undeveloped. This means that if one of them had been called upon to explain what he understood
the self to be, he would have given what we would now call a vague and insufficient reply. He would
have pointed to some fluid and subtle physical agent, saying that the self or mind was like that. He
would not have distinguished between mind and matter. But he would still have been personally
self-conscious. He would have distinguished between himself and things, and between himself and
other selves. His limitation would have been that he could not mean by the self what later thinkers
could mean; he could not interpret it as they did. When he talked about self, describing the fact of
his own self-consciousness, it would have been in terms showing that his thought on the subject
was crude and lacking in essential distinctions.
It will be of interest to define our topic in this way; for when we consider that it is the human self that
each of the great thinkers sought to understand and interpret to his fellows, we see that their
attempts, taken in their succession, will show the progressive development of what we may call
racial or social self-consciousness. [p. 4] They will show, each in turn, the type of thought about the
self which is fixed in a society or race as its understanding of its own nature and faculties. A
distinction must be made, indeed, when we interpret human institutions, between those customs,
rights, etc., which are spontaneous, due to gregariousness, natural imitation, tradition, etc., and
those which are due to deliberate co-operation, thought, interpretation of nature and man. These
latter reflect directly the way individual men are at the time thinking about and interpreting the self,
one another, nature, God. The history of religion, for example, is a history, just as that of psychology
is, of the ways in which men have interpreted self-conscious beings-in this case super-human
spirits: God, or the gods-and religious institutions vary with these interpretations. The deity cannot
be thought of as more refined or more moral than the interpretation of the self at the time will allow.
If the self consists of "thin vapour," then God as a self must be thin vapour also. The social
interpretation shown in institutions follows upon that of the individual thinker; it cannot anticipate the
latter nor can it surpass it.
Our history, then, becomes valuable as showing the stages in the evolution of racial self-
consciousness. All along we find that social life -- religion, politics, art -- reflects the stages reached
in the development of the knowledge of self; it shows the social uses made of this knowledge.
An analogy is current between racial evolution and individual development; we hear of the
"childhood" of the race, and of its growth from childhood to mature manhood. We now see that there
is more in this than mere analogy or a popular figure of speech. [p. 5] When men are thinking of
themselves simply or "childishly," and are building upon such thoughts institutions of like simple and
childish character, then there is a real childhood of the race. And when, with the development of
finer thoughts and interpretations of personality, institutions and racial things in general grow more
complex and refined, then we may say, in more than a figure, that the race is growing up into
maturity. It suggests itself, indeed, that in social evolution we may see a re-statement of the great
stages of individual development; that individual thought may show stages which recapitulate those
of racial evolution -- a parallel similar to the "recapitulation" recognised by biologists in the evolution
of organisms. The individual's development in consciousness of self recapitulates, we should then
say, the evolution of self-conscious reflection in the human race.
Such a problem becomes complicated when we deal, as we do in the history of psychology, with the
development of reflective self-consciousness; for we are not writing a history of human institutions,
but of a human science and its effect on institutions. To get any advantage from such a principle, we
should have to discover that the racial stages in the interpretation of the self, culminating in the
scientific and philosophical interpretation, have been unrolled "concurrently," or in the same serial
order, with the stages of development of individual self-consciousness.
Put in this way, the problem becomes for our purposes the following: Do the racial ways of thinking
of the self, seen in the theory or science of the mind known as psychology, show results of a
progressive character which are in nature similar to those reached by individual thought?-and this
despite the fact that [p. 6] these racial thoughts occur in the minds of single men, who are
themselves full-grown and reflective? That is, to put the question concretely, why do we find Thales,
himself adult and reflective in thinking about the self, to represent so simple and crude a stage of
racial interpretation? -- and what is the rule of progress in succeeding epochs, whereby later
representative thinkers achieve higher and more refined results? Is it the same rule of progress as
that shown by the individual's growth from crude to mature self-consciousness?