regional integration. Moreover,
the Member States acknowledge the need to adopt policies and concrete measures
to deal with this issue, as agreed at the meeting of Foreign Ministers held in
Montevideo. They have thus instructed the appropriate departments to take the
necessary measures in the next two quarters to define and implement them.”
The 25
th
Mercosur Summit, held on December 16th in Montevideo, was
marked by special features that make it truly deserving of the epithet “historic,”
as was the case with the summits at Las Leñas (Argentina, June 1992) and
Ouro Preto (Brazil, December 1994).
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It deserves to be described as historic for two main reasons. Firstly,
because it marks the effective establishment of solidarity as a cornerstone of
an integration process that has come of age among the Member States. The
second feature is concerned with Mercosur’s external relations: the bloc has
joined forces with the whole of South America by drawing up an Agreement
with the Andean Community of Nations.
It should, indeed, be recalled that the 1991 Asunción Treaty was based
on the principle of “reciprocity” of rights and duties tempered, nonetheless,
by the notion of “flexibility.” The latter has made it possible to grant limited
benefits to smaller partners in the form of longer terms for complying with
certain obligations. This new approach means that Paraguay and Uruguay will
be afforded a set of benefits aimed at compensating the difference in size of
their markets and economies. Particularly relevant in this context is the
establishment of “structural funds” to provide the infrastructure they lack
and help their industries to become more competitive.
Moreover, besides the measures adopted at the above-mentioned Summit
it has been decided that the other Mercosur partners will undertake in all the
bloc’s “external negotiations” to obtain additional benefits for Paraguay. This
may result in immediate waivers or allowances, shorter terms for products of
interest to Paraguay, the granting of special quotas, additional time for the
Paraguayan market to open up to sensitive products, and so forth.
On the other hand, Paraguay is to be allowed a “special origin regime”
designed to assist it in promoting industrialisation. From 2004 to 2008, goods
manufactured in Paraguay will be required to contain only 40% of regional
components. The remaining 60% may be imported from outside Mercosur. This
will provide an incentive for foreign companies and capital to invest and manufacture
in Paraguay as the majority of the components assembled can be imported from
more technically developed regions while local labour, energy and other components
will generate the remaining 40% required for entry into Mercosur.
Obviously, the point of this special concession is the fact that it is
temporary, companies being expected gradually to adjust their output to
conform to regular Mercosur standards. In other words, from 2009 onwards
compulsory regional content will rise to 50% of output and finally, in 2014
(i.e. within ten years) Paraguay will be on a par with its partners in the bloc vis-
à-vis norms concerning origin of goods.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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Paraguay is similarly entitled to maintain a set of exceptions to the
“Common External Tariff.” The importance of this special regime adopted
under the terms of treatment for asymmetric conditions is that it allows
Paraguay a certain amount of leeway in adjusting tariffs to its needs.
Finally, Paraguay has obtained a “special regime for importation of raw
materials” to secure a degree of competitiveness for its industry and agriculture.
Owing to a commitment assumed within Mercosur this type of instrument is
scheduled to be subject to regulation (i.e. rules applicable to all parties) in 2005.
Once again, however, by virtue of decisions taken to ensure differential treatment
for asymmetric conditions, in the case of Paraguay this special regime is to be
extended until 2010. This will enable the country to organise its production better
and thus equip it to conform to the general regime adopted within the bloc.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework of Mercosur has been strengthened and
enhanced by creation of the Council of Permanent Representatives (Coreper)
to be headed by Eduardo Duhalde, ex-president of the Republic of Argentina.
The Council will allow the bloc to broaden the scope of its action in
international politics besides serving as a mechanism for obtaining funding
for its projects. Meanwhile, the establishment of a Technical Secretariat makes
it possible to distinguish the sphere of action of the national delegations from
that which is the preserve of Mercosur staff. Mercosur’s administration will
henceforth be divided into two separate areas with political issues being handled
by Coreper and technical matters being dealt with by the Mercosur Secretariat.
On the other hand, with the Olivos Protocol on Settlement of
Controversies becoming effective as from 2
nd
January 2004, Mercosur is about
to embark on a new phase in juridical and institutional terms. From now on
the member states will have at their disposal a modern, pragmatic system for
settling differences arising out of the application of provisions contained in
the Asunción Treaty as well as supplementary legislation. As a result, economic
agents within and outside the Mercosur zone will have sufficient juridical
security to develop production and invest in the region.
A Permanent Tribunal is to be installed in the Paraguayan capital,
Asunción, and we are greatly honoured by the trust the other member states
The foreign policy of the Republic of Paraguay
132 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
132
have placed in us by bestowing this responsibility and privilege upon our
shoulders.
Paraguay hopes that the establishment of this Permanent Tribunal will
serve to mark the beginning of Asunción’s status as the judicial capital of
Mercosur. We are thus equally gratified by the decision to establish alongside
the Tribunal a “Mercosur Centre for the Promotion of the State of Law,” the
purpose of which is to provide a focal point for research and development of
initiatives aimed at developing Mercosur Community Law. The Centre will
serve as a vehicle for promoting democracy and the values of citizenship. The
aim is to ensure that the region will become not only a zone of peace but also
an example of democratic coexistence.
External Relations
The external agenda has come to be of vital importance for Mercosur.
More than a means of relating to the international community and participating
in the various forums for economic negotiations, it embodies the future of
the bloc’s member countries. Indeed, the success of the domestic policies of
each one of our countries will depend on Mercosur’s capacity to explore markets
and stake out its place in world trade. Without foreign trade all our endeavours
to create an appropriate environment for investment and labour will founder.
In 2003 as never before Mercosur has devoted a great deal of effort to
promoting bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (e.g. with Peru and the
Andean Community of Nations, respectively). For this reason also the 25
th
Mercosur Summit was historic for by means of the latter agreement we have
given concrete shape to the dream of so many eminent Latin Americans to
see the whole of Latin America united.
Paraguay is convinced that this is the right way forward for although it is
scarcely easy to measure the benefits and risks of a trade agreement with any
degree of precision, experience has shown that the end result is always positive
when compared with the alternative of remaining in isolation.
Likewise, as part of our foreign policy we are determined to continue
with moves to establish partnership agreements with the European Union,
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (Ftaa), India, and South Africa, among
others.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Leila Rachid
133
In this sense, we believe that Mercosur should continue not only to
broaden the bloc’s external agenda but also to exert its influence more effectively
in forums for international negotiations. In the complex scenarios where the
economic future of the nations of the world is decided today Mercosur has
become an ineluctable point of reference.
We are fully confident that we should continue to work together to maintain
and enhance this status. This is the only way to guarantee that our interests as a
bloc will be recognized when it comes to establishing the instruments that
enshrine the rights and duties regulating global economic relations.
Paraguay, a strategic country connecting the Atlantic to
the Pacific
As a landlocked country that is nevertheless aware of its strategic location,
Paraguay is eager to be the junction of routes linking the Atlantic to the Pacific.
In this context, our condition as a country deprived of a seaboard can be
transformed into an instrument for the physical integration of the continent.
Considering Paraguay’s geographic location, its remoteness from the
prime international markets and the consequent negative effect this has had
on the competitiveness of Paraguayan products, physical integration is, without
a shadow of doubt, of paramount importance to our country. Economic
development hinges essentially on the modernisation and expansion of our
energy, transportation and communications infrastructure.
In view of this, we are taking an active part in all forums where regional
interconnection strategies are under discussion. These include the South
American Regional Integration Initiative (known as the IIRSA Project), the
bi-oceanic corridors, and the Paraguay-Paraná Waterway, among others.
Cultural diplomacy: the Guarani World
We are currently working on a strategy for presenting the “Guarani
World” Programme. The aim of this programme is to promote the sustainable
social and economic development of a region in the Southern Cone of South
America covering parts of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
The foreign policy of the Republic of Paraguay
134 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
134
The idea is to establish a cultural, ecological and adventure tourism circuit
based on the preservation of the region’s cultural and environmental heritage,
guaranteeing the participation of Guarani and other indigenous communities
encompassed by the circuit.
Numerous areas in the region have been brought under official protection
of the countries comprising the “Guarani World” and they represent a sizeable
percentage of their respective national territories in which the wealth of biodiversity
is a salient feature. Combined with the cultural legacy of the Misiones and the
townships the Jesuits founded here, this makes the region unique in the world.
For more than twenty years, important work has been under way at the
main archaeological sites and in the towns that originated from the Jesuit
Missions to restore and enhance this legacy with support from a variety of
international institutions. The establishment of a tourist circuit or route within
the bounds of the Guarani World may provide a unique, intense cultural and
ecological adventure, all the more so since Unesco has listed the most important
of these reducciones or reduções as World Heritage Sites.
It is equally important to mention that the region has many other
attractions to offer, such as craft centres, museums, estancias, national parks
and natural wonders like the Iguassu Falls, the marshlands of the Chaco and
Pantanal or the Atlantic Forest and Seaboard.
The prime aim of this project is to restore Paraguay’s standing in the world
on a new footing, in full awareness that the current state of affairs enjoins us to
work together with all the members of the international community.
In conclusion, I would like to stress that with political will and the
collaboration of the different sectors of Paraguayan society we can establish
policies of State for the new century. They will empower us to meet the
permanent challenges our country faces and to achieve the development and
prosperity we dearly strive to attain.
We are confident that by accomplishing the objectives we have set out in
our foreign policy will not only serve to found a new Paraguay but also to build
a more fraternal, more humane world. The world we seek is one that for all the
men and women inhabiting it can be a “place of safety and freedom.”
Version: Mark Ridd.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros
135
G
lobalisation has not yet created an integrated market on a global scale.
Regional endeavours to deregulate trade and the multilateral rules established
by the WTO are gradual moves in that direction. Although the
internationalisation of capital flows has advanced more than the liberalisation
of trade, globalisation is still in a transition phase. Markets have not yet replaced
States or national societies, despite the fact that global governance has
somewhat cramped the autonomous decision-making of national economies
in the macroeconomic domain.
Undeniably, as Octavio Ianni
1
has pointed out, the global process is
altering the local, regional, national and international scenarios in which States
operate. Interpreting and assimilating these changes into the demands of
foreign policies is thus a core requirement of diplomacy in our times.
Nonetheless, the interests promoted, agreed upon or countered in international
policy continue to be representative of the State. Even within the framework
of globalisation, foreign policies are not conceived solely to make markets
viable but above all to make States and national societies viable.
Globalisation has progressively dismantled the natural barriers of time
and space in the economic sphere, the same applying in the realm of politics,
Peru’s foreign policy:
A national option in the
global process
Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros
*
*
Minister of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Peru.
1
See Octavio Ianni. La era del globalismo. Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 1999.
The Peru’s foreign policy
136 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
136
social relations and, no doubt, military-strategic affairs. From the economic
standpoint, the kernel components of globalisation are the deregulation of
financial flows, liberalisation of trade building up from regional experiments,
relocation of the production of manufactures and services, and the global
expansion of the effects of scientific-technological innovation in the fields of
communications and information technology. The dynamic hub of this system
is the global output of a hard core of 65,000 multinational corporations and
their 850,000 foreign affiliates.
Substantial growth has been attained over the past two decades in the
sphere of trade. Indeed, trade has certainly expanded faster than global gross
domestic product. Globalisation has not, however, been the harbinger of
increased exports and enhanced trade flows for all countries. Unctad and World
Bank data show that most developing countries have failed to obtain significant
trade growth. On the contrary, the least developed countries have experienced
a remarkable decline in their share of international trade.
Only twelve developing economies have achieved ostensible growth in their
share of world trade: China, which accounts for 13.2% of growth in trade of
manufactures among developing nations; South Korea (11.7%); Taiwan (11.2%);
Singapore (9.4%); Mexico (7.0%); Malaysia (5.0%); Thailand (4.0%); Hong Kong
(3.0%); Brazil (2.8%); India (2.8%); Indonesia (2.4%); and Turkey (1.8%).
2
The remainder – 167 countries or more – together account for a meagre
26% of trade in manufactures among the economies of the developing world.
Were these figures to be adjusted by introducing the level of transformation of
exports, the unequal nature of the global process would be even more glaring.
Since 1980, foreign investment has increased at an unprecedented rate.
Since then, too, regulatory norms have been developed to liberalise the
conditions under which foreign investment can be made. By the year 2000,
more than one hundred countries were already operating highly deregulated
regimes for foreign investment.
Meanwhile, a concentration of foreign investments in a number of
developing economies, similar to that occurring in the field of trade, has become
2
See report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation. A Fair Globalization: The role
of the ILO. Geneva: ILO, 2004.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros
137
3
Ibid.
apparent. Since 1990, China has received 23% of all foreign investment in
developing countries, Brazil has received 8.3%, Mexico 8.1%, Argentina 5.6%,
the Bermudas 2.7%, Chile 2.7%, Thailand 2.2%, South Korea 2.1%, and
Venezuela 1.7%.
3
Globalisation has made headway in the field of finance more than in any other
sector, both in the sphere of the multilateral finance system and in relation to banking
system financial flows. Developing country international bonds in circulation rose
from US$ 25,000 millions in 1982 to US$ 500,000 millions in 2002.
Technological innovation remains concentrated in the industrialised
world. With the exception of China, India and a few others, the scientific and
technological revolution has barely been assimilated into the production system
in developing countries, despite the fact that they willingly consent to the
consumption of high-tech products, especially in the field of communications,
information via the Internet, electronic mail, digital television, cable television
and telephone services, the charges for which have reached extraordinarily
low levels throughout the world.
Besides, the positive influence of globalisation on markets and
consumption, far from diminishing disparities in investment, its effects on
social relations within States and on relations between States, have served to
aggravate them. Inequalities have multiplied across the globe. Recent empirical
studies have shown that in the past two decades, between 1985 and 2000, only
16 developing countries have seen growth averaging 3% while 55 have grown
at no more than 2%, and 23% have endured negative growth.
In global terms, the level of employment has risen and absolute poverty
has diminished. The 1990 figure for those living in poverty or extreme poverty
was 1,237 million. By the year 2000, the figure had fallen to 1.1 billion. The
reduction of poverty in China alone explains the downturn in global
unemployment. The 361 million Chinese living in poverty in the early nineties
have since been reduced to a figure of 204 million. These figures, however,
have not been replicated in other developing regions of the globe, where rates
of unemployment and poverty have risen. This is the case of Latin America
and the Caribbean.
The Peru’s foreign policy
138 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
138
The economic and social components of globalisation should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the current political and strategic trends
of an international system in transition. It is an undisputed historical fact that,
by combining the various elements that determine national power, the United
States have become the sole superpower. We thus live in a world that is unilateral,
unequal and fragmented. The hard fact of unilateral power is not necessarily
tenable as a political fact. Global governance no longer responds to passive
systems of balance of power or the unilateral exercise of power. It necessarily
requires legitimacy on both the domestic and external fronts. This can only be
obtained through systems entertaining balance of decentralised (i.e. multipolar)
components – however relative they may be.
Foreign policy in the global process: change and continuity
The global international system is modifying the scenario in which States
operate. Foreign policies should therefore establish the necessary correlation
between the domestic requirements of society or the State and the trends of
globalisation as much in the social, political and strategic spheres as in the
economic domain.
In the case of middle-income developing countries like Peru, this means
defining foreign policies that are appropriate for both domestic and foreign
agendas. They must strive to act within the international system so as to maximise
trends that have a positive effect on the variables of domestic development
whilst minimising or neutralising those that may produce a negative impact. At
the same time, in order to enhance the negotiating capacity of small and medium-
size countries, foreign policies must be designed to join forces on a regional
basis or by means of coalitions of the like-minded with a view to exerting an
influence on the global and regional governance of globalisation.
No blanket recipe exists. Each move in the international arena has a
specificity determined by the weight of the domestic agenda and by the
“external competitiveness” of each player. That explains why coalitions have
become more complicated but nonetheless indispensable under the aegis of
globalisation.
As hinted above, competitive potential is not the preserve of corporations,
applying equally to States. It demands a less abstract, more precise definition
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros
139
of national interests. It also implies a decentralised approach to the planning
and implementation of foreign policy.
The paradigm that ascribes exclusive responsibility to the State for the
formulation of foreign policy has been called into question. It has proven
inadequate for representing national and social interests in today’s world. The
State can no longer act alone on the basis of government requirements. It
must liaise with non-state actors – private enterprise, political parties and
movements, and a plethora of institutions representing civil society, in particular
– to forge a national, social consensus. Otherwise, foreign policy may lack the
necessary social support at home and abroad.
The rationale of Peruvian foreign policy
Within this theoretical framework, Peruvian foreign policy stems from
an interpretation of the historical development of society and the State in
Peru, acknowledging the accumulation of domestic and international
experiences that have forged the State’s identity and autonomy. The bedrock
is a combination of democracy, the state of law, respect and protection for
human rights, social cohesion based on equity, and forthright regionalism –
values broadly shared by the various sectors of society in Peru.
This pivotal consensus allows Peru’s foreign policy to be conceived as a
policy of the State. Regardless of the differing traits of each administration,
the consolidation of certain continuities lends our policy the stability and
coherence required for competitive edge in tackling the challenges of
globalisation.
Insisting on national identity for enhanced international
standing
The historical touchstone of Peruvian diplomacy is the decision to insist
on national identity and autonomy in the context of economic liberalisation
and active engagement in global processes. This means interpreting the global
international system in terms that are compatible with the national fulfilment
of Peruvian society and the Peruvian State. It implies re-valuing not only
national identity and autonomy but also Peru’s cultural and ethnic diversity as
The Peru’s foreign policy
140 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
140
the cornerstone for promoting social and national cohesion. It entails upholding
national values in the context of globalisation and viewing the country not
merely from the standpoint of the State. The nation is not confined to the
State, much less to a centralist State. The nation is co-extensive with Peruvian
society (political circles and civil society included), and it demands decentralised
administration of national interests.
4
On the basis of this national stance in the context of globalisation,
Peruvian diplomacy is guided by the following fundamental principles: 1)
Autonomy and affirmation of national and social underpinnings for foreign
policy, the implementation of which is governed by a dynamics associating
globalisation, national self-determination and social cohesion; 2) Preservation
of national sovereignty and the integrity of the State; 3) Peaceful settlement
of controversies; 4) Promotion of democracy and respect for human rights;
5) Open support for regional initiatives, Andean-South American integration,
and Latin American identity; 6) Acceptance of universal trends in the global
process, respect for international law and promotion of multilateralism; 7)
Protection and support for Peruvian expatriates and their interests; and, finally,
8) Unity, coherence and decentralisation in foreign policy.
Peru has a number of attributes that lend the country a competitive edge
in the international arena: its geographic location in central South America (facing
the Pacific with longitudinal projection into the Andean region and latitudinal
extension into the Amazon basin); its great diversity (one of the most diverse
territories in the world) comprising 84 distinct habitats and 17 transition zones
among the 104 acknowledged to exist on Earth; and the plurality and antiquity
of its culture. At the same time, Peru’s foreign policy is closely tailored to domestic
reality, especially with reference to the state of poverty that continues to afflict a
high percentage of the population. The fight against poverty has thus been
incorporated as a permanent national objective.
The prime, long-term objectives of Peru’s democratic diplomacy, in the
context of the global international system, are as follows: to secure full exercise
of national sovereignty; to guarantee security for the country and its inhabitants;
to underwrite the consolidation of democracy; to assist even-handed economic
4
For an informed view of Peruvian national identity in a regional and international context, see Jorge Basadre.
Mentira o factibilidad del Perú. Lima: Apertura, 1978.
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros
141
and social development; to project Peru in the region and in the world as a
stable, democratic country strategically located in South America that upholds
the rule of law, pursuing bilateral and multilateral relations aimed at enhancing
its economic and social interests yet also committed to the maintenance of
peace with regional and international security being based on fairer multilateral
international governance and due respect for international law.
Peru considers the entirety of its external relations from the standpoint
of its strategic insertion in South America. In this context, it reaffirms its
membership of the Andean community, seeks to advance its strategic relation
with Brazil and to strengthen its preferential ties with neighbouring countries.
This South American outlook compels Peru to ascribe top priority to furthering
Latin American unity and integration. It views relations with its main economic
and trading partners, the United States and the European Union, as a form of
autonomous association. The diverse levels and degrees of concerted action
in the multilateral forums to which Peru belongs respond to this strategic
approach to foreign policy. They also reflect the country’s constant disposition
to promote concerted action with other like-minded nations on the basis of
shared values such as the preservation and defence of democracy, respect for
human rights, the fight against poverty, the strengthening of multilateralism,
and improvement of the conditions and rules governing international economic
relations, including those that prevail in the trade and finance systems.
The legal framework informing the external action of the Peruvian State
is determined by provisions enshrined in the Constitution and by the various
treaties to which Peru is a signatory. This is supplemented by multiparty
consensus, reinforced by the consensus of civil society forged within the
framework of the National Accord. The latter is a commitment entered upon
by all the political parties, regional governments, representatives of business
associations, labour leaders and the most representative national institutions.
The priority agenda of Peruvian foreign policy
In this context and in consonance with the provisions of the Peruvian
Constitution, the National Accord and the external requirements of
development and national security, Peruvian foreign policy pursues a priority
agenda implemented on the basis of an integrated approach:
The Peru’s foreign policy
142 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
142
1. Diplomacy for the promotion and preservation of
national sovereignty
Globalisation has not led to markets replacing States. Although new
actors have emerged in international relations, international politics continues
to be determined by interaction between nation-states, regardless of existing
disparities in economic and political power.
National issues have not been swept aside by globalisation. On the
contrary, they have acquired renewed prestige, albeit in far more complex,
decentralised scenarios. Much like corporations, States can be more or less
competitive and a key feature of their competitiveness is the degree of national
cohesion and consciousness they display.
As mentioned above, with regard to Peru’s foreign policy, affirmation
of a national outlook is a key component of the principle of promoting and
preserving the country’s sovereignty. Working to open up the economy and
make Peru a part of the global process demands simultaneously strengthening
not only the national drive of foreign policy but also the national character of
Peruvian society. In the context of globalisation, José Carlos Mariátegui’s motto
“let’s Peruvianise Peru” holds truer than ever. The national spirit of Peruvian
diplomacy is a tenet that must be made manifest in every foreign policy move
and, at the same time, be compatible with the opening up of the country
implicit in regional integration.
Preserving national sovereignty and the State’s territorial integrity, with
absolute respect for border treaties, is thus a permanent objective of our foreign
policy.
A prominent aspect of preserving national sovereignty in Peru’s current
diplomacy concerns actions designed to secure sovereignty rights and jurisdiction
over economic activities and natural resources within the 200-mlie limit of the
country’s territorial waters. Naturally, this implies a decision to extend the juridical
reach of the State’s sovereignty rights and jurisdiction as far as the 200-mile
limit. In the context of present-day international law, this can only be achieved
through compliance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The unsettled issue of Peru’s maritime border with Chile likewise ranks
high among Peruvian diplomatic concerns regarding the promotion of its
sovereignty. In 1952, Peru, Chile and Ecuador subscribed to the Santiago
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros
143
Declaration. This binding agreement established the legal entitlement of Peru
and Chile to their respective territorial waters extending to a minimum distance
of 200 miles from the coast. Since the rights of both countries regarding the
said waters overlap owing to the adjacency of their coastlines, rules must now
be fixed pursuant to the precepts of international law to draw a dividing line
that ensures an equitable outcome for both parties.
Peruvian diplomacy is taking the necessary steps to fulfil this national
objective. Moreover, settling this outstanding matter will make our highly
important relations and liaison for closer association with Chile more stable
and thus pave the way for further co-operation and joint action with our
neighbour to the south.
Peru has no problems relating to the delimitation or demarcation of its
terrestrial frontiers. All have been legally established, there being no issues
pending. This gives cause for a reconsideration of traditional approaches to
the lines drawing the terrestrial frontier. Frontiers naturally continue to be the
borderline for the exercise of sovereignty in relation to neighbouring States.
At the same time, however, a view of frontier zones that stresses neighbourly
attitudes and negotiation of frontier integration zones raises the prospect of
implementing joint development strategies.
We are endeavouring to introduce a frontier development and co-
operation policy that overrides the traditional view of frontiers as lines
separating States. Instead, we argue for a modern approach to frontiers as
areas for integration, creation of inter-regional markets, and economic and
social development. This is the thinking that now guides Peru’s frontier relations
with Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Chile.
Frontier integration is the most suitable way to interconnect transborder
markets by means of physical infrastructure projects, economic and social
development schemes, and joint investments. It is also a way to raise the level of
employment and social assistance for the population. It has likewise proven to be
the most effective way to instil a culture of peace, friendship and mutual trust.
The Binational Development Plan for the Peru-Ecuador Frontier Zone
is a joint strategy designed to promote activities and implement projects that
will foster the economic integration of the region, enhance its productive and
social development, and overcome its relative backwardness compared with
the remainder of both countries’ territories.
The Peru’s foreign policy
144 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
144
The Binational Plan is expected to last ten years (2000-2009). According
to estimates made in 1998, it will require investments of the order of US$ 3,000
millions to be put up by the governments of Peru and Ecuador, and supplied
through international co-operation and by private enterprise. Investment has
been programmed and is being made within the framework of four programmes:
Binational Programme of social and productive infrastructure projects with an
estimated budget of US$ 1,498 millions; Peruvian and Ecuadorian national
programmes for building and improvement of production infrastructure in their
respective frontier zones at a cost of US$ 400 millions; national programmes
for construction and improvement of social infrastructure and environmental
aspects in frontier zones estimated at US$ 500 millions; and programmes for
promoting private investment calculated at US$ 602 millions. Projects under
way contained in this Plan include those relating to the reorganisation and
management of the binational Catamayo-Chira basin; management of the
binational Puyango-Tumbes basin; the Huaquillas-Aguas Verdes Highway No.
1; and the health and rural development project, funded by Spain, the World
Bank, the European Union and Italy, respectively.
The strategy for frontier development and integration on Peru’s northern
and northeastern borders is complemented by frontier integration and co-
operation programmes with Colombia and Brazil. In the case of Colombia
this relates specifically to the binational development project for the Putumayo
river basin, covering an area of 160,500 square kilometres. The project focuses
on joint management of fishing activities and of the Tarapacá and Flor de
Agosto forests, the aim being to provide sustainable, productive employment
for the local population. In the case of Brazil, projects are under way to
interconnect the two countries by road, river and air with a view to boosting
inter-regional frontier markets in the states of Amazonas, Acre, Rondônia
and Mato Grosso in Brazil and the macro-regions of northern and southern
Peru, encompassing the Loreto and Ucayali regions. The emphasis here is on
engaging regional governors and chairmen in negotiations and on implementing
accords in conjunction with a dynamic association between regional and local
business communities. Physical interconnection and the development of inter-
regional markets along three bi-oceanic corridors is a determining factor in
the creation of shared development areas.
On Peru’s southern frontier, the development strategy for the frontier
zone aims to promote economic integration of western Bolivia, southern
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Peru and northern Chile. Frontier arrangements, the Economic Reciprocity
Accord between Peru and Chile, physical integration and on-going
negotiations on a common market treaty with Bolivia are all components of
this process which has enormous potential for interconnecting the countries’
electricity and energy grids.
2. Diplomacy for strategic insertion in South America
Peru’s foreign policy has elected the South American sub-continent as
the immediate scenario for the State’s foreign action. Owing to geographic,
historical and cultural identity and the density of shared interests, South America
is the most immediate social, economic, political and strategic space for Peru’s
international projection. The Andean, Amazonian and maritime environments
along Peru’s coastline link Peruvian territory to South America and to the
Pacific Basin. South America is the fulcrum of Peru’s regional and global
projection in foreign relations. This is the environment that has shaped and
continues to determine a large proportion of its history.
Peru envisages its strategic insertion in this sub-region from the
standpoint of its membership in the Andean Community and its strategic
understanding with Brazil. It postulates the creation and consolidation of a
South American forum functionally consistent with Latin American liaison
groups and identities, such as the Group of Rio and other institutional
expressions of regional politics. Peruvian diplomacy has been working to
promote the creation and consolidation of an integrated South American space
by means of the following initiatives:
a. Improvement of the free trade area in the Andean Community, and
the implementation of a new strategic configuration based on a review
of development variables and on a functional dovetailing of trade
commitments within the Community as well as the signing of free
trade agreements with countries and groups of countries in the
expansion zone, so as to obtain a larger extended market.
b. Negotiation and signing of a common market treaty between Peru
and Bolivia.
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c. Merging of the Andean Community and Mercosur by means of recently
signed free trade agreements as a move towards establishing a greater
South American free trade area.
d. Active participation by Peru as a Mercosur associate.
e. Physical integration of South America, on the basis of transborder
regional markets, especially through establishment of the corridors
envisaged in the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure
in South America (Iirsa).
f. Upgrading of the commitments to build the physical infrastructure
agreed upon under the umbrella of Iirsa in the text of a Treaty on
Physical Interconnection of South America.
g. Transformation of South American Summit Meetings into a full-blown
Commonwealth of South American Nations with a flexible,
multifunctional, multi-sector institutional framework capable of
providing dynamic co-ordination and dialogue.
Despite the evident transformation of the production system that has
taken place in some countries and in certain sectors, South America remains
largely dependent on exports of raw materials, mainly oil, copper, gold,
iron, soybeans, coffee, bananas and tin. Exports of raw materials continue
to account for more than 40% of the region’s total exports. It is thus vital to
push ahead with the transformation of the region’s production system, and
to enhance the competitiveness of national economies and corporations.
According to figures on competitiveness published by Harvard University
and the World Economic Forum, the average competitive ranking of South
American economies was 59
th
among the 75 countries examined. At the
same time, the region displays the highest levels of income inequality in the
developing world: the richest 5% of the population in South America receive
26% of all income.
To overcome this predicament, South America must grow consistently
at annual rates of 6% or 7% without the population increasing more than
1.5% per annum. A development strategy that fosters social cohesion is most
likely to attain these objectives. To this end, however, certain obstacles must
be removed and substantial advances made concerning competitive potential,
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particularly if economic growth is to prove sustained not merely in terms of
external factors but also with regard to the region’s own production dynamics.
A number of physical obstacles persist regarding access to intra-South
American markets. The region encompasses an area of approximately
17,819,100 square kilometres and its major cities are situated at a relatively
great distance from the main international consumer centres. Meanwhile,
integration of national, regional and world markets is hampered by enormous
natural obstacles: the Andes mountain range, the Amazon region, sprawling
river basins and wetlands. The initiative for integrating the South American
region’s infrastructure seeks to establish mechanisms that can overcome these
obstacles and boost the region’s economic development through
methodological and financial innovations. The aim is to establish transportation,
energy and telecommunications connections between markets and areas with
high growth potential. These connections must provide compatible technical
standards and operating conditions acknowledged to be reliable.
From our standpoint, Iirsa constitutes a decentralised alternative for
regional integration, an option that enables Peru to take full advantage of its
geographic location, making it a viable choice for interconnecting the Pacific
and Atlantic Oceans in South America. It also provides a prime opportunity
for developing the different regions in Peru by exploring the potential of
regional inter-frontier markets. Peru has a keen interest in the following elements
of the Iirsa initiative. The inter-nodal hub in the Amazon region designed to
interconnect northern Peru and eastern Brazil, linking the ports of Paita and
Bayóvar on the Pacific coast in Peru to Belém and Macapá on Brazil’s northern
Atlantic coast. The Central Inter-Oceanic Hub linking Peru’s southern region
to the States of Acre and Rondônia in Brazil. Both states are farther from São
Paulo than from Peru’s regional markets. The inter-oceanic hub can improve
access to the Pacific Basin for exports from these western states in Brazil via
the Peruvian ports of Ilo and Matarani. The Southern Inter-Oceanic Hub
linking southern Peru to the States of Mato Grosso do Sul, São Paulo and Rio
de Janeiro from Peru’s Pacific coastline. This hub additionally links Peru to
Bolivia and Paraguay whilst also raising the possibility of an inter-oceanic
connection between the Peruvian ports of Ilo and Matarani and the Paraguayan
ports of Villeta and Concepción on the Paraguay-Paraná waterway.
The Iirsa integration hubs should be supplemented by efforts to integrate
road systems and national markets. All these undertakings require hefty
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investments, nonetheless. Bearing in mind that the region’s fiscal status does
not allow for major investments, the Government of Peru has proposed
mechanisms that may assist in financing physical infrastructure projects and,
as a spin-off, provide jobs and alleviate poverty. The first proposal is that the
international finance community adopt innovative financing mechanisms. The
accounting criteria employed by the International Monetary Fund for calculating
fiscal deficit should be altered so as to differentiate current outlay from spending
on investments. This would free funds from the cap on debt for investment in
physical infrastructure. On the other hand, a South American infrastructure
authority could be created.
As an area of physical and economic integration and as a political unit,
South America has sufficiently high levels of transborder flows in people, trade
and investment, and sufficient social and political exchanges to envisage a relatively
high degree of unity in political co-ordination on regional and global issues. A
South American integration project may also serve to strengthen Latin American
identity by means of convergence with other sub-regional units making similar
progress in the same direction: Central America and the Caribbean.
3. Economic Diplomacy
Peru is a middle-income developing country with productive potential, a
substantial endowment of natural resources, and an increasingly competitive
business sector. At the same time, its social indicators reveal a high percentage
of the population living in poverty (approximately 50%) or extreme poverty
(22%). The prospects for defeating poverty are directly associated with growth
and greater corporate competitiveness – both factors that generate decent
employment.
In full awareness of this state of affairs, Peruvian diplomacy must take an
essentially economic and social tack in a large proportion of its foreign relations.
The fundamentals of Peru’s economy are stable and auspicious. When President
Toledo took office, the economy had registered real GDP growth of just 0.3%
for 2001. Since then, Peru has grown at an average rate in excess of 4.2% per
annum, and estimates for 2004 and 2005 put growth at 4.5% or more. Inflation
stood at 1.5% in 2002 and 2.48% in 2003, the rate for 2004 being estimated at
2.5%. The country’s risk ratings have dropped substantially, averaging 249 points
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in 2003. Foreign reserves have increased steadily, rising from US$ 8.613 millions
in 2001 to US$ 11 millions in 2004. The debt-to-equity ratio fell from 45.7% in
2000 to 45.45% in 2003 and is set to continue on this downward trend in 2004
and 2005, dropping to 45% and 43.2%, respectively.
Peru’s macroeconomic stability is laying the groundwork for greater
business activity and higher employment – as yet incipient. Exports, which
stood at US$ 6,900 millions in 2001, have increased significantly, reaching
US$ 8,000 millions in 2003. The forecast for 2004 is US$ 10,000 millions,
which allows one to assume that the target of US$ 13,000 millions will be
attained in 2005. Peruvian exports are reasonably diversified, 25.79% going to
the United States, 29.2% to Nafta (Canada and Mexico, besides the US), 25.5%
to the European Union, 19% to Asia, and 10% to South America.
Peru has a relatively small domestic economy, economic activity being
highly concentrated in the coastal strip, especially in and around Lima. As a
result, the national development strategy focuses on the external market, seeking
to reach an extended market of 800 million or more consumers. Peru has
practically consolidated a free trade area with the countries of the Andean
Community in addition to signing a free trade agreement with Mercosur and
initiating negotiations for an FTA with the United States. Negotiations that
should culminate in a free trade agreement between the Andean Community
and the European Union have been under way since the Europe-Latin America
Summit held in Guadalajara. Negotiations are likewise in progress for a free
trade treaty with Thailand, and others are due to commence, probably with
Morocco and with Latin American countries not included in multilateral
regional trade liberalisation processes.
Another priority of the national strategy for expanding trade and boosting
productive activity is insistence on more equitable negotiations in the Doha
Round. Peru argues that concrete results must be achieved concerning access
to markets and agricultural trade, including gradual elimination of farm
subsidies, assistance for agriculture and exportation of agricultural produce,
acceptance of a safeguard clause that is more effective for developing countries,
as well as lists of sensitive products that will enable their farmers to be
progressively more competitive.
Regarding the specific activity of Peruvian embassies and consulates
overseas, all Peru’s diplomatic missions have been assigned specific tasks for
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promoting exports, attracting investments, and encouraging tourism. An
integrated approach has been adopted to overcome the dispersion and
compartmentalisation prevalent in the past. The present strategy actively seeks
to involve the private sector. Diplomatic staff are receiving specialist training
in economic promotion, and a commercial counsellor of the diplomatic service
has been appointed to every mission overseas in addition to the specialist
attachés posted to embassies in countries with which Peru has more dynamic
trade relations.
4. Social Diplomacy
Convinced of the importance of multilateral action to foster a fairer,
more inclusive and equitable international economic system, Peruvian foreign
policy propounds a new development agenda for global governance. All
countries – developed and developing alike – should have access to the benefits
of expanding trade, greater investments and improved social cohesion.
It is estimated that there are 1.2 billion people exposed to extreme poverty
in developing countries living on less than a dollar a day. Of these, 826 million
endure famine and hunger. As many as 114 million children are deprived of
primary education, 63 million of whom are girls. Every year 11 million infants
under the age of five die of preventable diseases. Every minute a woman dies in
the world of causes related to childbirth. A total of 42 million people worldwide
are infected with HIV/Aids. Access to clean drinking water is denied to 1 billion
people while a further 2.4 billion do not have access to basic sanitation.
Peru’s position in the human development index has remained stationary
between 2002 and 2003, ranking 82
nd
, below Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia,
Venezuela, Hungary and Rumania but above Ecuador, Paraguay, Honduras
and Morocco. The tasks of promoting domestic socio-economic development
and combating hunger are priority components of Peru’s national development
strategy. In view of this, the current administration has included social
diplomacy among its priorities.
Extricating 52% of the population from a state of poverty is in the
interests of the entire nation and is thus a prime national objective. Hence,
Peruvian diplomacy has incorporated the social variable into its strategy for
action. The creation of decent employment, the improvement and expansion
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of coverage for health, education, housing, nutrition and adequate care for
mothers and infants are targets that foreign policy should help accomplish.
In the context of Peru’s international projection, Social Diplomacy can
be defined as an endeavour to muster an array of available resources in
implementing Foreign Policy. The aim is to promote fair, democratic national
development while enhancing our competitive potential.
In a changing global and national scenario, Peru faces the challenge of
plotting anew the co-ordinates of its foreign presence. The implications of
this approach are such that they assume the appearance of a renewal in the
way Peru sees itself. In this light, the concept of Social Diplomacy augurs
auspiciously for harmonising the way we project out to the world at large with
the way we project inwards. Indeed, the concept of Social Diplomacy comprises
one of the strategic dimensions that should be the hallmark of Peruvian foreign
policy. It reflects the Government’s political will to ensure its action in
multilateral forums and in dealing with other realities emerging in the context
of globalisation matches the pressing demands and needs of domestic
development. Operating harmoniously on both fronts has become an
imperative since globalisation has made frontiers and national sovereignty
porous categories. It has intensified the transit – if not the lack of distinction
– between domestic and international spheres so that, for instance, domestic
policies for combating poverty can no longer fail to take account of the effects
of migration or international trade.
Peru’s Social Diplomacy represents an attempt to attune foreign policy
to the priority national objectives of drastically reducing poverty, malnutrition
and the incidence of infectious or contagious diseases associated with them.
It entails maximising the national, social and personal benefits to be derived
from emigration. It operates on three fronts: multilateral action, mainly
associated with the Millennium Development Goals; channelling Official Aid
for Development to our country; and mobilising communities of Peruvian
émigrés in support of national development goals, including protection for
expatriate Peruvian nationals and support for their interests.
One positive aspect of multilateralism in the present day is the
globalisation of the social agenda. This is based on recognition of the fact
that many contemporary social phenomena are replicated across the globe or
produce consequences that transcend national borders. The fight against hunger
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and against today’s infectious/contagious scourges, for example, cannot be
circumscribed to the exclusive competence of nation states. They demand
multilateral or supra-sovereign responses.
The globalisation of the social agenda – understood as a projection of
aspects of social policies on a worldwide scale – is particularly evident to a
country like Peru where the surfacing of unsolved structural problems has in
recent decades provoked intense emigration (often referred to as the exportation
of poverty) leading to the present situation in which roughly 10% of Peruvian
nationals now live outside the country.
The globalisation of the social agenda is strategically significant for at
least three reasons. First, the burgeoning inequalities marking the international
scenario led UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to state the following in his
report to the Millennium Summit titled “We the Peoples: The Role of The
United Nations in the 21st Century”:
First, the benefits and opportunities of globalisation remain highly
concentrated among a relatively small number of countries and are spread
unevenly within them. Second, in recent decades an imbalance has emerged
between successful efforts to craft strong and well-enforced rules facilitating
the expansion of global markets, while support for equally valid social
objectives, be they labour standards, the environment, human rights or poverty
reduction, has lagged behind.
The globalisation of the social agenda thus represents a response to
these imbalances, which seriously affect Peru and all other developing nations.
It gives voice to a universal desire to build a fairer world.
Second, globalisation of the social agenda is an attempt to make the
emerging world scenario coherent and sustainable. In the same document, the
UN Secretary-General also points out that:
[...] globalisation must mean more than creating bigger
markets. The economic sphere cannot be separated from the
more complex fabric of social and political life, and sent
shooting off on its own trajectory. To survive and thrive, a
global market economy must have a more solid foundation
in shared values and institutional practices – it must have a
broader, and more inclusive, social purpose.
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Third, domestic social developments and conditions in Peru are
significantly determined by extra-national variables. One example of this is
the effects that the phenomenon of global warming is apparently having on
regular climate cycles in most of the poorer regions of our country. They
aggravate pre-existent conditions of poverty and inequality. Other examples
include the differential effects that the signing of a Free Trade Treaty with the
United States will have for Peru or the sudden change in international meat
trade flows caused by outbreaks of pandemic diseases, which create unforeseen
opportunities for our country that are rarely turned to its benefit.
Responding to the drive that globalisation of the social agenda propitiates,
Social Diplomacy holds to the premise that social equity, socio-cultural
development and economic development comprise a single process. They are
thus tackled en bloc, in an integral, coherent manner. Consequently, political
and economic integration schemes must be geared to achieving a permanent
improvement in living standards for the region’s inhabitants. They should
likewise serve to strengthen the exercise of economic and social rights and
duties, as high authorities responsible for social development policies in our
Continent have acknowledged in the recent Santa Clara Declaration on Social
Cohesion in Latin America and the Caribbean. In this context, Peruvian foreign
policy – planned as a lever for national development – must take stock of the
latter’s pivotal importance for the country’s international standing, projecting
its inherently multifaceted nature abroad. Peru’s Social Diplomacy thus seeks
to promote national interests pro-actively when it comes to establishing and
implementing the global social agenda. The latter is understood as the
international community’s contribution to facing the challenges of our own
development as our country seeks to assert its leadership in promoting better,
more equitable international conditions for progress.
With this in mind, the Peruvian Foreign Office has defined and is currently
implementing a social diplomacy drive concentrated in three priority spheres
of action:
1. Pursuant to the requirements of the National Plan to Combat Poverty,
active participation in international negotiations on the social agenda. The
prime focus is on the fight against poverty and hunger, eradication of illiteracy,
treatment of the diseases and ailments that most affect the Peruvian population
(including endemic diseases such as tuberculosis, yellow fever and malaria),
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overcoming the housing deficit, particularly in poorer rural and urban areas,
food supply and nutrition programmes, the creation of decent jobs, rural
development, improvement of working conditions for women and children,
and matters relating to population policies.
Within the framework of these international processes, priority is ascribed
to seeking national and international initiatives that can help Peru meet the
global targets laid out in the United Nations Millennium Declaration. This
applies especially to accomplishment of the basic development goals
established: halving by the year 2015 the percentage of people living on less
than one dollar a day and who suffer from hunger; preventing school
absenteeism so as to meet the target for all boys and girls in the country to
complete at least the full cycle of primary education; eliminating gender
inequalities in primary and secondary teaching, preferably by the year 2005,
and at all levels of education by the year 2015; reducing by two thirds by the
year 2015 mortality rates among children under 5 years of age; reducing
maternal mortality by three quarters by the year 2015; halting and beginning
to reduce the spread of HIV/Aids by the year 2015; controlling and beginning
to reduce the incidence of yellow fever, tuberculosis and malaria by the year
2015; halving by the year 2015 the percentage of people denied sustainable
access to clean drinking water and better sanitation services.
The millennium development goals listed above applied to circumstances in
Peru have become targets of the country’s national development policy and of
social diplomacy. Internal endeavours thus mesh with co-operation for development
activities within the United Nations system. These activities have in common the
following characteristics: they are universal, voluntary and provided as donations;
they are neutral and multilateral; they are carried out for the benefit of the target
populations in consonance with national development policies.
The main technical and financial co-operation agencies of the United
Nations Organisation, such as the United Nations Development Programme
(Undp), the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef), the United Nations
Population Fund (Unfpa) and the World Food Programme (WFP), whose
headquarters is in Rome, run programmes in Peru designed to relieve poverty
and generate productive capacity among more vulnerable social segments.
The current Undp co-operation programme with Peru (2001-2005) is one
of the most far-reaching in the region with a global budget of US$ 311,783,000.
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5
See Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros. “La Carta Democrática Interamericana” In: Carta Democrática nteramericana,
documentos e interpretaciones. Washington DC: OAS, 2003.
These resources are used to support social programmes for alleviating poverty
and to support the country’s drive to improve the State’s administrative capacity,
enhancing the level of democratic participation of local governments and
communities as means of bolstering democratic governance.
Finally, social diplomacy also plans to implement a programme still being
drafted called Solidarity. The aim is to select each year sixty to eighty micro
projects that have a direct social impact. These can range from the building of
small schools or the installation of bakeries or milk bottling plants in women’s
clubs to medical care programmes or the installation of small health centres.
One to three projects will be assigned to each diplomatic and consular mission
overseas for them to seek funding through non-refundable co-operation or
donations. The local populations benefiting from the projects will be responsible
for administering them through grassroots organisations.
5. Diplomacy in defence of democracy and the modernisation
of the inter-American system
Great progress has been made in recent years in forging an agenda for
inter-American governance. The Inter-American Democratic Charter (a
Peruvian initiative) enshrines the juridical and political framework of democracy
and the rule of law in the region.
Today, democracy is not merely a protected asset but rather a binding
obligation for all the member states of the OAS. The Inter-American Charter
has acquired sufficient status for other continents to advance in the same
direction, expanding approval of democratic clauses. Indeed, it has even allowed
the United Nations to make progress for the first time toward achieving a
consensus on elements that define or contribute to the existence of a
democratic regime.
5
Nevertheless, the region has not yet reached a consensus on the usefulness
and convenience of applying the Charter to situations in which institutional
democracy is at stake. The case of Haiti is emblematic. Had the Charter been
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opportunely brought to bear, the crisis might have unfolded in a manner less
harmful to institutional democracy. We still lack a sense of practicality when it
comes to defending institutional democracy.
Other important advances in redefining the inter-American agenda include
the Convention against Corruption; the decisions adopted in the wake of the
September 11
th
attacks on combating terrorism; the experience of utilising the
Multilateral Assessment Mechanism in the fight against drugs; the results of the
Extraordinary Summit of the Americas on economic, social and financial issues;
the consensus concerning a pluralist, democratic approach to continental security
reached at the Ministerial Conference in Mexico; and the strengthening of the
inter-American system for protecting and promoting human rights.
All this is still insufficient, however, as is the fact that a compartmentalised
approach persists in inter-American dialogue. Sadly, issues such as peace and
security are not linked, in practice, to the maintenance of democracy or the
fight against drug-trafficking and the social agenda.
We must continue to perfect the system on a consensual basis. The
challenges posed by globalisation and their bearing on domestic and sub-regional
agendas demand a modern, up-to-date inter-American system based on the
juridical equality of the member states, one that can provide ready responses to
the real problems afflicting our citizens, especially the poor and the excluded
among them. To this end, we must strive to forge an inter-American agenda that
focuses on the issues and priorities that affect our people’s daily lives. Peru
considers the following to be the key elements of such an agenda:
a. Defence and preservation of institutional democracy. Determined
political will is required to apply the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, especially the preventive aspects of the same, and to accept
that the future of democracy in the region hinges on its capacity or
failure to address the legitimate demands for decent employment of
the majority of the population.
b. Means to secure governability that do not expose democracy to social
questioning as a result of failures or shortcomings in solving the
problems besetting large numbers of people on a day-to-day basis
because they are unemployed, because their wages are insufficient to
provide a decent standard of living, because they are ill and cannot
get adequate treatment or because they see their children abandon
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primary or secondary school for lack of economic means. This is the
real daily agenda underpinning democratic governance.
c. Issues relating to equitable economic growth, the tasks of development
and social issues. This is the social and economic agenda that we cannot
continue to downplay or sidestep. It urgently needs re-valuing, making
the Permanent Council responsible for taking up the debate on
economics and regional development.
d. It is likewise necessary to tackle matters of peace and regional security
with a proactive approach that seeks to put the conclusions of the Mexico
Conference into practice. It is essential that the OAS engage more actively
in a number of urgent tasks: institutionalising a democratic, co-operative
approach to security; discouraging any hint of an arms race that would
only undermine the prospects for economic growth and might revive
national tensions that have fortunately been laid to rest. Practical
measures should be introduced to implement a regional register for the
acquisition of weapons as a means of fostering trust that may avert an
arms race and head off sub-regional imbalances. The OAS should also
commit itself more fully to the elimination of antipersonnel mines.
e. The issue of drug trafficking and terrorism. We must advance more
decidedly in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism, which
are increasingly interrelated. We must consolidate an integral approach
to combating drug trafficking focusing simultaneously on demand
and supply. In this respect, positive results have been obtained in
applying the multilateral assessment mechanism to the substitution
or eradication of crops. However, the mechanism’s assessments must
also identify advances that could be made in countries most affected
by consumption concerning actions adopted to reduce demand.
f. The fight against corruption. Corruption corrodes institutional democracy
and opens the door to drug trafficking, money laundering and illegal
trade in weapons. Corruption is the antithesis of good governance.
Peru considers it indispensable to reinforce anticorruption measures
and to create new instruments of judicial solidarity and co-operation
that will allow for the extradition of high-ranking government officials
responsible for acts of corruption, including negotiation and signing
of a multilateral extradition treaty exclusively for cases of corruption.
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g. Improvement of the inter-American human rights system. Making it
possible for individuals to bring cases directly before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights is another pressing task, as is
endowing the Court with permanent status.
Similarly, Peruvian diplomacy is proposing a number of changes to the
institutional structure of the OAS so as to adapt it to the demands of the
regional governance agenda. Preventive diplomacy is an urgent necessity,
especially when situations that can provoke a crisis for institutional democracy
arise. For this purpose, there must be a unit directly responsible for managing
the Organisation’s political affairs. Likewise, matters relating to peace and
security, particularly those associated with preventing an arms race, effective
registration of the purchase of weapons, introducing confidence-building
measures, and a proactive policy to flesh out a shared vision of democratic
security all require a specific institutional management body.
A study on democracy in Latin America published by the United Nations
Development Programme has presented several worrying indicators. A large
percentage of the population in the region feels cheated by the results of
democratic rule, and a significant percentage claim they would opt for an
authoritarian regime were it to resolve their subsistence problems. This is a
wake-up call for all those with a democratic conscience in the hemisphere. It
is not a real indicator of the democratic will of our peoples. Were a survey to
ask the population if they would support a democratic regime that gave them
freedom, guaranteed their rights and provided them with decent employment
while satisfying their basic needs in terms of work, health and housing, a
predictable outcome is that the survey would find 90 percent or more in favour.
6. Diplomacy for peace and international security,
prevalence of international law, strengthening and positive
reform of the United Nations, and the affirmation of
groups in favour of disarmament and the restriction of
weapons
A reform of the United Nations is needed to strengthen multilateralism
and to make the institution more efficient and effective.
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The imperative for reform has been acknowledged in a number of General
Assembly resolutions, particularly in the Millennium Declaration (Resolution
55/2) passed in September 2002. Under the terms of the Resolution, the Heads
of State and Government of the member states have decided “to reaffirm the
central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policy-making
and representative organ of the United Nations, and to enable it to play that role
effectively; to intensify efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security
Council in all its aspects; to strengthen further the Economic and Social Council;
and to strengthen the International Court of Justice, in order to ensure justice
and the rule of law in international affairs.”
Subsequently, given the sense of urgency ensuing from the legitimacy
crisis engendered by the conflict in Iraq in 2003, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Kofi Annan, insisted in his report to the General Assembly
on 2
nd
September 2003 (A/58/323) on calling on the member states to examine
carefully the present “architecture” of international institutions. He suggested
that the 2005 General Assembly be set as a deadline for reaching an agreement
on the changes that need to be made.
Peru is in favour of a reform of the United Nations that will empower it
to address in a solidary fashion new and old demands in the realms of peace,
security and development. Peru insists that the General Assembly shoulder its
responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner, including matters relating
to international peace and security. It holds that the Security Council should
be made more representative and democratic by expanding the number of
seats to include new members and especially by making reasonable
modifications to the Council’s decision-making procedures, at the very least
restricting issues subject to veto. With a view to contributing to this reform
process, the Government of Peru has joined the “Group of Friends” of United
Nations Reform.
Similarly, Peru endorses continued improvement of the UN’s capacity
to respond in preventing armed conflict and fielding peace-keeping operations.
The Government has decided to increase Peru’s contribution to peace-keeping
missions whenever they comply with the provisions in chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Peru has already contributed military observers to peace-keeping
missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Monuc, since 2000), in Eritrea-
Ethiopia (Unmee, since 2001) and Liberia (UNOL, since 2003).
The Peru’s foreign policy
160 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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In November 2003, the Government of Peru increased its political
commitment to Peace-Keeping Operations by means of a Memorandum of
Understanding on the United Nations System of Stand-By Arrangements,
signed in Lima by President Alejandro Toledo and Secretary-General Kofi
Annan. This document lays out in detail Peru’s offer to contribute to Peace-
Keeping Operations one Infantry Battalion of 640 officers, two Marine
Companies of 212 officers and one Special Forces Infantry Battalion of 91
officers, in addition to helicopters, combat aircraft, specialist equipment and a
missile frigate. In March this year, Peru is expected to contribute one aero-
transported company to the peace-keeping operation in Haiti.
In the field of human rights, Peru supports the Secretary-General’s
proposal contained in a document titled “Strengthening the United Nations:
An agenda for further change.” This reform package includes measures for
reforming the organs created by virtue of treaties on human rights so as to
make good the commitments assumed by the States and to enhance the
United Nations Organisation’s relations with private enterprise and civil
society. It presses for greater transparency and objectivity in the workings
of the Commission on Human Rights besides insisting on a co-operative
approach from the human rights protection bodies stemming from the UN
Charter as well as conventional organisations. Protecting human rights is an
essential function of the United Nations that should be exercised without
discrimination and shun politically selective procedures.
Peru is a staunch supporter of an international order based on
multilateralism and respect for clear, predictable legal norms underpinning
firm, effective, legitimate action. This is the best guarantee of a stable
international system capable of guaranteeing global peace and security on the
basis of international law and the legitimacy of broad consensus.
Peru forthrightly condemns any act, method or practice of terrorism in
all forms and manifestations wherever they may occur and regardless of who
commits them. Peru is thus party to the international drive the United Nations
is promoting to provide systematic, sustained and efficient response to
terrorism, assessing all aspects of this scourge. Peru is a signatory of the
twelve international treaties on the fight against terrorism drawn up under the
auspices of the United Nations. It is also a member of the General Assembly’s
Special Committee established by virtue of resolution A/RES/51/210 and
of the Working Party of the Sixth Commission established by virtue of
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Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros
161
resolution A/RES/57/27, currently negotiating a draft General Convention on
International Terrorism and a draft International Convention for the Repression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
On issues relating to disarmament, Peru considers that the threat of
nuclear proliferation among States continues to be a real danger. It therefore
defends an end to the nuclear arms race and supports nuclear disarmament.
It is also in favour of the following: prevention of nuclear war; adoption of
international agreements that provide States not in possession of nuclear
weapons with effective guarantees against the use or threat to use such arms;
international control of new types of weapons of mass destruction and
new systems for such weapons (e.g. radiological weapons); control of
conventional weapons at regional and sub-regional levels; transparency and
universal, regional and sub-regional restrictions on the purchase of weapons;
and adoption by the United Nations of a comprehensive disarmament
programme.
Peruvian diplomacy places strong emphasis on the elimination of anti-
personnel mines, the establishment of international, regional and sub-regional
regulations for controlling small and light firearms, as well as prohibition of
the use and transference of chemical and biological weapons. In the ambit
of the Andean Community of Nations, Peru tabled and won approval for
the Andean Charter for Peace and Security, Limitation and Control of
Spending on External Defence. The Charter introduces commitments to
adopt a common Andean security policy, to establish a sub-regional peace
zone, to place a cap on spending on external defence, to draw up agreements
for the control of conventional weapons and to promote transparency. It
also provides for an agreement enabling Latin America to be declared a
zone free from air-to-air missiles beyond visual range and from medium and
long-range strategic missiles.
In addition to these provisions, the Andean Charter also contains
commitments aimed at consolidating regimes for the banning of chemical
and biological weapons and for the eradication of illegal trade in firearms,
ammunition, explosives and other related materials.
In support of these initiatives, Peru has backed moves in the General
Assembly of the United Nations to declare the Andean sub-region and South
America as a whole peace zones.
The Peru’s foreign policy
162 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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With reference to its frontier relations, Peru is in favour of measures
to foster renewed trust, including the establishment of security zones – or
zones of mutual trust – in border areas, ensuring that the number and
strength of military units and detachments match the requirements of
peaceful, co-operative security relations. Meanwhile, Peruvian diplomacy
is committed to initiatives to limit weapons on a multilateral, regional or
sub-regional basis. It likewise supports the introduction of standard
methods for measuring defence spending as well as the proscription of
any kind of arms race in the region.
7. Policy for reforming consular services and for the
protection of Peruvians overseas
Consular services and the policy for protecting Peruvian communities
overseas have been fully improved. The changes made come in response to
the major transformation that has taken place in recent decades in the make-
up and distribution of Peruvian communities abroad. In line with global trends
in migration from developing countries, Peruvian communities overseas have
grown considerably and are now mainly concentrated in big cities in developed
countries and in neighbouring countries. In this context, the previous paradigm
for the provision of consular services (performed by a “Prefect-Consul”) has
become obsolete and dysfunctional. In replacing it, the foreign policy of the
democratic State has sought to create a regime for the provision of consular
services based on the paradigm of “Civil Servant Consuls.”
The phenomenon of global migration has acquired novel characteristics
in present-day international relations. Advances in communications and the
globalisation of economic and cultural trends have shortened geographic
distances. It is estimated that 10 million people were expatriates in 1965. Ten
years later, the figure had risen to 84 million. It rose further to 105 million in
1985, reaching 120 million in 1990. By the year 2000, the number of
international migrants, voluntary migrants and refugees included, was estimated
at 150 million.
6
6
See ALTAMIRANO, Teófilo & CARDENAS, Gerardo. Migración Peruana al Exterior: Resumen ejecutivo de los
trabajos de investigación por encargo de la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). Lima, March 2003.
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Peru has not remained untouched by this global trend in migration. Indeed,
as a number of surveys indicate
7
, the pace of emigration has increased in recent
decades. Approximately 7% of Peruvian citizens are now migrants. According
to figures for 2002, 1.87 million Peruvians out of a total population of 26.75
million inhabitants are now resident outside the country.
8
The problems raised by migration in the global order can be summarised
in the following points:
a. The legal predicament or status of migrants in the receiving country;
b. Illegal traffic in persons;
c. Respect for the human rights of migrants, taking into account expressions
of xenophobia and discrimination in the receiving countries;
d. The place of migrants in the labour market and production systems
of the receiving societies;
e. Culture shock resulting from the encounter migration provokes of
dissimilar sets of values in the countries of origin and receiving societies;
f. Maintenance of migrants’ ties with their countries of origin.
With regard to the economic impact of migration, according to data
supplied by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), it is estimated that in
2002 repatriation of income by Latin American and Caribbean communities to
their countries of origin totalled US$ 32,044 millions. This figure was practically
the same as the influx of foreign capital into the region in that year in the form
of foreign direct investment. Moreover, these repatriated earnings far exceeded
the sum total of foreign aid labelled as official assistance for development.
According to the same source, such remittances accounted for at least 10% of
GDP in six countries in Latin American and the Caribbean: Nicaragua (29%),
Haiti (24.2%), Guyana (16.6%), El Salvador (15.1%), Jamaica (12.2%) and
Honduras (11.5%). If remittances to Latin American and the Caribbean continue
to grow at a very conservative rate of 7% per annum, the IDB reckons that by
the year 2010 the aggregate figure will have reached US$ 400,000 millions.
9
7
Altamirano, op. cit., p.3.
8
Source: INEI (National Statistics & Data Institute). Compendio Estadístico Perú 2002.
9
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Sending Money Home: An international comparison of remittances markets.
Washington DC, February 2003.
The Peru’s foreign policy
164 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
164
The previous paradigm of the Prefect-Consul had become dysfunctional
in performing the State’s duties towards its nationals. In replacing it, a need
was felt to flesh out a paradigm for a “Civil Servant Consul” attuned to the
new foreign policy designed to protect nationals resident abroad. In this new
scheme taking shape in the wake of the restitution of the rule of Law and the
revival of democracy, consular staff ’s duties are to citizens, their most important
tasks being:
- to provide protection and assistance for expatriate Peruvian nationals;
- to offer efficient, opportune services resulting from consular reform;
- to serve as a cultural and economic link for Peruvians resident abroad
with their country as a whole and with their communities of origin in particular.
The creation of a Sub-secretariat for Peruvian Communities Abroad is
the starting point for the structural modification to consular foreign policy
and the establishment, for the first time in the country’s history, of state action
directly aimed at protecting and maintaining constructive links with Peruvian
nationals living outside Peru. This is the rationale behind the priority the Foreign
Office ascribes to restructuring consular services to assist and provide
communication with expatriate Peruvian communities.
In the new scheme of Peru’s foreign policy, the purpose of consular
work is to provide protection and to promote the interests and rights of
Peruvians overseas. Consular action should likewise provide expatriates with a
link to their country of origin, concentrating on efficient repatriation of funds
to promote the country’s development. This implies a new model for the
administration of consular services that will allow Peruvians overseas to assist
the State in drafting and implementing policies of direct interest to them. In
other words, one of the mainstays of the consular administration of the
democratic State of Peru must be active participation of expatriate Peruvian
nationals.
The new policy of consular reform and protection of expatriate
Peruvian citizens is implemented by means of seven programmes: consular
reform and administrative streamlining; legal protection; humanitarian
assistance; support for the productive, legal placement of migrants in
receiving societies with due respect for their human rights; promotion of
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the renewal of cultural and national links with Peru based on acknowledgement
of the country’s multiethnic, pluri-cultural make-up; renewal of productive
and economic links with Peru; and promotion of citizenship and democratic
participation in political life both in Peru and in the receiving society.
8. Toward an integrated model of external management
of the Peruvian State and a decentralised approach to
implementation of foreign policy
One of the most complex problems impairing the efficacy of foreign
policies in Latin America has been and still is what Marcel Merle refers to as
“the dismembering of the executive branch,”
10
i.e. fragmented management
of foreign policy. This is the result of the encroaching competency of sectors
other than the Foreign Office in various spheres of the State’s foreign relations.
In practical terms, this sectorisation of foreign policy has engendered a lack
of coherence and consistency in the handling of foreign affairs. To avoid and
overcome this shortcoming, an endeavour is being made to provide effective
co-ordination and harmonisation of sectorial policies in the international sphere
so as to achieve a single approach and integrated praxis in the handling of the
State’s foreign affairs.
At the same time, Peru is introducing a decentralised approach to
foreign policy on two levels. On the one hand, with regard to internal
agents, propitiating the participation of the State’s other branches of power
(the Legislative and Judicial branches, as well as civil society, regional and
local governments) in the formulation and implementation of foreign
policy. On the other hand, a decentralised approach is being adopted in
identifying Peruvian diplomacy’s foreign interlocutors. This includes not
only relations between sovereign States but a supplementary option to
establish relations between the Peruvian State and decentralised political
units in other countries. In the case of Brazil, for example, direct links are
being established with governors of neighbouring states along the frontier
between Peru and Brazil.
10
See Marcel Merle. La politique étrangère. Paris, 1984.
The Peru’s foreign policy
166 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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Closing remarks
In analysing the history of Peru’s foreign affairs, Jorge Basadre made a
statement that holds true for the past. Basadre said Peru’s foreign relations
have been the upshot of its often conflicting domestic and external tensions.
In view of this historical predicament, Peru’s present foreign policy seeks to
strike a balance between development and the consolidation of the nation,
between the affirmation of its historical-cultural identity or personality and a
form of engagement in the global process that promotes development with
social cohesion, based on Peru’s membership of the Andean Community and
location in South America. This balance strives to express itself in the previously
non-existent stability among external and domestic features of Peruvian policy.
To paraphrase Jorge Basandre, in the context of globalisation, Peruvian
diplomacy endeavours to ensure that the interrelation of internal and external
variables no longer leads to confrontation marked by continual tension. Rather,
it is designed to be a process of intermeshing interests that underpin stable
institutional democracy and forge a development model combining
competitiveness and social cohesion.
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167
n formulating and implementing the foreign policy of the Republic
of Suriname, the achievement of the national development goals of this
country receives prime attention.
In this regard the existing relations on the bilateral, regional and
multilateral level that can contribute significantly to the achievement of the
national development goals of Suriname receive primary attention, while the
identification and establishment of potential relations from both a political
and economic perspective also constitute the Surinamese foreign policy strategy.
In implementing the foreign policy of the Republic of Suriname special
consideration is also given to the common international values, norms and
standards that should guide relations between states.
Therefore, reference may be made to, among other things:
- respect for the constitutional state and democratic principles that are
internationally applicable;
- non-interference in internal affairs of other states or mutual respect
for national sovereignty;
The foreign policy of
the Republic
of Suriname
Maria Levens
*
E
* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Suriname
The foreign policy of the Republic of Suriname
168 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
168
- advancing harmony, peace, stability and cooperation with our
neighboring countries, the countries of origin of our peoples, and all
other countries in the world;
- observance of human rights;
- protection of the environment and implementation of sustainable
development.
By means of intensifying relations on the bilateral, regional and
multilateral level efforts are made to realize mutual objectives, whereby the
advantages arising from economic and social development as well as the
aspirations of the People of Suriname, are basic elements.
In view of the above, the foreign policy of the Republic of Suriname
with regard to bilateral relations is aimed at strengthening existing relations of
cooperation as well as promoting, expanding and developing new relations
between Suriname and other friendly nations. The participation in sub-regional,
regional and multilateral integration processes and in international
organizations, in which the promotion of issues of mutual interest are
fundamental, should also be considered within this scope.
Diversifying our relations is also one of the key objectives of Suriname’s
foreign policy, this in view of the international developments that have been
taking place in he past decades, and that constitute yet another challenge for
small economies to survive in the current international economic constellation.
As a result thereof, the intensification of the cooperation on the bilateral
and regional level between Suriname and friendly and strategic partners extends
primarily to the countries of the South American continent, the entire western
hemisphere and countries in Europe and Asia.
If we focus our attention on the western hemisphere special reference
should be made to the relations between Suriname and the Federative Republic
of Brazil, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Guyana, the United States of
America, Canada and Mexico. Suriname maintains special bonds with these
countries as to strengthening its economy, cooperating in the field of technical
development and realizing common objectives of various natures.
With regard to the relations between Surinam and Brazil it is worth
mentioning the positive results that are already manifest as a result of the
intensification of the bilateral relation between both countries.
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169
Special reference, in this context, can be made to the commercial link
that is currently flowering due to the establishment of a direct shipping line
connection between Suriname and Brazil, which is facilitating the export of
agricultural products to the northern market of Brazil.
As a result of the intensification of the relation between Suriname and
Brazil, both countries are also working closely in other areas such as e.g.
education, the fight against cross border crime, justice, health protection and
sustainable development, while on the political front cooperation is reflected
by Suriname’s support to Brazil’s efforts to become a permanent member of
the UN Security Council.
In the Caribbean region the relations with the Caricom and ACS
(Association of Caribbean States) countries also deserve special mention when
taking into consideration the intensity of the cooperation and the process of
subregional integration.
Suriname’s participation in the Caricom should be seen in the context
of its efforts to promote economic development through strategic partnerships
with countries such as Cuba and the Dominican Republic, while a free trade
and economic agreement with Costa – Rica is also being considered.
Through Caricom membership, Suriname is also taking steps to increase
its international presence and involvement in international organizations, in
order to, among other things, effectively express its vision on issues of concern.
As to the European countries the relations between Suriname and the
United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Italy, Russian Federation, Germany and
the Netherlands may be underlined.
Considering the importance of the Asian continent in the world economy,
Suriname aims at strengthening relations with various countries on this continent.
The priority partners on the Asian continent include China, Japan, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea. Suriname maintains bilateral relations
with these partners in the financial, economic, trade, political and, especially,
technical and cultural fields. This takes place either by means of bilateral
contacts or through the existing treaties between these countries, and the
Caricom and ACS-organizations of which Suriname is a member.
Suriname’s participation on the sub-regional and on regional level must
be considered on the basis of the fact that up till today, in view of global
The foreign policy of the Republic of Suriname
170 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
170
developments, no country has been spared the consequences of the events of
the recent past.
In this respect, reference can be made to the erosion of preferential and
special treatment of small economies as well as to the international trade
negotiations and developments that are taking place internationally and that
have already given birth to the blocks that have emerged between countries
with geographic proximity, namely e.g. Nafta, Mercosur, EU, Caricom.
Bearing these facts in mind the foreign policy of the Republic of
Suriname, in particular the economic approach towards regional integration
processes, has been adjusted in accordance with the latest developments so
that the challenges that present themselves due to the formation of blocks,
may be adequately addressed.
The participation of Suriname in other integration processes extends
even further to the Treaty on Amazonian Cooperation, which should be
considered a reflection of our commitment to the protection of the
environment, the promotion of sustainable development and the economic
and social security of the people.
In addition, the integration policy of our Government is aimed at
adjusting the contacts with Mercosur to the new reality of block formation in
order to establish relations of cooperation and give new dimensions to the
relations with Mercosur member countries, in particular Brazil, since intensified
relations create possibilities for trade and investment.
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Suriname
and Mercosur in 2000 should be seen as a first step in that direction.
Establishing linkages between existing integration processes is also one
of the objectives of the integration policy of the Surinamese Government.
In view of this and considering the possibilities and beneficial opportunities
that will emerge as a result of the integration efforts with countries in the region,
Suriname stresses the importance of the strengthening and development of
relations with the countries that are part of the Arco Norte project as well as
with the countries that participate actively in the Iirsa project for the integration
of the physical infrastructure, the energy and communication sectors.
Considering our geographical location in the north of the South American
continent and our membership of Caricom, Suriname aims to establish a link
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between the Caribbean region and the rest of South America, and also between
the Caribbean region, North America and Europe in order to facilitate
commercial flows between these regions.
The efforts of our Government to realize the physical integration in the
South American continent must also be viewed within the scope of expanding
its commercial and trade relations.
However, Suriname considers the elimination of economic inequalities
between developed and developing countries as well as the improvement of
market access and access to financial sources and technology, as a basic
requirement in order for especially developing countries to benefit from the
intensified participation in integration processes.
The participation of Suriname in the Ftaa negotiations in connection
with Caricom reflects our efforts to avoid becoming isolated by developments
of which no country has been spared the consequences. In this regard Suriname,
together with the Caricom and ACS countries, devote special attention to the
effects of recent developments on the national economy, especially the
economic and social consequences emerging from globalization. Therefore,
safeguarding the small and vulnerable economies will be the key element in
minimizing the negative effects.
The participation of Suriname in various international organizations,
our commitment to various international Treaties and Agreements as well as
the intensification of the relations with countries outside of our region , must
be viewed within the scope of the globalization process that is characteristic
of the international arena at present, and which also reflects the growing
interdependence between States as a result of the developments to which the
foreign policy of the Republic of Suriname has had to respond, namely,
uncontrollable movement of peoples, economic interdependence, cross-border
activities, to name just a few.
On ACP level, through the cooperation between countries from the
Caribbean region, Africa and the Pacific, efforts are made for safeguarding
economic interests that are evident from, among others, the development
cooperation that exists between the ACP and EU.
Within the scope of the ACP-EU relations the foreign policy of the
Surinamese Government is further aimed at using the advantages arising from
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172 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
172
the EPA’s for the benefit of poverty control through trade and economic
cooperation.
The bonds between Suriname and the African continent manifest
themselves in the multilateral cooperation on the level of G77 and bilateral
relations.
Suriname also actively participates in the UN and OAS, organizations
that tackle a range of issues of global and regional nature through joint efforts.
Suriname, through its participation in these organizations, aims at realizing
several objectives that are of national importance, including:
- protection of human rights (racism, discrimination, gender, child
protection);
- sustainable development and environmental protection
- poverty control;
- terrorism control and maintaining peace and security;
- safeguarding the constitutional state and democracy.
The protection and promotion of the Fundamental Human Rights as
well as guaranteeing the socio-economic, political and civil rights are also part
of the objectives of the Surinamese Government. This is evident from our
commitment to protecting women and child rights on the same level as the
UN , dealing with the issues of child labor, child trafficking, child prostitution
and unequal rights towards women.
Therefore, Suriname is also party to the Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of violence against Women
(Cedaw) and the Treaty of Belem do Para, which is an indicator of our
commitment to the protection of human rights and the pursuit of equality in
the world.
Directly linked to the protection of human rights is poverty control that
is often the root of the violation of human rights.
The social development policy of the Surinamese Government is,
therefore, aimed at promoting the social welfare of society through participation
on the multilateral level and in international organizations via international
cooperation programs.
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The efforts of Suriname in the Undp must, therefore, be seen within the
scope of the above.
The signing by Suriname of the Millennium Development Declaration
on poverty control and the complete eradication of poverty is evidence of
our commitment to this global issue that constitutes an obstacle to the
development of many countries in the world.
With regard to environmental issues Suriname participates not only in
the Treaty on Amazonian Cooperation but also signed the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollution.
In undertaking demarches for the benefit of the growth, well being and
welfare of our country, we are vigilant that objectives are not realized at the
expense of the environment but that economic growth takes place bearing in
consideration natural, environmental and social conditions.
The involvement and role of international organizations as well as NGO’s
must not be underestimated in this regard.
With reference to peace and security it is well known that security and
stability are necessary requirements for further development and socio-
economic stability.
One of the objectives of our foreign policy is, therefore, to contribute
to the promotion of peace and stability in the world, which is propagated on
OAS and UN level, and is evident in the approach of the border issue between
Suriname and Guyana in which a peaceful solution is being pursued.
In maintaining peace and security in the world Suriname supports all
countries that commit themselves to the control of international violence and
terrorism that are a real threat, not only to countries where the activities
physically take place but also to the national security of countries that are
more or less involved by international terrorism networks due to the cross-
border character thereof.
For that reason, Suriname is party to the international treaty on terrorism,
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction and the Inter-American
Convention against Terrorism, the legislative instruments on the control of
terrorism and maintenance of peace and security in the western hemisphere
and in the world.
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In the field of terrorism Suriname is taking the measures that could
assist in bringing its laws in accordance with the international regulations aimed
at tightening the financial inspection, especially inspection of unusual national
and international financial transactions, as well as border control.
It may be noted that the above takes place pursuant to the observation
that nowadays international security is not only affected by military threats but
mainly by narco trafficking, criminal activities, transnational organized crime,
intensified migration, etc., which only highlights the need for the establishment
of a broader common approach on maintaining peace and security in the world.
Suriname is of the opinion that, in view of the multidimensional,
international and cross-border character of crime, cooperation between all
countries in the world is vital in order for this problem to be tackled adequately.
With regard to the protection and promotion of democracy and good
governance Suriname, on OAS level, fulfills its obligations through the acceptance
and execution of points of action as laid down in the Inter-American Democratic
Charter.
The acceptance of the Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean
Community in 1997 by Suriname, which relates to the promotion of good
governance as well as the observance of internationally acknowledged rights
and the representative democracy must be considered in this light.
For our country it is a given that the strengthening and preservation of
the democracy and democratic legal order is essential in shaping a peaceful
and stable society in which development possibilities are best served.
Suriname’s commitment to facing global issues and threats should not be
underestimated, however, in view of the unavoidable challenges that arise as a
result of inter alia the globalization process, it is of great importance that small
economies be given the opportunity to benefit from the increase of income and
global wealth, while special mention must be made that the international community
should fulfill a supporting role in tackling the harmful effects of globalization.
The prevalence of an international community that is supportive to the
development efforts and needs of developing countries and that contributes to the
establishment of an international atmosphere of cooperation, is pivotal to effectively
face the challenges that arise as a result of the increased movement of capital, people,
goods and the menaces of poverty, international terrorism, etc.
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nitially, it should be stated that the present article is confined to my
country’s present-day foreign policy since any attempt to summarise its historical
evolution would require greater effort, scope and space than the present study
allows.
On the other hand, if one’s purpose is to provide an overview of the
guidelines of this foreign policy, it is evidently all the more reasonable to take
them as the starting point, illuminating them with some reference to the past
where necessary.
A fortiori, I trust the reader will forgive the summary nature of this exposé.
It will, nonetheless, seek to transmit the key components of a policy forged by
a set of Basic Principles, Objectives, Scenarios, Strategies and Players. We
shall thus focus on these features using an approach that is neither theoretical
nor abstract but rather normative (in the case of the first two components)
and that arises from the issues themselves (in the case of the remainder) without
failing to stress the strategic aspect.
In full awareness of the prime purpose of the present publication, we
shall likewise explain our outlook on the present international scenario without
losing sight of the fact that as Foreign Minister the opinions expressed herein
The Uruguay’s
foreign policy
1
Didier Opertti Badán
*
I
* Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Uruguay
1
Author’s note: condensing Uruguay’s foreign policy and international standing into 20 pages entails considerable
summarising and runs the risk of reductionism, which I submit to the reader’s consideration.
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176 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
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are grounded in the policy adopted by the present Government of Uruguay.
This is the policy the President of the Republic has drafted in collaboration
with the Minister of Foreign Relations (pursuant to Art. 168, introit, of the
Constitution) and repeatedly laid before Parliament (2000-2004).
In this sense, issues such as integration, Mercosur, its merging with the
Andean Community and the possible role of the Latin American Integration
Association (Aladi) could not fail to be addressed.
Similarly, in the short term at least, foreign negotiations such as those
between Mercosur and the European Union and even those concerning the
Ftaa (however different the perspectives may be) continue to play a significant
part in our foreign policy without in any way diminishing bilateral undertakings.
The current Doha Round undoubtedly deserves a larger chapter in
Uruguayan foreign policy. This is not solely on account of the content and
far-reaching implications of this attempt to regulate international trade in a
fairer, more even-handed and equitable fashion. More than that, it is because
this new Round is an affirmation of multilateralism, which – regardless of the
details – has regained undeniable prominence at the WTO in Geneva.
Proposals for reform of the United Nations that Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has entrusted to a select Panel of Eminent Personalities demand special
attention on our part, particularly with regard to membership of the Security
Council, the Council’s relation to the other UN bodies such as the General
Assembly and the Economic & Social Council, the way these other bodies
relate to the Secretary-General and even to States contributing to Peace-Keeping
Operations.
Regionalism and universalism, globalism and integration are often
dichotomous notions. In our opinion, the international community should
strive to reconcile them in different scenarios by employing its own instruments.
I. Basic principles of Uruguayan foreign policy
1) Uruguay’s Foreign Policy is firmly grounded in the 1967 Constitution,
revised in 1996. The Magna Carta enshrines certain general principles
and ground rules stemming essentially from laboriously attained
historical-political consensus. Foreign Policy is based on the overriding
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Didier Opertti Badán
177
principles of Sovereignty of the Nation (Art. 4) and full adherence to
the rule of Law (Section II, Rights, Duties and Guarantees). For its
part, the Nation has adopted the “republican democratic form of
government,” exercised directly by an “Electoral Body in cases of
election, initiative and referendum, and indirectly by means of the
representative Powers established in this Constitution; all pursuant
to the rules stipulated herein” (Art. 82).
2) Similarly imbued with the force of norms comprising the Nation-
Sovereignty nucleus (de facto bedrock principles) is “the clause stating
that all differences arising among the contracting parties shall be settled
by arbitration or peaceful means.”
3) On a par with this precept is a mandate that has attained irrefutable
political force: “The Republic will endeavour to bring about the social
and economic integration of Latin American States, especially with
regard to common defence of their products and raw materials.
Moreover, it will move towards achieving effective complementary
provision of public services” (Art. 6).
4) As a State of Law, in the realm of Rights, Duties and Guarantees –
the veritable backbone of the Constitution – Uruguay bases its
presence in the international community on principles of public and
private freedoms, countenancing no other distinction among people
than their “talents and virtues” (Art. 8). This is an eloquently effective
check on all forms of discrimination.
5) Hence, Uruguay’s Foreign Policy cannot neglect these Principles
however much the foregoing may at times appear to be theoretical
or, by overstatement, rhetorical. Far from it, they serve irreplaceably
as compass bearings and co-ordinates that convert our external
conduct into acts on the part of a country. The in turn together comprise
a policy of State, with all that that implies in terms of commitment
of the entire political spectrum to these principles.
6) None of this in any way inhibits correct interpretation of reality, be it
regional or sub-regional, hemispheric or global. At the same time,
however, one should not lose sight of the time it took to forge our
country as an autonomous, independent State virtually throughout
the 19
th
century. This was the period when Uruguay’s sovereign limits
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were established and its political frontiers drawn, particularly with
regard to our neighbours, Argentina and Brazil, with whom we were
soon to weave a dense, profound web of relations informed by
necessary, inexorable priorities arising out of integration.
7) Naturally, a corollary of the principle of independence is equality
of sovereignty among States, with all the effects and consequences
that implies.
Assuredly, none of these principles can be neglected or left aside as this
would be tantamount to a derogation of the constitutional mandate and
constitute a break with the Republic’s most precious historical asset, plunging
into crisis the so-called “foreign policy of the State.” In this respect, it is
opportune to bear in mind that this commitment was established and
consolidated following a period of crisis for Uruguay’s democratic institutions
(1973-1984).
The international commitments to which Uruguay has freely subscribed
under the United Nations system (particularly those enshrined in the UN
Charter), under the inter-American system (laid out in the Bogota Charter of
the Organisation of American States-OAS) and by means of other basic
instruments merely reaffirm such principles. On an international level they
are made manifest in the form of non-intervention and self-determination
with unerring respect for International Law.
8) It could thus be said that in terms of the basic principles of Uruguayan
Foreign Policy there is a consolidated body of precepts and mandates
with which the Executive Power must comply in decision-making
and the Legislative Power in exercising political control, more
specifically when it comes to “Declaring war and passing or rejecting
by an absolute majority of votes by the members of both Houses
peace treaties, alliances, trade agreements and conventions or contracts
of any nature that the Executive Power may celebrate with foreign
powers” (Art. 85, subsection 7).
9) The competencies mentioned above have been the subject of
supplementary legislation, the most important being the Law on the
Republic’s Foreign Service (Law no. 14,206), which basically describes
the way it is to be organised, particularly with reference to
appointments of special trust (Art. 168, subsection 12).
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There is certainly no point in going into any detail on this here except to
say that the Law stresses the professional nature of the diplomatic career,
providing for a modern, effective service that guarantees continuity in the
handling of international affairs.
True to our opening remarks, let us proceed directly to the concrete
issues of current Uruguayan Foreign Policy.
II. Core issues of our foreign policy
i. Uruguay in Mercosur
10) In dealing with this issue certain points need to be stated clearly:
a) In signing the Assunción Treaty and the subsequent basic Protocols
(including the OuroPreto, Brasilia and Olivos Protocols) Uruguay
complied with the provisions of Article 6 of the Constitution, referred
to above.
b) The same constitutional provision covers the agreements Mercosur
drew up with the Andean Community in December 2003, since it
includes the “Latin American States.”
c) Uruguay’s Constitution envisages “social and economic integration,”
which means that other dimensions such as political integration, for
example, will require a prior constitutional amendment.
On this issue, it is not a matter of raising a theoretical debate but rather
of pointing out that the fundamental political pact enshrined in the Constitution
(as is the case with Constitutions in many other countries) cannot be side-
stepped by institutional or organic developments, albeit stemming from the
bodies of Mercosur itself or similar institutions.
This is the (paradigmatic) case of a prospective Mercosur or Latin American
or South American Parliament if a new legislative body with supra-national powers
is to be created, powers that override the legislative norms of our own Parliament,
based either on the principle of legal competence or on that of hierarchy, which
(alongside derogation) are the ground rules of any juridical order.
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Whatever denomination may be chosen (undoubtedly an important
matter), the proposals submitted by Mercosur member states – mainly
Argentina and Brazil – are of the greatest concern to us, especially as they may
provide an adequate response to public opinion on which it is expected Mercosur
will be founded. In this respect, enhancement of the competencies and operation
of the Joint Parliamentary Commission seems an appropriate way forward, all
the more so bearing in mind the attributions the Ouro Preto Protocol ascribes
to it, entrusting it with the following tasks: “speeding up the corresponding
domestic procedures in the Member States for prompt enforcement of the norms
emanating from Mercosur bodies;” helping to “harmonise legislation;” and
examining “priority issues” at the behest of the Mercosur Council (a co-operation
agreement has been signed by both bodies to this effect). These powers are all
set out in Article 25 of the Ouro Preto Protocol in addition to the prerogative
of submitting “Recommendations to the Common Market Council through
the offices of the Common Market Group” (Art. 26).
We should therefore continue to analyse this matter without introducing
extraneous interpretations or issues that might otherwise make it more difficult
to obtain the necessary consensus – the golden rule upon which the entire
institutional architecture of Mercosur is founded.
11) The idea of a new Latin American institution encompassing more
than Mercosur to include other countries in South America has not
yet taken the shape of a formal proposal contained in a negotiated
project. The mere fact, though, that it has and continues to figure in
the public discourse of Heads of State of Mercosur member countries
lends it singular importance.
We must realise that however much Latin American integration constitutes
a socio-economic model with an emphasis on trade, it has become part of an
essentially political, hence transcendent, dynamics. It is therefore our duty to
address this issue squarely, pointing out that it raises a wider debate that would
have to start out from such basic questions as the preparation for this debate,
the political-institutional implications of the idea, the scenario in which it is to
be examined and debated, indispensable consultation of public opinion for
decisions of such magnitude, the time-span required for achieving the necessary
scope and content in view of the “foundational” nature of this initiative, which
is permanent, not circumstantial, and more historical than ideological, etc.
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12) It is worth recalling that South America together with Cuba and
Mexico already form a Latin American Integration Association
(Aladi), the only integration organisation encompassing Mercosur
and the Andean Community in addition to Chile, Cuba and Mexico.
Aladi could well serve the purpose of furthering intra-regional
liaison on trade, services and infrastructure, scientific-technological
co-operation, socio-cultural integration, engaging and serving other
active agents of integration such as workers and the business
community, without running the ever-present risk of institutional
overlapping.
In this frame of reference, notice must also be taken of Iirsa (Initiative
for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America), which can
already boast a concrete project encompassing communications, transports,
energy, and so forth. My country devotes special attention to Iirsa submitting
specific proposals for the initiative. Moreover, all the parties to it expect to see
tangible results ensue.
13) Uruguay’s foreign policy takes full account of the opportunity and
magnitude of these issues. For this very reason, it holds that
considered prior analysis at the levels of co-ordination that this
proposal implies is a sine-qua-non condition for making headway.
Forums such as Mercosur (strictu sensu and expanded) together with the
Andean Community, in the framework of broader regional integration (Aladi),
are appropriate for performing this task – all the more so as the institutional
instrument already exists, there being no need to create one.
14) Since the creation of Mercosur to the present day, without interruption,
Uruguayan foreign policy has made institutional consolidation one
of its prime objectives, demonstrating its commitment through active
participation at Assunción, Ouro Preto and more recently in the
discussion and drafting of the Olivos Protocol. This has fortunately
culminated in the official installation of Mercosur’s Permanent Review
Tribunal in Assunción (13 August 2004). Another relevant
improvement is the transformation of the former Administrative
Secretariat (SAM) into a Technical Secretariat or plain Mercosur
Secretariat (Decree no. 30/02). An excellent report on the
competencies of and prospects for the new Secretariat entitled “An
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approach to the Process of Regional Integration” (Montevideo, July
2004) has recently been prepared.
15) We have likewise contributed to the recent creation of the Commission
of Permanent Representatives-Coreper (Decree 11/03 of 6 October
2003). The Coreper Chairman has been given a relevant role in helping
to further the development of regional integration. The Commission
itself, meanwhile, is to be a diplomatic forum, of a political nature,
providing a hierarchy for diplomatic representation of the Member
States in the regular operation of Mercosur, in liaison with the bodies
to which it is attached.
16) In trade matters, suffice it to observe our constant quest for formulas
in agreements on a wide range of issues to attest Uruguay’s
commitment to Mercosur.
Purely for the sake of illustration and because they are recent examples,
mention should be made of the agreements drawn up with the Andean
Community (December 2003), the clear, sustained defence of the need to
address disparities among Member States of Mercosur, our position at Puerto
Iguazú (July 2004) in favour of the Free Circulation of Goods and Production
Processes – the latter resolutions not yet approved by all four member states –
in addition to a wide range of solutions contained in the legislative repertoire
recorded by the Secretariat.
17) With regard to the urgent macroeconomic adjustments in which the
Ministries of Economics & Finance and the Central Banks are
engaged, Uruguay has submitted ideas and proposals. Indeed, it has
been part of our foreign policy to encourage this process as a vital
means of securing stability as integration progresses, the aim being
to protect against traumatic changes, for which there have been
traumatic precedents in the region.
18) In brief, Uruguay views Mercosur is an instrument of integration to
which the country is committed by effective constitutional mandate.
This has led us to take an active part in the different Mercosur bodies
and to adopt a serious, responsible attitude towards all levels of
negotiation and decision-making, including any decision to expand
the bloc’s membership.
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In respect to the latter, the association of Peru and Venezuela is a relevant
milestone, as is the intention to join Mercosur made public by the Government
of Mexico at the recent Puerto Iguazú Summit.
Besides economic and basically trade-tariff norms, Mercosur’s corpus juris
includes definitions of a political nature like that of the Ushuaia Protocol on
the issue of democratic commitment. My country ascribes the greatest
importance to this aspect, which has proved to be highly relevant in certain
situations facing one or other of the Member States.
It should be stressed that this institutional commitment provides valuable
international identification as it reveals how politically mature Mercosur has
become, placing it on an equal footing with organisations such as the European
Union, for instance, in line with the 1994 Madrid Treaty.
19) Finally, Uruguay’s Ministry of Foreign Relations entertains well-
founded expectations concerning the need for an opportune review
of the Ouro Preto Protocol. In this context, it reiterates its
willingness to co-operate in fashioning what was referred to at
Puerto Iguazú as “Ouro Preto II.” Not only does this mark the
tenth anniversary of the Protocol but it is also the most propitious
moment to upgrade certain changes made by means of Resolutions
or Executive Decisions that may have insufficient legal grounding.
New elements can then be introduced to provide Mercosur with a
more effective legal instrument as well as a more realistic political
and institutional outlook.
Our Foreign Ministry is currently working on this issue and will shortly
be in position to submit its ideas on the matter for its partners’ appreciation.
ii. Mercosur and its external relations
20) Under this heading, to keep it brief, I shall proceed to list the following
undertakings:
1)
With the European Union: these will negotiations take several years
to complete and, although it could be said that the aim of achieving a trade
liberalisation agreement has not been abandoned, the situation on the ground
has dramatically revealed certain major obstacles to accomplishing that goal.
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Among them, one is to our mind of the utmost significance: the status of
affluent societies (“welfare state”) attained by European countries (albeit restricted
to the Fifteen) and strongly sustained by protectionism, especially in the field of
agriculture, has become for them a virtually unalterable or untouchable point.
Meanwhile, the countries of Mercosur essentially strive to attain or recover decent
basic living standards by the most legitimate means possible, i.e. by placing quality
exports on the international market at competitive prices.
Quite simply, this is the predicament we face.
Nevertheless, certain subsidiary factors that may well affect the outcome
of the negotiations, should they be successful. These factors are as follows:
a) The evident caducity of the European protectionist model, under
pressure at home from consumers and tax payers and abroad owing
to recent advances in the Doha Round in the arena of the WTO
General Council, an issue we shall come back to shortly.
b) The insufficiently gauged impact of new members joining the
European Union.
c) From a positive point of view, the outcome – at least in terms of
declarations – of the Guadalajara Summit in May this year, the first
to bring together the new 25-member European Union and the 33
States of Latin America and the Caribbean. It has provided a common
fund of values and co-operation distinct from those apparent on
previous occasions to the extent that the Europeans present at the
negotiating table are no longer all rich countries. This has made for
more equitable, balanced dialogue.
On the other hand, the expansion and the consequent expectations and
rights of the new EU member may lead to negotiation processes that are not
exactly favourable to Mercosur and Latin America, whose member states are
so seriously hampered by poverty and exclusion.
d) The imminent expiry of the mandate of the present European
Commissioners, which lends the October deadline for completing
inter-regional negotiations a personal touch while also signalling the
closure of an unquestionably relevant phase.
e) Better knowledge of demand and supply, the product not only of
time spent in negotiation but also of progressively closer relations
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that enable both parties to set strict limits to what can and cannot be
negotiated.
On this point, Uruguay recognises that the bigger economies of Mercosur
(Brazil mainly and also Argentina) will pay the highest price for opening their
markets to the industrial goods and the services the EU has to offer.
Likewise, it cannot be denied that since Europe is the biggest foreign
investor in Latin America (investing more than 222,000 euros in 2003 alone) it
is entirely logical that we should seek to improve the state of our economies
as a pledge and guarantee of social and political stability. The contribution
that the opening of European markets to our exports can make in this respect
is indisputable.
In any case, growth in intra-regional trade (substantially higher in the EU
than in Latin America and therefore in Mercosur) will continue to be an objective
we must work towards. Only 33% of Uruguay’s exports in 2003 went to Mercosur
countries whereas exports to Nafta and EU countries leapt from 24% to 42%.
This explains the high store we set by a merger of Mercosur and the
Andean Community.
Finally, we reckon that there are sufficient political and economic interests
on both sides to warrant believing that “at the end of the day” we shall bring
these excessively drawn-out negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.
2)
With the Andean Community: After several years of negotiation, a
trade agreement has finally been reached, without relegating the importance
of institutional advances such as the acceptance of Venezuela as a Merocsur
Associate State, and the signalling to Colombia and Ecuador that they will
also be accepted should they so request. Beyond the Andean Community,
there is the invitation to Mexico to attend Mercosur meetings until the respective
trade agreements have been signed.
Trade negotiations with the Andean Community (CAN) commenced
on 16 April 1998 with the signing of a Framework Agreement between the
two blocs. This was a formal token of a commitment to negotiate a Free
Trade Area encompassing Mercosur and CAN.
Following lengthy negotiations, a new Mercosur/Andean Community
Framework Agreement was signed at the Brasilia Summit in December 2002.
The aim was then to conclude negotiations for achieving a free trade agreement,
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a deadline being set for 31 December 2003. An agreement was eventually
reached by 16 December 2003 in Montevideo.
It was in this context that the initiative of a Free Trade Area within the
Latin American Integration Association (Aladi) arose. The idea was to proceed
on the basis of work carried out by an informal group comprising all the
delegations.
A ministerial-level meeting was held in Montevideo on 4 August 2003.
This provided the necessary political drive to prepare Economic
Complementation Agreement No. 59 between Mercosur and Colombia,
Ecuador and Venezuela (all members of CAN), duly signed on 16 December
2003.
For its part, Uruguay has concluded negotiations on all its outstanding
issues, as have all the other signatories except Paraguay and Ecuador, which
will continue negotiating until the deadline.
On 12 August the Delegations of the respective pro-tempore chairs (Brazil
and Venezuela) submitted a note to the General Secretariat of Aladi requesting
commencement of the procedures for protocoling an Agreement.
It should be stated that the Delegations have pledged to extend current
Bilateral Agreements until Mercosur-Andean Community ECA No. 59 comes
into force.
3)
In the sphere of the Ftaa: Little has happened at the level of global
negotiations since the Miami meeting at the end of last year though progress
has been made at bilateral level and groups of countries are promoting on-
going negotiations between the United States and Latin American countries.
In the realm of Mercosur strictu sensu no new chapters have been opened
of concerted action in this scenario. Besides other factors, this is largely due
to the protracted elections in the United States.
Nonetheless, the advances made in the Doha Round and the possible
outcome of negotiations between Mercosur and the EU will necessarily affect
all spheres of external trade negotiations in our region, Ftaa included.
4)
Mercosur and third-party States: bilateral relations
It is important to mention the different fronts on which negotiations are
taking place.
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A) Merocsur – Bolivia
In the context of these negotiations, Uruguay has accepted the initiative
to bring forward the schedule and raise the present level of deregulation
(Economic Complementation Agreement No. 36) whenever this is a reciprocal
arrangement.
B) Mercosur – Chile
At the LIV Meeting of the Common Market Group (CMG) Uruguay
undertook to work for the internal approval of the Protocol for the Settlement
of Controversies.
It should be mentioned that a meeting of the Administrative Commission
of Mercosur-Chile ECA No. 35 is scheduled for September.
C) Mercosur – Peru
With regard to the Mercosur-Peru ECA, all that remains to be done to
protocol it with the Latin American Integration Association (Aladi) is for
Uruguay to complete its annex to the Trade Liberalisation Programme (TLP).
In the interim, Peru’s bilateral agreements with each of the Mercosur
countries have been extended to 30 September, 2004.
D) Mercosur – India
Fixed Tariff Preferences Agreement
On 25 January, 2004 the Fixed Tariff Preferences Agreement under
negotiation was signed in New Delhi. In addition, a side letter was signed by
which it was agreed that negotiation of the outstanding chapters (list of
products, rules of origin, safeguards and settlement of controversies) be
concluded by June 30.
At the negotiation meeting held in New Delhi from 24 to 26 June, analysis
continued of the normative texts of the annexes on Rules of Origin, Safeguards
and Settlement of Controversies.
Lists of products were likewise exchanged between Mercosur (205) and
India (352).
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The issue of Free Trade Zones was considered at the last Meeting of the
Common Market Group held in Buenos Aires. On this matter, the Delegations
agreed at the time that “in a period of ten days, Mercosur will identify the sectors
whose production originating in the Manaus Free Trade Zone and the Tierra del
Fuego Special Customs Area could benefit from the provisions in the Agreement.”
It was decided that a request be put to India to proceed likewise with its own free
trade zones. A videoconference is to be held on August 20, preceded by an Intra-
Mercosur meeting on the 18 and 19 of the month to examine extra-regional relations
in general (India, Sacu, Morocco, China, GCC, etc.), to be followed by a further
negotiation meeting in Brazil in September 2004.
E) Mercosur – Southern African Customs Union (Sacu)
The I Mercosur-SACU Technical Meeting was held in São Paulo on June
16 during the Unctad meeting. On that occasion, the Uruguayan Delegation
submitted its position on Free Trade Zones, subsequently included in the text
of the Preferential Trade Agreement currently under negotiation.
F) Mercosur – China
On June 30 and July 1 this year a meeting was held between Mercosur
and China: “V Mercosur-China Dialogue.”
The main points covered were as follows:
• Insistence by the Government of China on the need for Paraguay to
officially acknowledge the People’s Republic of China.
• Decision to set up Liaison Groups.
• Mercosur proposal to negotiate a Fixed Preferences Agreement.
Proposal turned down by China.
• Chinese proposal to hold a Mercosur-China Summit in November this
year.
G) Mercosur – South Korea
The V High Level Mercosur-Korea Meeting was held in Buenos Aires on June
4, 2004. On the occasion both parties agreed to release a Joint Press Communiqué.
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A seminar on “New prospects for trade relations and investment between
South Korea and Mercosur” was organised to coincide with the said meeting.
The Korean proposal to carry out a feasibility study for a trade agreement
– including the possibility of a free trade agreement to boost economic and
trade relations between Mercosur and South Korea – is currently being
considered by the Common Market Group (CMG).
H) Mercosur – Egypt
The proposal of a Framework Agreement for the creation of a Free
Trade Area between Mercosur and the Arab Republic of Egypt was submitted
on 5 January 2004.
This Mercosur-Egypt Framework Agreement was signed on 7 July 2004
during the XXVI Meeting of the Common Market Council in Puerto Iguazú
(Argentina).
I) Mercosur – Japan
The V High Level Mercosur-Japan Meeting was held on 9 October 2002.
At this meeting information was exchanged on the economic standing of both
parties, prospects for trade between Mercosur and Japan, both parties’ positions
concerning Free Trade Agreements, and multilateral negotiations at the WTO,
as well as investments and trade relations between Mercosur and Japan.
Concerning mechanisms for boosting trade between Mercosur and Japan,
the possibility was raised of establishing a Mercosur Promotion Centre in
Japan and of sending a joint trade mission to that country. Additionally, a
representative of Iirsa (Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure
in South America) made a presentation of business opportunities for Japanese
corporations in South America.
The VI High Level Mercosur-Japan Consultation Meeting was held in
Tokyo on 28-29 July 2004.
J) Mercosur – Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
The Member States of Mercosur are currently examining a proposal for
a Framework Co-operation Agreement between Mercosur and the Co-
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operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), which had already
drawn positive reactions.
K) Mercosur – Arab Magreb Union (AMU/UMA)
In April 2003, the Chairman of the Mercosur Commission of Permanent
Representatives (Coreper), former Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde,
during an official visit to the Kingdom of Morocco presented a message of
goodwill manifesting Mercosur’s willingness to establish initial contacts with
AMU/UMA to explore the possibility of at a later stage reaching some kind
of agreement between the two blocs.
L) Mercosur – Singapore
In March 2004 Singapore raised the possibility of initiating contacts with
Mercosur for the purpose of signing a Free Trade Agreement. On 3 June this took
more concrete shape with a proposal to commence negotiations that went under
the title of “Understanding for Co-operation on Trade and Investments.”
During the LIV Meeting of the CMG, it was decided that a draft
Understanding between Mercosur and Singapore be prepared as a counter-proposal.
M) Mercosur – Caribbean Community (Caricom)
The intention to bring Mercosur-CACM (the Central American Common
Market) and Mercosur-Caricom closer together dates back to 1998. So far,
however, no concrete initiative has been forthcoming.
N) Mercosur – Mexico
On 21 April 2004, during a visit to Argentina the Mexican Foreign Secretary,
Luis Ernesto Derbez Batista, officially announced his country’s intention to join
Mercosur. This move was greeted with great enthusiasm by the bloc.
O) Mercosur – Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (Apec)
Mercosur has received an invitation to attend the Apec Joint Ministerial
Meeting to be held in Santiago de Chile in November this year.
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P) Mercosur – Morocco
The Mercosur Member States have agreed to the interest shown by the
Kingdom of Morocco in signing a Fixed Preferences Agreement with
Mercosur.
iii. Uruguay and the Doha Round
21) At the General Council held on 31 July 2004, the 147 members of
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reached an agreement on trade
negotiations under the Doha Round. Apart from the details and
feasibility of this agreement, Uruguayan Foreign Policy sees it as a
relevant move forward from a political standpoint, first and foremost
in the context of the aftermath of Cancún.
Similarly, the efforts made in Cancún by those endeavouring to advance
negotiations (the Chairman of the Council and the host Government, in
particular) added to the hard work expended in Geneva in the months following
Cancún and in the most recent phase with the decisive part played by the
Group of Five interested parties (the United States, the European Union,
Brazil, India and Australia) have resulted in a milestone instrument. It preserves
the structure of the original Cancún document while agreeing on ground rules
for eliminating subsidies for exports of agricultural produce. It also addresses
the matter of the substantial domestic aid provided by developed countries
that provokes distortions in international trade.
It is worth recalling as a very concrete feature that by the end of the first
year of the future agreement the overall sum of this assistance will have to
have been cut by at least 20%.
Another kernel component of the Doha Round – access to markets,
including access for agricultural produce and services – still requires tough
on-going negotiation.
In this sense, it should be stressed that three of the four Mercosur member
states were present at the 31 July session – a token of the importance both
Uruguay and Mercosur ascribe to this multilateral undertaking. Particularly
noteworthy is the role played by the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim
– a fact roundly acknowledged at international and especially regional level.
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22) The foregoing does not prevent us from warning that, when
negotiations resume in September, the WTO Council will have to
grapple with the tough task of making these undertakings binding,
although the force of consensus certainly provides powerful backing.
Uruguay will continue to co-operate in these efforts at the highest possible
technical, diplomatic and political levels.
iv. Uruguay in the United Nations
23) As a founding member of the United Nations, Uruguay continues to
view with concern the agenda and decision-making of the
Organisation responsible for underwriting the Peace and Security of
the international community. Both are severely impaired in the present
day by armed conflict that stems from a variety of causes yet has in
common the seemingly endless suffering of peoples and nations.
Uruguay’s foreign policy is attuned to the key issues addressed by the
United Nations, which champions a multilateral, universal approach. Indeed,
the UN’s overriding – and to our mind ineluctable – mandate is to protect the
international community as a whole.
To this end, we continue to participate in all initiatives that seek to perfect
the United Nations system and that envisage the adoption of unswerving,
serious commitments. These include campaigns such as the fight against hunger
led by the Government of Brazil and particularly by the Brazilian President,
Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva. The Uruguayan President, Jorge Batlle Ibáñez, will
attend the session in New York on 20 September to lend Lula his support.
24) Uruguay is keen to see the outcome of the work carried out by the
Panel of Eminent Personalities appointed by the Secretary-General
so that it can contribute its own ideas and experience concerning
possible reform of the United Nations. Our prime concern is that
the fairest criteria be adopted to ensure the harmonious operation
of the diverse decision-making and consultancy bodies comprising
the Organisation.
25) Uruguay vouchsafes its full support for the work of Unctad as the
presence of President Batlle and his delegation at the recent
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Didier Opertti Badán
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Conference in São Paulo betokens. The Uruguayan Government
understands that development with equity is the best way to secure Peace.
26) Uruguay likewise supports and makes ample use of the work undertaken
by Eclac, helping to divulge its conclusions in a responsible manner.
27) In the legal sphere and pursuant to the country’s best traditions,
Uruguay’s foreign policy pays special attention to the codification
and progressive development of International Law under the auspices
of the United Nations through the good offices of the International
Law Commission (of which we are a member) and the Sixth Commission
of the General Assembly. We are particularly interested in the question
of water resources classed under the heading of so-called “Shared Natural
Resources” (which also includes Gas and Petroleum). In this context, it
should be stressed that Uruguay has submitted to Mercosur – and
publicised outside and beyond the bloc – a project on Guarani Water
Resources. The project reaffirms the principle of sovereign entitlement
of States beneath whose soil water resources are located. This in no
manner releases them from due observance of basic criteria for rational
use of such resources agreed upon within Mercosur should they be located
in the subsoil of the Member States.
The support this initiative has received from other Mercosur members
should be recorded here. The proposal is now being examined by a Special
High Level Group.
28) The issues addressed by the Economic & Social Council (Ecosoc)
also deserve special attention in Uruguay’s Foreign Policy, the same
applying to work the United Nations is carrying out in other spheres
on issues such as the environment, the fight against drug trafficking,
terrorism, gender equality and repudiation of all forms of
discrimination, human rights, the International Criminal Court, and
many others which we are unable to list in full here.
Contact and collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights is another line of action of Uruguay’s
foreign policy.
In brief, reaffirming multilateralism and the paramount role of the United
Nations are cornerstones of Uruguayan foreign policy.
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Uruguay’s stalwart participation in international Peace-Keeping
Operations, measured in troop numbers and levels of responsibility, bears
witness to our trust in the mechanism and its efficacy, wherever peace-keeping
forces may be deployed (mention of the presence of Uruguayan troop numbers
is sufficient proof of this: 1,824 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
576 in Haiti).
v. Uruguay in the OAS
29) Uruguay is a staunch believer in regional bodies, of which the OAS is
undoubtedly a fine example. It is likewise fully aware of the role of
the inter-American system in addressing an extensive, varied socio-
political agenda.
We uphold regional initiatives and integration as worthy alternatives to
globalisation. In this sense, we particularly appreciate the work of the OAS in
defending democracy by means of the Lima Inter-American Democratic
Charter, the crowning achievement of a decade of Secretary-General César
Gaviria’s administration. He shall always deserve my Government’s fullest
support, as does the recently elected Secretary-General, Miguel Ángel
Rodríguez, former President of the Republic of Costa Rica.
My government is glad to see that historical circumstances that previously
prevented the OAS from affirming its distinctive identity and independence
owing to the Cold War are happily now a thing of the past.
Nowadays, the role of the OAS, for instance, in elections taking place in
our countries, and the seriousness of its commitment to democracy
undoubtedly constitute a regional asset that we have all striven to build and
that it is our bounden duty to defend and protect.
Attention to complicated situations like that facing the Republic of Haiti
(a member of OAS) serve to demonstrate how a response from our regional
organisation can dovetail with that of the United Nations. The former lacks
sufficient capacity to intervene whereas the latter can appeal to chapters VI
and VII of the 1945 San Francisco Charter.
This is the framework in which Uruguay (also a member state of the
OAS) is participating in peace-keeping operations in Haiti. It eloquently proves
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Didier Opertti Badán
195
that it is possible to combine both scenarios harmoniously through a political
approach to which Uruguay fully subscribes in an endeavour to help reconstruct
this suffering brother nation.
vi. Uruguay in the world
30) Uruguay is developing a policy of greater presence in Africa – a
logical move from any standpoint – implemented not only through
the effective operation of Embassies in several countries on the
African continent but also very forcefully be means of official visits
by President Batlle to Angola in October 2003, South Africa and the
Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2004.
31) In bilateral terms, membership of Mercosur has enabled Uruguay to
draw up a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, which is already
operational. This was done with the bloc’s express authorisation:
Decree 32/00, Decree 37/00 and Economic Complementation
Agreement for the creation of a Free Trade Agreement between
Mercosur and Mexico within the framework of Aladi (ECA No. 54)
sanctioning bilateral agreements between Mexico and Mercosur
member states (5 July, 2002). My country attributes the greatest
economic significance to this development since it opens the way for
potential access for imports and exports of goods and services to
the partner economy of Nafta.
New general formulas, renewed product lines and different ways of
quantifying access quotas (e.g. textiles, which can now be measured per linear
metre instead of by aggregate value in dollars) are all patently positive features.
32) Negotiations currently under way with the United States for an
Agreement on Investments are nearing conclusion. This is a major step forward
in our foreign policy regarding a country that is one of the main markets for
our expanding exports (meat, in particular).
It should, nonetheless, be underscored that these negotiations (undertaken
at the closing of the Ftaa session in Miami in 2003) have been carried out in
the broader context of political relations between Uruguay and the United
States based on mutual respect and shared positions regarding certain key
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196 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
196
issues. These include combating international terrorism and defending Human
Rights, the latter being specially relevant to our democratic society, which, it
should be stressed, acknowledges the role of the Geneva Commission and,
no less so, of the Inter-American Commission.
33) In brief, by maintaining resident Embassies in 43 States and
Cumulative Missions in another 57, Uruguay promotes a foreign policy
strategy that is open to the world without neglecting its regional
obligations.
Our trade within and beyond the region displays interesting features,
such as the inclusion among the top four destinations for our exports (Brazil,
the United States, Argentina and Germany) of two countries outside the region
alongside two traditional neighbouring markets.
In the realm of concerted regional political action, the Group of Rio
has in due time produced fully acknowledged accomplishments since its
inception as the Contadora Group, subsequently as the Contadora Support
Group and finally as the Group of Rio per se.
In the present international scenario, the Group’s agenda should be
adjusted to incorporate new issues prevalent in the region and even those
beyond its confines.
Without in any way detracting from the foregoing, were the Group of
Rio to be viewed as a type of regional “board,” it might present a higher
profile, for example, in the arena of the UN General Assembly and even
outside it, taking a leading role in inter-regional dialogue with States or groups
of States – a role it has performed, in practice, in recent years.
Avoiding an overlapping of regional agendas, especially with the agenda
addressed by the OAS, is no doubt a reasonable limiting factor for the Group
of Rio. In this respect, the agenda of the XXIII Meeting of the Group’s
Foreign Ministers includes distinct topics such as innovative financial
mechanisms for public investments and infrastructure, among others, as well
as advance information on the meeting of Heads of State to combat hunger
and poverty, scheduled to take place in New York on 20 September. Be that as
it may, the usefulness of the mechanism will be proven if the region is capable
of transferring to the Group issues of general interest insufficiently explored
in other forums.
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In conclusion, Uruguay favours the Group of Rio acting as a political
interlocutor for the region in the sphere of the United Nations.
vii. Strategies of Uruguayan foreign policy
The mere listing of these issues serves to outline Uruguay’s foreign policy
priorities and guidelines. So as to illustrate them better, nonetheless, the
following points should be underscored:
1) Uruguay is, at one and the same time, an independent nation and a
Member State of Mercosur. This dual identity should therefore be
taken into consideration in all circumstances where the formally
contracted commitment to Mercosur affects decision-making by
Uruguayan authorities.
2) From this standpoint, the foremost strategy is to consolidate within
Mercosur sufficient institutional mechanisms to ensure predictable,
objective operation of the system’s constituent bodies. Planning and
implementation of the Mercosur Secretariat and the Permanent
Review Tribunal are instances of this strategic institutional approach.
3) Uruguay does not view Mercosur as a closed, self-sufficient bloc but
rather as a springboard for international insertion. It thus negotiates
from Mercosur outwards when this is so determined by consensus
among the partners. It does so on an individual basis for reasons of
national interest providing this does not conflict with Mercosur’s
established organisational norms.
4) When it comes to intra-continental relations, Uruguayan foreign policy
acknowledges the existence of an extended regional space manifest
in its support for Andean Community agreements without this
preventing recognition of the individuality of members of both
groupings (Mercosur and the Andean Community) and of leeway
still available for bilateral negotiation. This might point to the existence
of an implicit subsidiarity clause as yet unexplored in the normative
framework of Mercosur.
5) In inter-continental negotiations, the twin vector of common values/
shared interests is acknowledged to be the driving force behind
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198 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
198
negotiations between Mercosur and the European Union. Uruguayan
foreign policy recognises gravitation towards one or another in view
of their respective natures.
6) Limited availability of funds is a factor restricting the projection of
strategies. Nevertheless, balanced presence in central countries on all
continents equips Uruguayan foreign policy to combine bilateral and
multilateral relations, thus propitiating various levels of concerted
action with a multiplier effect. By way of example, our diplomatic
missions in Africa and Asia provide us with better first-hand
knowledge of local economic and political reality with remarkable
social peculiarities, thus enabling us to gain a foothold in markets
and take an active part in international co-operation exercises such
as the peace-keeping operations in the Congo, among others.
7) Uruguayan foreign policy pursues its objectives in compliance with
the respective budgetary norms under the heading of strategic
products. This allows the country to plan, manage and implement
non-discretionary criteria that are therefore reasonably predictable.
8) Finally, the professional support of the foreign service makes it feasible
to introduce programmes and standards in diplomatic training that
correspond to the strategic products mentioned above.
This is duly reflected in the programmes followed when promotions are
made.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion and in an endeavour to condense in a single
paragraph the keynote of Uruguayan foreign policy, we can fairly state the
following:
This is the foreign policy of the State, implemented by a Government
by means of administrative actions. It is marked in its entirety by unfailing
commitment to the sovereign integrity of the State focussing strongly on the
new demands raised by the social and political evolution taking place within
the country that projects outwards on its external relations.
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lmost four years ago our country embarked on a period of profound
transformation. Let us not be naïve: periods of social transformation are
inevitably tough. While they proffer hope and social advances, genuine
satisfaction and progress, they also imply conflict, resistance and, at times,
crisis. I recall that this word, which has become part of our everyday language,
was the object of specialist analysis in my student days in Toulouse. In Latin
America and particularly in the Southern Cone region that was a time when
democracy was a scarce article. In a nutshell, a time of crisis.
Let us speak frankly. Only in societies under the yoke of dictatorships or
authoritarian regimes do domestic conflicts fail to surface and pervade public
debate, taking the press and political circles by storm. Amartya Sen, a Nobel prize-
winner in Economics, has examined this phenomenon with regard to famine across
the globe. In Venezuela, where President Chávez’s administration has undertaken
far-reaching reforms, opinions are openly voiced for or against the policies adopted.
This holds for all democracies. Day by day, the Venezuelan people are building a
democracy whose legitimacy is based upon law. Its legitimacy derives from universal
suffrage, the will of the people enshrined in the Bolivarian Constitution.
Venezuelans
and their
democracy
Jesús Arnaldo Pérez
*
A
* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Venezuelans and their democracy
200 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
200
What of the enemies of democracy? They exist in Venezuela as they do
everywhere else! That is the fate of all young democracies like ours in the
throes of teenage crisis. The fact is that the period of democratic rule that our
generation experienced from 1958 to 1998 – when for a forty-year political
pact between the social democratic party (Acción Democrática) and the social
Christian party (Copei) held sway – served as no more than a proxy for
democracy. So much so that the political parties proved incapable of responding
to the legitimate aspirations of the people who had placed their trust in them.
Many are to blame for this state of affairs. They include the congressmen at
the new National Assembly, members of the Acción Democrática, Copei and
Primero Justicia parties, who refused to denounce publicly the failed coup
d’état on April 11
th
2003, thus expressing their deep disdain for democracy.
The Venezuelan people have made it abundantly clear that no retreat will
be countenanced. The antidemocratic movement – which has a fascist, retrograde
inclination – reached its zenith on that dark day in the month of April. It is my
conviction that there is no place in present-day Venezuela for coups or rebel
escapades. I would even dare to wager that there is no longer any place for
military dictatorships or violation of human rights throughout Latin America.
Indeed, I would like to believe that this a page that has definitively turned in
Latin America’s dramatic history. Our peoples are placing the stakes of their
hope on democracy. Democracy is not the privileged preserve of rich countries.
We too have the right to live, develop and die under democratic rule.
Amartya Sen and Hugo Chávez Frías: from theory to practice
The political situation in Venezuela was virtually unknown in France
outside the select circles of academics specialising in Latin American affairs.
It was precisely before the resounding electoral victory of Hugo Chávez Frías
that the French press (the monthly magazine Le Monde Diplomatique and the
daily Le Monde, in particular) began to take an interest in what was inexorably
about to pass in Venezuela. Just one week before the presidential elections in
December 1998 Dr. Arturo Uslar Pietri (R.I.P.) wrote an article in Le Monde
Diplomatique analysing the root causes of the deep changes the 6
th
December
elections were about to usher in. It was an exclusively historical analysis that
this distinguished Venezuelan intellectual, who has since passed away, laid out
in his article. It went under the title “Venezuela one step away from a major
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201
change. End of a political cycle.” It should, however, be acknowledged that as
early as November 1992, Le Monde Diplomatique’s director wrote an editorial
called “The rebellions to come.” In it he rightly referred to the events of 4
th
February in Venezuela as a response and a desperate search for political solutions
to the progressive destitution foisted upon the peoples of the world by
globalisation.
After learning of the results of the elections and verifying that Hugo
Chávez Frías had been elected president by an unquestionable majority of
Venezuelans and following admission of defeat on the part of the anti-Chávez
coalition, on December 8
th
1998, Le Monde published a front-page report
describing his electoral triumph. The page displayed a sketch of the winning
candidate, Hugo Chávez, with a caption reading “candidate of the poor.” The
same edition of Le Monde also published a full centre-page photographic portrait
of him. The journalist culled significant passages from the speech made by
the candidate elect, unlike the television news broadcasts that dubbed him a
“populist.” The article in Le Monde referred to “Hugo Chávez, the converted
revolutionary,” explaining that the new President had managed to combine
warrior rhetoric and heartfelt mysticism. It was this that had made him the
“candidate of the poor” with backing from the left and centre against an
oligarchy that had lorded it over the country with support from Acción
Democrática and Copei. Two days later (i.e. on Thursday, 10
th
December 1998)
Le Monde also published a portrait of Amartya Sen, the new winner of the
1998 Nobel prize for Economics, classifying it as “the Nobel Prize for the
Poor.” His 1999 book “Development as Freedom” was translated into Spanish
and French
*
. For the first time ever, a Nobel Prize for Economics had been
awarded to a researcher whose scientific interest had always been focused on
poverty without taking much interest in financial markets.
The coincidence of the “Candidate of the poor” and the “Nobel prize
for the poor” is curious but also highly symbolic, significant and current: the
war on poverty was already on the agenda in Venezuela, alongside globalisation
and our country’s standing in the international scenario. This was an interesting
*
Amartya Sen (1999) Development as freedom. [English edition] Amartya Sen (2000) Desarrollo y libertad.
Madrid: Planeta [Spanish edition]; Amartya Sen (1999) Un nouveau modèle économique: développement,
justice, liberté. Paris: Odile Jacob [French edition].
Venezuelans and their democracy
202 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
202
experience to share with mankind. Thus in 1998, Hugo Chávez Frías, the
candidate of the poor became the “President of the Poor” by the will of the
Venezuelan people. They in turn were poor and dispossessed, many of them
living below the poverty line according to the criteria adopted in published
statistical data. Different specialists describe Venezuela as a “poor country at
the same time rich in natural resources.” Much has been said about this
dichotomy, once dubbed the “Venezuela effect.”
It can thus be said that the common denominator linking the theoretician,
Amartya Sen, 1998 Nobel Prize winner for Economics, and the practitioner,
Commander Hugo Chávez Frías, elected President of Venezuela in the same
year, is the interest each in his own peculiar manner has shown in defending the
poor and dispossessed. The Nobel Prize winner and his team of research workers
by their penetrating, precise analysis of the genesis and mediation of poverty
have contributed to advancing our knowledge of the greatest scourge currently
afflicting mankind. Meanwhile, the President of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela and his government team have been striving tirelessly for five years to
find ways (FUS, Bolivar Plan 2000, People’s Bank, Women’s Bank, Barrio Adentro
Plan, Robinson Mission, Ribas Mission, Sucre Mission, Vuelvan Caracas Mission,
etc.) to bequeath Venezuela an economy with a human face that refuses to deny
the majority of the population elementary freedoms and rights (health, education,
housing, work and recreation).
The foreign policy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
The paradigms pursued by previous administrations in foreign affairs
were outworn and the areas of Venezuela’s insertion in the world seemed to
have entered the doldrums. President Chávez has sought to instil a new vision
and a new style, the prime purpose of which is to open new spaces for Venezuela
in the world associated with new political, social and ethical values that mirror
those underpinning his domestic administration. This approach has broken
with many of the paradigms of the past and, quite naturally, has stirred reactions
from those accustomed to the status quo. Nonetheless, I am convinced that
the fruits of this international modus operandi, which are already perceptible,
will gradually change the opinion of those still loath to join the ranks of the
new Venezuela.
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Venezuela’s resolute stand on international issues stems not only from
the need to uphold the country’s interests in an increasingly competitive and
demanding world environment but also from our determination to help
establish a multipolar world.
We are firmly engaged in brokering a democratic model designed to
revive human and spiritual values, driven by a determination to forge the
development of solidary international co-operation. In these times of pacific,
democratic revolution, Venezuela’s domestic development framed in its foreign
policy is grounded in the new Constitution.
Section Five of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
ascribes major importance to international relations by clearly setting out the
aims and principles that are to guide the country’s international conduct. It
states that Venezuela’s international relations must respond to the purposes
of the State with regard to exercising sovereignty and promoting the interests
of the people. It likewise rules that the National Government is responsible
for determining the Republic’s foreign policy and conduct, as well as for
defending and overseeing its general interests.
On the other hand, the general outlines of Venezuela’s foreign policy have
been outlined in the 2001/2007 National Development Plan in the context of
the basic balance described under the title “Let us strengthen sovereignty through
multipolar integration.” This document sets out the strategies designed to
strengthen the country’s international action, based on the following objectives:
• Furthering the democratisation of international society so as to foster
concerted action among developing countries besides solidarity and
co-operation among the different actors comprising the international
system;
• Promoting Latin American and Caribbean integration with a view to
tackling more effectively the social inequalities and high levels of
poverty prevalent in the countries of the region;
• Consolidating and diversifying international relations, buttressing South-
South co-operation and broadening relations with other regions and
countries;
• Strengthening Venezuela’s standing in the world economy by expanding
non-traditional exports and thus adding value to our traditional exports.
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204
In accordance with these premises, President Chávez has made every
effort to project the country’s image overseas. Official and working visits have
been made to nations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe and
numerous heads of state and government have been received in Venezuela.
Within a framework of enhanced sovereignty and international pluralism, these
visits have served to broaden the possibilities and options available to Venezuela
in a wide variety of scenarios and with a broad range of international players.
Ties with our traditional friends have thus been strengthened and closer
relations established with new centres of power across the globe such as Russia,
Iran, China and India.
In the present circumstances, personal contacts between Heads of State
and Government from all latitudes are singularly instrumental in contributing
to world peace by means of dialogue and co-operation. President Chávez has
become a protagonist in the international scenario, spreading abroad a message
of peace and solidarity among all peoples. His vision is supported and shared
by other world leaders.
The worrying current state of international affairs requires of
governments throughout the world reflection and pondered action in
combating scourges like international terrorism. For well-known reasons,
terrorism has come to the forefront of international attention. Venezuela has
accompanied the unanimous approval of the OAS and ITRA
1
resolutions
recently adopted in Washington. They express hemispheric solidarity with the
United States for the attacks it has suffered. They reiterate our forthright
rejection of terrorism and our trust that an escalation of violence will not be
unleashed since this would undermine international peace and security, and
only serve to aggravate humanitarian problems.
Nonetheless, I am convinced that we should at no point underestimate
major, long-term challenges such as concerted action to combat backwardness
and poverty, and joint efforts to promote economic and social development.
This is an ineluctable responsibility befalling governments throughout the
world, one which Venezuela, for its part, has shouldered with unflinching
determination.
1
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
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205
The Government of Venezuela believes in integration, co-operation and
concerted action, systematically nurturing all three. Never before in Venezuela
has such intense activity been under way to promote regional integration not
only in the economic and trading sphere but also in the realm of politics. This
is borne out by the hosting in Caracas in early 2001 of the Group of Three
Summit Meeting between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. The G-3 is a co-
operation mechanism encompassing a free trade agreement that was failing to
measure up to expectations. In Caracas the Presidents of the three nations
decided to re-launch this important co-operation scheme, agreeing to intensify
political consultations, trade and co-operation.
Further proof of this commitment was the successful hosting of the
Community of Andean Nations Summit Meeting, which culminated in the
adoption of the Carabobo Declaration. The accords signed at this Summit are
designed to develop the social agenda and economic integration of the Andean
nations. Like the G3, the Community of Andean Nations was facing serious
difficulties that hampered the fulfilment of its objectives. With the renewed
presidential impetus mustered at Valencia, conditions are now ripe for obtaining
effective performance and paving the way forward to the establishment of the
Andean Common Market in 2005.
A meeting of the Association of Caribbean States was also held on Margarita
Island, gathering together 25 heads of state and government from the region.
This was instrumental in promoting co-operation among the member states.
For obvious reasons, given our pacifist vocation and our solidary approach,
all matters affecting our region enjoy a high priority. Thus our staunch contribution
to the Colombian peace plan, for peace in Colombia plainly spells peace in
Venezuela too. Our adherence to the co-operation agreements on energy with
Caribbean and Central American countries is an unequivocal demonstration of
the regional solidarity we put into practice without any kind of restriction.
The issues of democracy and human rights have acquired special interest
for Venezuela. We have thus sought to turn increasingly to account the meaning
of proactive democracy.
Another key feature of our foreign policy is our active participation in
co-operation mechanisms and schemes for concerted action among developing
countries such as the Rio Group, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of
77 and the Group of 15.
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Venezuela presided over the Group of 77 for a year in 2002-2003. This
amounted to international acknowledgement of the commitment displayed
by the Government of Venezuela at the United Nations in voicing developing
countries’ positions on major global economic issues.
The Second Summit of Opec Heads of State and Government held in
Caracas in September 2000 proved an outstanding accomplishment for
Venezuelan foreign policy. Never before had a meeting of this magnitude,
attended by renowned leaders from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, taken
place in Venezuela. It sent out a clear message of unity in approach and purpose,
showing that Opec can act as a channel of communication between
extraordinarily diverse peoples, races, cultures and creeds.
We have resolutely contributed to strengthening Opec and we are
unwaveringly committed to offering an adequate, opportune and sound supply
of oil to consumers at fair, stable prices, stressing the link between security,
supply and transparency in global demand for oil.
Unlike previous Venezuelan administrations, which showed little interest
in the G-15, President Chávez has displayed stalwart involvement in this South-
South co-operation scheme. As a result, in 2001 he assumed the presidency of
the G-15, recently hosting the XII Summit in Caracas. Seven heads of state
and government from the Americas, Africa and Asia in addition to high-level
representatives from the remaining 19 nations comprising the group accepted
President Chávez’s invitation. They likewise backed the proposals and measures
Venezuela tabled for the full benefit of the Group and on behalf of all
developing countries.
By means of a Joint Communiqué, the Heads of State and Government
of the Group of 15 convening in Caracas reaffirmed their political will to
strengthen South-South co-operation and to endeavour to broaden and intensify
dialogue with a view to exploring their potential and mutual assistance. It was
decided that “the Troika (Venezuela, Algeria and Iran) should take greater
responsibility for ensuring that the Group vigorously implement the jointly
identified plans, projects and programmes and that the member states take
effective action in pursuit of the decisions made by the Heads of State and
Government.”
The XII Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Group
of Fifteen culminated with the firm intention to propose new activities in
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areas of mutual interest on the following issues: Energy and Development;
Communication and Information Technologies; Generic Medicines and Public
Health. The participants also resolved to step up co-operation on Medical
Research and Human Resources Programmes.
The leaders present at the meeting examined fundamental issues
concerning the international scenario and the way they affect their respective
countries. The working sessions classified the issue of energy and development
as a top priority given its overriding importance in the global economy and
particularly for developing nations.
With regard to North-South dialogue, the member states of the Group
of Fifteen committed themselves to continue their efforts to improve liaison
and enhance mutual understanding with developed countries, including those
comprising the G-8.
They likewise reiterated their support for the provisions contained in the
Final Document of the Tenth Special Meeting of the General Assembly
concerning the relation between disarmament and development while also
reaffirming their commitment to combat drug trafficking. On this matter, they
insisted on the need to co-ordinate efforts to tackle this scourge through
unwavering compliance with the precepts of international law. They further
announced their firm intention to combat illegal trading in small and light weapons.
The “Caracas Declaration on Energy and Development” expressed the
determination of the Heads of State and Government of the G-15 to combat
poverty and contribute to the social and economic development of each of the
member states. They lent their full backing to permanent international dialogue
in order to achieve detailed assessment of global energy needs and resources.
They considered that public and private-sector funds should be employed –
with due respect for domestic legislation and development priorities – to boost
exploration of these resources, intensify trade and enhance exchange of
technology so as to promote efficient use of energy.
The General Guidelines of the 2001-2007 National Development Plan
– the first plan issued under the aegis of the new Constitution in Venezuela
– have introduced a dynamic process for boosting growing positive interaction
between sustained macroeconomic balance, effective social opportunities, a
new territorial rationale, broader political opportunities and rational
diversification in the international sphere.
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As the visible head of the Executive Branch of Power, the President has
turned his attention to all realms of life in Venezuela. His top priority is to
restore to Venezuelan citizens their political and civil rights that had been
trampled under foot. At the same time he seeks to satisfy their material needs,
enhancing their access to decision-making.
As for foreign policy, it is based on intense diplomatic activity without
precedent in Venezuela’s history. The Government has widened its potential
range of action by multiplying contacts and enhancing liaison with a view to
nurturing political dialogue and joining forces in many areas of particular
interest to Venezuela.
This drive to adopt an independent stance in the world by means of
effective, proactive diplomacy has led the country to act resolutely in all forums
and with a great variety of international players. Venezuela seeks to uphold
the self-determination of peoples and a pluralist approach to international
affairs. The aim is to achieve concrete results that will not only enhance the
country’s political status but also bring it economic, commercial, social and
cultural benefits.
I am convinced that today’s undeniably competitive and globalized
environment requires more than ever before an active, dynamic foreign policy.
It must prove capable of unfalteringly promoting national interests and at the
same time serve to unite efforts to uphold the principles and objectives deemed
to be of prime importance to the international community as a whole. These,
meanwhile, must be translated by rational, systematic procedures into sources
of fundamental values to which all humankind can ascribe. These include
maintenance of world peace, the happiness and welfare of our peoples, and
access to development and decent living standards as a key factor for securing
the former two.
In view of the foregoing and since our country is undergoing a process
of intense political and institutional change, Venezuela has drawn the attention
of the international community and its diplomatic moves have been observed
with increasing respect. The fact that our country is engaged in implementing
substantial, far-reaching transformations lends our foreign policy a legitimacy
that nourishes it with the same principles of justice, equity and participative
democracy underpinning the Government’s drive to promote Venezuela’s full
development and renewal.
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International balance
As a matter of survival, today’s world is grappling with the imperative to
overcome the model of Globalisation stemming from the worldwide projection
of neo-liberal ideals. In this context, a path is opening up for an alternative
model that is both fair and democratic. It aims to secure national and local
well-being while restoring humane spiritual values through the establishment
of solidary international co-operation. We are apparently witnessing the advent
of a time in which civil society, uncommitted to prevailing economic and
political power structures, is taking up the reins. Respect for the self-
determination of peoples, enhancement of South-South dialogue, support
for a multipolar stand in today’s world, the consolidation of Venezuela’s status
in the international arena and the exercise of economic diplomacy – all told,
these are the compass bearings of our current foreign policy.
Today, Venezuelan diplomacy is viewed with great interest and respect
throughout the world for its dynamism, adherence to the tenets of international
law, and its determination to promote a solidary, multipolar international system.
Venezuela has placed particular emphasis on its sovereignty, on integration
moves, and on attributing renewed prestige to dialogue.
Our country is beginning to reap the fruits of having sought, from the outset
of the present administration, to launch anew active, efficient diplomatic drives in
the commercial, economic and financial spheres. Moreover, it has endeavoured to
revitalise its policy concerning regional blocs, to take a bolder stance in countering
hegemonic international approaches, and to transform the internal structure of the
Foreign Office – an indispensable step for bringing about such changes.
Efficient, active overseas policy has been re-launched through a series
of international visits the President of the Republic has made to countries in
various continents. He has been accompanied on these trips by business
delegations from the public and private sectors, the aim being to improve
trade relations with the countries visited.
The results of these trips and the revival of Venezuela’s trade with friendly
neighbours can be seen in the investments now being made in the country in
other fields of hydrocarbon prospecting. Brazil has likewise increased its
investments in Venezuela, including joint construction of Line Four of the
Caracas underground and of the new bridge over the Orinoco River.
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The Venezuelan Foreign Office has been entrusted with the task of
implementing a new diplomatic strategy geographically focused on what has
been termed the four main fronts: the Atlantic, the Caribbean, the Andes and
the Amazon. The focal points for these four fronts are Guyana, Brazil,
Colombia and the Caribbean States – all neighbours and natural partners in
this undertaking.
In this framework, Venezuela and Guyana have agreed to create a High-
Level Bilateral Commission and a Bilateral Business Council, the purpose of
which is to promote new initiatives and activities for expanding, strengthening
and advancing ties between the two nations, and so overcome our border
disputes. This sea change has been signalled by President Hugo Chávez Frías’s
recent visit to Georgetown.
Besides intensifying bilateral trade, Venezuela is keen to enhance its
relations on all levels with Brazil. It has especially sought to support Brazil’s
drive to promote greater Latin American integration by bringing together the
Community of Andean Nations and Mercosur, an initiative in which Venezuela
has played a strong hand.
Our relations with Colombia, however complex they may be and however
numerous the issues involved, have become clearer, more transparent and
more respectful. They may occasionally be more emotive but this is partly
because they have become more affectionate. We have lavished the greatest
attention on all aspects of our relations with Colombia because our two
countries are historical blood brothers, inseparable neighbours and, for the
present and if for no other reason, because Colombia is our second largest
trading partner. Venezuela has made an active contribution to the restoration
of peace in Colombia putting its territory at the disposal of all the parties
involved in the present conflict in an endeavour to reach an understanding.
Besides our natural interest in the fate of a brother Bolivarian nation, Venezuela
is the country most seriously affected by the conflict in Colombia.
The new policy toward the Caribbean has been strengthened and it is in
our interest to enhance it further. It has established a position of solidary
reciprocity with Cuba, with the Association of Caribbean States, with Caricom
and with the Central American-Caribbean countries. A good example of this
policy are the supplementary agreements sealed in the field of energy, by which
Venezuela is to provide these countries with crude oil and by-products at
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211
market prices but with facilitated terms of payment, thus assuming its solidary
responsibility as a regional energy power.
With regard to the United States, we have sought to maintain a stance of
friendship and goodwill while clearly manifesting our independence and
autonomy when it comes to planning and developing our foreign policy.
Goodwill and rationality have marked our relations with the US, of considerable
historical relevance to Venezuela. This has been the tonic since the first year
of the present Government’s mandate when what was then the Congress of
the Republic approved an agreement with the United States to avoid double
taxation as a result of pressure applied by the Venezuelan Foreign Office.
To a restless generation in search of new horizons
The Venezuelan people are today experiencing moments of intense
emotion expressed by deep sentiment coming direct from the heart. Nonetheless,
all Venezuelans are aware that we must progress from feeling to action.
Such moments are ideal for focusing on the idea of a generation of men
who, in the early seventies, left school in the Venezuelan hills and headed off
in different directions along distinct paths. In our high-school days we dreamt,
loved and nurtured our conscience in preparation for the struggles that lay
ahead. Some envisaged direct political action and forms of future revolutionary
organisation of the people. Others sought in science and knowledge means
of overcoming the exclusion of the majority and forging true democratic
alternatives. They pondered on the landscape, music, the environment, nature
and man as facets of what was later to be defined as sustainability, a sine qua
non condition for the development of society.
At that time we could merely visualise the future which now unfolds
before us as a genuine hope and real expectation, precisely because we had
had the intuition and certainty that solutions to the structural crisis were indeed
feasible. As in the days of the War of Independence when many people from
the hills proved capable of immense sacrifice of fortune and lives in the cause
of freedom, our generation also devoted itself to this cause under somewhat
different circumstances. The compass bearings were education, knowledge,
science, discipline, ethical and moral principles. To this have we dedicated our
lives. We have proved capable of crossing the desert without selling out for a
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212
jug of water. My fate was voluntary exile in France for years on end, years of
banishment that kindled in me a deeper love for my people and for this
Venezuelan society among whom it is so gratifying and pleasing to live. Our
teachers at the O’Leary Lyceum helped forge our democratic convictions and
imbued us with love for work well done.
This “restless generation in search of new horizons” who, despite the
odds, managed to earn its qualifications during the period of representative
democracy, today demands and propounds Participatory, Protagonistic
Democracy for the sake of the principle of continuous improvement.
We have demonstrated that it was worthwhile insisting even when the
path ahead was fraught with difficulties. If obstacles still exist today, it is among
other things because there are those who magnify them, doing their utmost to
drive into reverse a process that is already irreversible. This is no longer the
dream of a group of stripling lads but the will of an entire nation that has
come to understand that when the bread is for everyone, all must help knead
the dough.
One should not, of course, forget to say that this “restless generation in
search of new horizons” to which I belong has always counted on the support
of parents, relatives and friends who have unflaggingly guided us. Where
material resources may have been lacking, good sense and decency were
abundant in heading us toward professional life and creative work as the sole
alternative of social ascent for people of scarce means.
I am concerned today because the Democracy that Venezuelans have
chosen to enshrine in the Bolivarian Constitution is in jeopardy. The truth is
that we are experiencing a crisis marked by a dearth of democrats in Venezuela.
Forty years of representative democracy that raised such high expectations in
Venezuelan youth have proved insufficient to forge true political parties or to
bring forth leaders devoted to overcoming the great difficulties the Venezuelan
people have had to face. Indeed, during the dire events of April 2002 we could
see among the representatives of these parties that traditionally defend
Democracy (and with such conviction!) some congressmen and leaders of the
so-called left wing applauding its death alongside fascist apprentices.
A well-known paper of the “intelligent opposition” jokingly published
on the front page of its 12
th
April edition a headline reading “Chao Huguito”
[Bye-bye little Hugo”]. Its taunt might just as well have been “Bye-bye
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Democracy,” thus vaunting its scorn for the Venezuelan people. What a
contradiction! Some of these same personalities can today be seen vehemently
attacking the Electoral Power invested in the National Electoral Council without
fear of reprisal. Therein lies the need to call upon the Venezuelan people to
see themselves reflected in the “restless generation in search of new horizons,”
to help bring into being a true opposition moved by its convictions and
democratic conscience. The motherland demands this much.
The new banner to which the “restless generation in search of new horizons”
rallies today is the defence of our Constitution. We now seek to put into practice
its core values, i.e. Sustainable Development for Venezuela. The Bolivarian Republic
has a key role to play in this venture as it did during the struggle for Independence,
mustering its human, energy and natural resources. The results of the Robinson I
& II, Ribas, Sucre, Mercal and “Barrio Adentro” missions prove that health, nutrition
and education can become the basic freedoms for forging Sustainable Development
in our country. Together with the “Vuelvan Caras” mission, they will allow us to
eradicate poverty from our midst.
The eyes of the world’s billions of poor inhabitants are turned toward
us thanks to globalisation. Many leaders of nations from both North and
South hope and trust that the methods being tested in Venezuela will prove
capable of accomplishing the objectives of the United Nations Millennium
Summit. They share with us President Hugo Chávez’s idea of setting up an
International Humanitarian Fund for effectively combating poverty. The efforts
being made by the Venezuelan people and their Government should be
publicised across the globe, and this task befalls the Foreign Office of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. As President Chávez has stated, I too believe
that in Venezuela we have chosen the toughest solution, which consists in
increasing Democracy and reducing poverty. We are sure, nonetheless, that we
can and shall achieve this goal.
The Food & Agriculture Organisation was created to eradicate hunger.
Yet despite the technological advances, despite the great potential we are
afforded, the fact is that hunger has spread in the world. Brazil’s President
Lula is currently leading a Zero Hunger campaign. President Chávez is in full
agreement that hunger must be abolished. However, he takes a much more
systemic, holistic view of hunger: hunger is poverty by another name. It is my
firm belief that man does not live by bread alone, as the saying goes and many
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people reiterate. We also need to know how to read and write, we need good
health, we need land to till, we need culture, and so forth.
Here in Venezuela we are working methodically to meet the targets set
by the Heads of State at the United Nations Millennium Summit. These include
reducing hunger in the world by half by the year 2015 and in each sector
halving the number of people denied access to drinking water, among other
things. The Unesco Dakar accords, which envisage quality education for all,
are being fulfilled in Venezuela thanks to the broad range of social Missions
the Government is implementing.
Sustainable Development to eradicate poverty
At the Johannesburg Summit in September 2002 Heads of State and
Government from the entire world agreed on the urgent need to concentrate
mankind’s efforts on the struggle against all forms of poverty. In his speech
President Jacques Chirac, in particular, pathetically caught the world’s attention
by saying that “our house is on fire and we are looking the other way.” He
insisted that “the persistence of poverty among the masses is a scandal and an
aberration.” At the same time, the French President proposed an increase in
public aid for Sustainable Development, arguing that it was insufficient and
concluding that there was a need for “a solidary levy on the considerable
wealth produced by globalisation.”
For his part, President Hugo Chávez reaffirmed that the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela follows the path and takes up the banner of Sustainable
Development. Moreover, pursuant to his stance in Monterrey and in New
York, the Venezuelan President reiterated his proposal for “the creation of an
International Humanitarian Fund”: “... a rigorously compulsory Humanitarian
Fund into which we should pay 10% of the world’s military spending or, for
example, 10% of the foreign debt that the world’s poorest nations pay to the
developed world... An International Humanitarian Fund to which a percentage
of the vast capital derived from drug-trafficking and corruption could be
allocated or channelled...” Finally, in January 2004, at the Monterrey Summit
of American States, President Chávez once again insisted on the need to
institute an International Humanitarian Fund to eradicate poverty on the
American Continent. Meanwhile, in his New Year’s message before the
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215
diplomatic corps accredited in Paris, President Chirac announced that in the
second quarter of this year he will present the conclusions reached by a group
of highly-qualified experts appointed to seek new sources of international
financing, particularly vis-à-vis the idea of a duty to be levied on international
capital flows. It is a great satisfaction to note that Presidents Chirac and Chávez
share the same concerns regarding Sustainable Development and the need for
urgent, unwavering combat to wipe poverty from the face of the Earth.
The diplomatic policy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela should
thus be consonant with all the social programmes being implemented in our
country today within the framework of sustainable development.
Indeed, at the last Earth Summit held in Johannesburg, it became evident
that virtually no progress had been made concerning the targets and commitments
to which the participants had subscribed. On the contrary, the scenario had
worsened. In referring to the Millennium Summit, experts now concur that,
despite all the efforts countries are making to eradicate poverty, they will not be
able to achieve the objectives according to the schedule originally set.
The main concern of both Rio92 and the Millennium Summit was
humankind and the fight against poverty. This explains why Venezuela has
been focusing on the social plans and programmes mentioned above. They
constitute methodological experiments in the fight against poverty and a means
of attaining the objectives set at these Summits.
Our country has become a centre for trials and experimentation in the
fight against poverty and, in this capacity, has attracted international attention
because the world is anxious to learn about Venezuela’s experience in this
field. The general belief is that poverty is a fatality and hence nothing can be
done to eradicate it. In Venezuela, on the contrary, we are working with concrete
plans to combat poverty.
The diplomatic service of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has
thus been called upon to use its embassies, consulates and diplomatic
representation offices to divulge the progress being made and also to seek co-
operation and information about similar undertakings in other countries in
the fight against poverty. Besides publicising this action, our ambassadors are
active in gathering information and seeking to establish bilateral and multilateral
co-operation projects to supplement the work being carried out in our country.
We are in search of co-operation for enhanced citizens’ participation, new
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technologies for sustainable agriculture, instances of private enterprise and
the business sector helping to create jobs, etc. We are interested in programmes
that may support the work already under way to combat poverty.
Sustainable Development will lead to the eradication of poverty. Sustainable
Development, however, also implies a bilateral and multilateral agenda on the
environment including a search for projects for dealing with social problems,
new techniques for obtaining drinking water, climate change, international
regulations for treating environmental problems as global concerns.
As megadiverse, energy-producing countries, we have added
environmental responsibilities that we can share in international forums such
as OPEC. It would, for instance, be convenient to examine the environmental
liability bequeathed by the oil industry. We might ask ourselves what should
be done to comply with the principle of internationalising environmental costs
and to apply the principle that “those contaminating the environment must
pay.” This is one of the tenets of Sustainable Development.
Another founding principle of Sustainable Development that we are
putting into practice by involving indigenous communities in the country’s
development is the management of natural resources and parks, in addition to
promoting the active participation of women and young people.
Venezuela is a signatory of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. Ours is a peace-loving country, all the more so as war is the negation
of Sustainable Development.
Democracy is the very essence of Sustainable Development and the
latter is inscribed in the Bolivarian Constitution. This explains the great effort
we are making to buttress our institutions. The aim is to mould responsible
individuals capable of providing the country with alternatives and seeking
solutions within the framework of democracy while upholding the laws and
the Constitution.
What we are currently undertaking in Venezuela is basically designed to
meet the targets established by the United Nations. Our concern is that these
purposes cannot be accomplished merely by fine official discourse. What is
required is political will, and our government has consistently expressed that
will in international forums. Its unfaltering political will has been translated
into plans, programmes and the social Missions currently in progress.
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The will of the Venezuelan Government has likewise expressed itself
first and foremost by the enhancement of Democracy and secondly by the
increased budget resources for implementing these social support programmes
while engaging the population as stakeholders of their own future.
The fight against poverty does not depend solely on governments but
should also include the participation of the population. People must be
encouraged to seek solutions to their own problems and, at the same time,
private enterprise should be persuaded to take part.
We have come to a point at which it is plainly apparent that the growth
of developed or underdeveloped countries is not in itself sufficient to provide
welfare for the majority. At the same time, we know that the economic
integration looming on the horizon, the main purpose of which is to integrate
markets, necessarily accentuates competition among nations. This holds true
for labour, facilities to be tendered to corporations in order to convince them
to invest, inducement to tax exemption, and the temptation to disparage
workers’ social rights. This is will kindle cut-throat competition and set us on
the slippery path that leads to low wages, flimsy social protection, child labour
and a general worsening of working conditions. That is the precise opposite
of Sustainable Development. It is what would occur with the onset of the
integration of markets, in which attention is focused on the market.
Venezuela, on the other hand, proposes the integration of peoples through
the medium of culture, through exchange of information and the establishment
of direct contact among the peoples of the world. Only then may integration
create the conditions required to put a human face on globalisation.
The time is ripe for this, considering that the United Nations are due to
discuss the Convention on Cultural Diversity under the auspices of Unesco in
2005. In this context, culture and peoples will not merely be on the receiving
end of the integration of markets.
Education, Health and Nutrition as basic freedoms
underpinning Sustainable Development in Venezuela
The President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez,
holds that the most effective way of eradicating poverty as a sine qua non
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condition for Sustainable Development is to grant “power to the people.”
Indeed, throughout 2003, after successfully facing down antidemocratic
attempts to destabilise the country in February and despite the considerable
economic losses they provoked, the Venezuelan Government forged ahead
with concrete steps to devolve “power to the people” by means of Education,
Health and Nutrition. This was the origin of the Robinson Mission entrusted
to the Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports. The purpose of the Mission
is to eradicate the high level of illiteracy that persists in our country and to
enable more than one million Venezuelans to complete primary education.
This was soon followed by the Ribas Mission placed in the hands of the Ministry
of Mines & Energy. This mission is designed to help hundreds of thousands
of young Venezuelans, who have been prevented from doing so for one reason
or another, to finish secondary schooling. Finally, the Ministry of Higher
Education has implemented the Sucre Mission and founded the Bolivarian
University so as to provide more than half a million high school students with
an opportunity to further their studies and obtain a university degree.
With regard to Health and Nutrition, President Chávez’s Government
has implemented the “Barrio Adentro” Plan and the Mercal Mission jointly
entrusted to the Ministry of Health & Social Development, the Ministry of
Agriculture & Land, and the Defence Ministry. The prime objective of the
former is to improve living conditions among the poorest segments of the
population living in shantytowns on the outskirts of Venezuela’s big cities.
The Plan consists in providing integral free assistance in terms of health and
education through the involvement of organised communities and with the
help of specialised medical teams. In tandem with this initiative, the
Government is establishing a public health network based on health centres
and community clinics. The Mercal Mission, meanwhile, is designed to improve
nutritional standards in the country, the aim being to set up a logistic system
for the purchase, transportation, storage, distribution and sale of foodstuffs
and basic general medications. The food and medicine are to be sold below
market prices, thus allowing millions of underprivileged Venezuelans to exercise
their right to health.
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Antonio Berni
First Steps
Alberto G. Bellucci
*
Berni painted Primeros Pasos [First Steps] in 1937, the year in which Picasso
produced Guernica. The association is arbitrary but deliberate. It is not simply
that two such masterpieces were born simultaneously during the long
trajectories of these two modern masters. More importantly, it is because
Antonio Berni (1905-1981) surely stands to Argentine painting as Pablo Picasso
*
Director of the Buenos Aires Fine Arts and Decorative Art Museums of the Argentine Republic
Antonio Berni – First Steps
220 DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
220
does to European art. They were unique artists marked by their ethical and
aesthetic restlessness. Both were leftwing militants of a frequently Utopian
bent, exuberantly creative, avid to explore fully the plastic potential of figurative
art and denounce the glaring scourges of twentieth-century society: in Picasso’s
case, the cruelty of war; in Berni’s social exclusion and urban injustices.
After spending five years in Madrid and Paris on a scholarship, Berni
returned to Argentina in 1930. He was 25 years old and recently married to
Paule Cazenave, a sculpture student whose acquaintance he had made in France.
By then, he was also the doting father of Elena, whom they affectionately
called Lily. Mother and daughter were to feature prominently in many of his
paintings in the late thirties and early forties. These include Primeros Pasos,
Paule y Lily [Paule and Lily] (1941) and Lily (1943), pointedly classical works
denoting a “return to order.” Stylistically speaking, they take us back to the
pre-Renaissance period and, more recently, to Italian metaphysical painting. It
is curious, though explicable, that these family portraits set in serene, tranquil,
congealed-looking surroundings should come hot on the heels of the searing,
convulsive, overwrought expressionism Berni had employed to jolt society
into awareness of the dire effects of the Depression and subsequent mass
unemployment (Manifestación [Protest march] and Desocupados [Idle workers] in
1934; Medianoche en el mundo [Midnight in the world], 1936-37). As shown above,
however, there were many Bernis in Berni, just as there were many Picassos in
Picasso.
Let us return to Primeros Pasos and allow ourselves to linger there, enjoying
its pervasive serenity. The painter simultaneously captures not only the precise
features of wife and daughter (Berni was an accomplished portrait artist, a
form of expression he never abandoned) but also the protoptypical universality
of their demeanour, capable of being extended to many others and even to
mankind as a whole. This is one of the secrets that make such a deep impression
on keen observers, definitively producing a profound change in the way we
grasp a representation that, at first glance, seems obvious. The hieratic postures
of both the dancing girl, half suspended in mid-air, and the pensive mother
who has set her sewing to one side are one with the immobility of the patently
scenic architecture and background landscape. The aura is redolent of
fourteenth-century Italian masters. The folds in the fabric draped over the
sewing table and the bunched curtain (a continuation of the young dancer’s
blouse) have the same frozen, immobile presence, forever fixed exactly as the
DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY & POLITICS - OCTOBER/DECEMBER 2004
Alberto G. Bellucci
221
painter’s eye caught them. A deep calm envelops the entire ensemble. But if
you look closely, you can detect sentiments throbbing: re-distilled illusion in
the daughter, absorption in her own recollections in the mother. These delicate
vibrations flow from the two figures at the sides into the central plane of the
picture, which just happens to coincide with one upright of the wide-open
doors. The vertical white line marks the axis of a virtual diptych, each leaf
representing a phase of womanhood. The uninhibited zest of adolescence
played off against the resignation of the woman who has seen – and continues
to see – such illusions all too fleetingly vanish.
In this magnificent opus, Berni unleashes a whole world of possible
remembrance. It comprises a range of memories sweeping from the ranked
pinnacles of western figurative realism to the far frontier of precise
geometrification, beginning with psychological characterisation. Objectivity
and subjectivity, quietude and exultation, line and colour mingle in a
reciprocating association. In shot, what we witness here is a subtle, intimate
dialogue in which the spectator is invited to join – to in order to complete it.
Primeros Pasos [First Steps] was exhibited at the XXX National Fine Arts
Salon in 1940, being awarded first prize, and was immediately incorporated
into the collection of Argentina’s National Fine Arts Museum. Just five years
earlier the National Salon had turned down Desocupados. This monumental
tempera on sackcloth painting by Berni is now on display in the Buenos Aires
Latin American Art Museum (Malba), a few blocks from the National Fine
Arts Museum. What a fitting image of how triumphs live side-by-side with
failures in artists’ careers. It is equally expressive of the generally short span it
takes for history to restore the balance required for judicious, mature
appreciation.
Version: Mark Ridd.
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